840.20/12–2248
Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, December 22, 1948, 3 p. m.
Before discussion began on the Working Group’s report,1 Sir Oliver Franks said that he would very much like to get something to his Government before Christmas. He suggested that as the preamble had not been discussed, and as it would greatly influence those who might see it, consideration of it should be reserved. He also suggested that if the representatives would state their positions on the relatively few points on which there was a difference of opinion, it would be of help in referring back to governments.
M. Bonnet said that he hoped the draft pact could be improved so that it could become a model of a regional pact within the framework of the United Nations. He said the pact should have not only an immediate purpose but also should prepare for the future by contributing to the organization of peace, security and the better functioning of the United Nations.
Sir Oliver Franks suggested that the preamble should be so written as to strike the popular imagination. It should be in simple [Page 325] words and should set forth the purposes of the pact in a manner which would appeal to people both inside and outside the participating countries.
Mr. Lovett remarked that the progress made had advanced the timetable he had contemplated by about a week. He said that the United States Working Group had consulted nobody outside the Department of State, so that it would have to go through the same process of consultation as the Ambassadors. To take political soundings he would need to have fairly firm conclusions. He agreed with the opinions already expressed as to the importance of the preamble and said that its language must be easily understood and must set the tone of the pact. If the pact appeared merely to be aimed at the Soviet Union, it would lose a great deal of its moral strength which would be a primary factor in getting it accepted in the United States.
Mr. Wrong said that the form (not the content) of some of the articles would be influenced by the form of the preamble. He thought that the use of the phrase “High Contracting Parties” throughout the treaty would be a mistake. He thought the language should be simple.
M. Le Gallais said he had no remarks to make at this stage.
Baron Silvercruys concurred in the expressions of opinion which had been heard concerning the method of procedure and the order of discussion.
Mr. Van Kleffens concurred with Sir Oliver Franks’ remarks about the preamble and thought that a modern Jefferson had to be sought to formulate the ideas underlying the North Atlantic Pact in appealing language like that of the Declaration of Independence.
Mr. Lovett suggested that the meeting should consider the difficult points relating to the area to be covered, the inclusion of Italy, and the nature of the assurances to be given to countries not signatories to the pact.
M. Bonnet agreed to this suggestion and asked that after the hard questions had been discussed consideration be given to the way to approach the various countries, as he would have some remarks to make about Sweden at the appropriate time.
Mr. Lovett suggested that the meeting begin to discuss the area to be covered by the pact which would be one of the major problems affecting ratification by the United States Senate.
M. Bonnet, in reference to the problem of the inclusion of North Africa, said that it would be extremely difficult for France to leave a part of its metropolitan territory out of the area. Algeria was a part of France and in the same relation to France as Alaska or Florida to the United States. He did not think that the arguments against including [Page 326] North Africa were very weighty. He thought that alternative “B” of the draft of Article 5, paragraph 2, should afford a suitable basis for a meeting of minds if one or two small alterations were made to ensure that Florida and other parts of the United States were included. He did not think that it was advisable to move the southern boundary of the area from 30° north, south to the Tropic of Cancer.
Sir Oliver Franks said that his government had been thinking of the inclusion of all Africa north of latitude 30° north. The British Government sympathized with the French position; thus, while the British Government would probably not wish to continue to press for the inclusion of all of Africa north of 30° it would want the part west of Libya. The British position was not rigid.
Mr. Lovett thought the matter of the area to be covered was one of the controlling elements in the entire project. He could not yet speak with any certainty as to the limits to which the Congress might go, but he thought that it would be a mistake to try to expand the area beyond the basic limits of the homelands. He thought that if the area included North Africa it would become impossible to draw a logical line anywhere and the problem of countries like Turkey and Iran would become more involved.
M. Bonnet said that the area covered by alternative “B” was only the territory occupied by the population or the armed forces of the signatories. The signatories would have no direct responsibilities in Greece or Turkey.
Mr. Lovett was concerned with what the Congress would accept. It would be better to avoid trying to include too wide an area in the pact in the interest of getting the main project approved by the Congress. The proposed provisions for consultation could always be relied upon to cover wide areas. There were areas in Africa north of latitude 30° north whose security was of great concern to the nations represented. The U.S. would reserve its position on the area to be covered since the discussion was concerned with concepts not dealt with previously. The Vandenberg Resolution had contemplated a tight regional pact and the State Department did not now want to seem to be undertaking a larger obligation.
M. Bonnet said that the State Department’s difficulties with Congress would be paralleled by those of the French Government if Algeria were left out and the North Pole were included.
Mr. Lovett remarked that the basic concept in the State Department had been that of a relationship with the signatories of the Brussels Pact; North Africa had not been included in the Brussels Treaty.
M. Bonnet said that the original concept had been greatly expanded [Page 327] by the inclusion of the northern territories of Canada, Alaska and possibly Norway and Denmark.
Mr. Lovett said that the need to bring in the stepping stone countries had been fully explored earlier. The fact that North Africa was not included in the Brussels Pact appeared to indicate that in the security system of Western Europe it had been considered and found to be not of cardinal importance. He said that in order to get an accurate answer about the inclusion of North Africa it would be necessary to discuss the question with Congressional leaders and military advisers.
M. Bonnet remarked that the basic concept of the Brussels Pact was protection against Germany. The North Atlantic Pact had a different purpose.
Mr. Lovett said he understood the Brussels Pact would be effective against any aggression, not merely against aggression from Germany and also that the North Atlantic Pact would operate against German aggression if necessary. The more the North Atlantic Pact was confined to North America, Europe and the stepping stone countries between them, the better was the chance of securing ratification from Congress.
Mr. Wrong said he had no specific instructions about North Africa but was sure that it would be a surprise to the Canadian Government to suggest that a considerable stretch of North Africa facing the Mediterranean should be included, because the assumption was that the same limits were being used for the European parties as in the Brussels Pact. He thought the issue depended, to a considerable extent, on what was done about Italy. Canada did not think Italy should be a full partner in the North Atlantic Pact, but if that country should nevertheless become one, there would be a good case on geographical grounds for including the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. He hoped, however, that the European commitments could be limited to countries bordering on the North Atlantic.
M. Le Gallais said that he would abstain.
Baron Silvercruys remarked that the question of the geographical scope was debated to a certain extent in London by the Permanent Commission, and that the Belgian Government made it clear at that time that in their opinion it was preferable to limit the area to European territory proper, without extending it further to the South. He recalled, in this connection, Article 4 of the Brussels Pact. Although the conception of the security arrangements in Europe was wider now than when the Brussels Pact was signed, the objective of the discussions was essentially a North Atlantic Pact. By going further afield into the territories mentioned, the parties would be drawn into considering [Page 328] security arrangements in the Mediterranean that would come close to raising the whole problem of the Mediterranean zone. He recognized that this was an important problem to which a solution might well be sought but he could not see how it could be arrived at under the scope of North Atlantic security discussions and in a North Atlantic security arrangement.
Furthermore, it had been agreed that certain Governments should be invited to become members of the Pact. When some of these Governments were approached, and particularly Norway or Denmark or possibly Ireland, it would be doubtful whether an extension of the area so far afield would be a fillip to their participation. These governments might hesitate or even be reluctant to extend too far the considerable obligations assumed under the Pact. For these reasons he thought his Government would definitely prefer the Alternative A of the draft Article 5, paragraph 2.
Mr. Van Kleffens pointed out that the Netherlands had considerable sympathy for the position of France. On the other hand, he felt bound to observe that any conflict in view of which this Treaty negotiated would be of a global nature; hardly any region in the world would stay out of such a global conflict. The group should constitute a strong, well-knit defense unit, powerful enough to act as a deterrent to or eventually as an instrument against aggression. Inclusion of too many regions, however important, which could become involved in a global war would only tend to weaken such a unit.
Inclusion of Morocco or Tunis in the pact would in his personal opinion necessarily entail the inclusion of Italy, and might raise grave difficulties with regard to Greece and Turkey, and also raise the question whether such a strategically important area as the eastern shores of the Mediterranean—pipeline-terminal—should not also be included.
He wandered, whether all this was not leading too far. The position of the Netherlands was not rigid; it had a distinct preference for sensible limitation, but if the majority thought it wise to include North Africa, the Netherlands would not oppose it.
Mr. Lovett said that there had been repeated approaches from Turkey and Greece, especially Turkey, and also from the Union of South Africa. This was an example of the sort of problem encountered once the pact got beyond a definite area. To get into Africa would open up a limitless field.
Mr. Van Kleffens said that the countries Mr. Lovett has just named would at least come under the consultative clauses of the pact.
M. Bonnet agreed that the protection of the northern stepping stones was important, but asked whether the southern route was not of the same importance. It would be unwise to over-extend the area [Page 329] to the north and restrict it dangerously to the south. If Italy and the northern coast of West Africa were excluded from the pact, the area in Europe would be very much open from one side.
Mr. Lovett thought the distinction was that the areas in North Africa were under the control of one of the parties to the pact, whereas the northern stepping stones were under the control of countries which were not as yet parties. He suggested that those present should refer the matter to their governments, and that the meeting consider the Italian problem. He thought that the discussion should be based on the premise that North Africa would not be included in the area.
M. Bonnet endorsed all the arguments in favor of the inclusion of Italy which appeared in the First Report of the working group.2 Dealing with the arguments against the inclusion of Italy, he conceded that Italy was not a North Atlantic power but stressed that it belonged to the North Atlantic security area. He thought that military advisors would agree that defences should be established on the central Alps of northern Italy and on the plains of the Po. The argument based on the limitation of Italian armaments in the peace treaty was not serious, as precautions could be taken to ensure that Italy conformed to the treaty. Other countries would not be able to use the inclusion of Italy as a basis for arguing for their own inclusion because of the territorial contiguity of Italy with the other nations participating in the pact. The problem could not be dismissed by saying that a Mediterranean Pact could be concluded later. He thought that the basic criterion was to secure the greatest efficiency for the North Atlantic Pact; such efficiency would be lacking if Italy were not included.
Sir Oliver Franks said that the United Kingdom on the whole was against the inclusion of Italy both because of Italy’s distance from the Atlantic and because of doubt as to its ability to bring any real military strength to the association. If trouble started, any area in the world would be looked after if it was important strategically. He therefore did not think that the argument based on Italy’s strategic importance was necessarily an argument in favor of its inclusion in the Pact. He did think, however, that the case of Italy was a special one because, like Greece and Turkey, Italy had been closely associated with the effort during the last year or two to build up positions of democratic strength in the world. It was his view that Italy, Greece and Turkey should be dealt with in a way which would associate them with the Pact and keep them from feeling left out. One way in which this could be done would be by a protocol which would give assurances by the signatory countries.
[Page 330]Mr. Lovett said that the United States had no firm position at the present time. The view that United States would take of the importance of Italy for the North Atlantic Pact would probably depend on the view of the signatories of the Brussels Pact towards Italy’s inclusion in that pact. Whatever the outcome, he did not think that Italy could be left without some sort of protection. He would not attempt to suggest a solution.
Mr. Wrong thought the Canadian Government would agree with the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada had doubts about the advisability of including Italy as a full partner on geographical and military grounds. While Canada did not like the idea of limited partnership for certain countries, Italy was admittedly a special case. Possibly a special agreement could be concluded, shortly after the present pact, at least to assure the Italian people of the good intentions of the Atlantic Pact countries and to encourage Italy to associate herself with the Western Powers.
M. Le Gallais said that the Luxembourg Government considered that something should be done for Italy in the best form that could be agreed upon.
Baron Silvercruys recalled that the inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Pact was a matter over which there had been a great deal of hesitation for some time. The position likely to be taken by the Italian Government in the matter was still uncertain. To the best of the information available it was not even known whether the Italian Government wanted to participate in a North Atlantic Pact. One thing was definite and did not leave room for any argumentation: up to now Italy had refrained from seeking admission to the Brussels Pact; it had thought it best not to depart from a certain policy of aloofness. This was the reason why the working group had suggested seeking clarification as to the opinion of the Italian Government before a decision was registered.
But there was another point to be taken into account. In the event that an invitation were extended to Italy to become a full member of the Atlantic Pact, the question might be asked whether certain problems would not be linked by Italy to her readiness to consider the invitation favorably. A nation restricted by the peace treaty, when the fate of its colonial empire has not yet been decided, might easily be induced to follow such a course. What would be the result? Exchange of views would take place, discussion would be started, formulas would be considered, solutions would perhaps be sought, and a great deal of time would elapse.
As Mr. Lovett said a few days ago, time and urgency were of paramount importance. Should the Governments concerned become [Page 331] involved in delicate and intricate negotiations on far-reaching matters, having no direct relations with the North Atlantic security, they might be faced with complications that would retard the speedy conclusion of the Pact.
A third point could be made, which he had raised previously when talking about North Africa, namely that the inclusion of Italy in the pact might not be regarded favorably by certain nations like Norway, Ireland and Denmark.
The inclusion of Italy would have repercussions, in other capitals, namely Athens and Ankara. Although he would not attempt to gauge the sentiment that would prevail in those capitals, should it be known that Italy was being taken into the Pact, while Greece and Turkey were being kept out—in spite of certain definite overtures which they had already made—he was sure that their reaction was foremost in the minds of the Governments that were to be parties to this Pact.
His Government has been somewhat reluctant to consider favorably the admission of Italy, although it had never formally opposed it. It merely doubted whether there would be military advantage in having Italy in the Pact.
It had been suggested that some sort of protocol could be attached to the treaty in order to cover the problem of Italy, Turkey and possibly Greece and Iran. He did not see why the Northern part of Africa could not be mentioned too. These were adjacent and strategic areas and they might well be covered by a declaration of the signatories to the effect that, while they were signing the Pact, they were equally and vitally interested in the preservation of peace everywhere and especially in these regions whose security remained a matter of vital concern to them all.
Having made clear this position, he wished to say that on behalf of his Government he had nevertheless expressed its willingness to accept Italy’s participation in the Pact if it were so desired by the other Governments. This acceptance, however, was conditional upon the assurance that the obligations to be assumed under the Pact would not be extended further afield. Should Italy’s participation lead to the inclusion in the area covered by the treaty of territories not situated in the North American, North Atlantic and Western European regions, he would have to reserve the position of his Government.
Mr. Van Kleffens wished to make a distinction between countries whose participation would add to the strength of the Pact, and countries which were important to the Western World. Italy undoubtedly belonged to the second group but it was doubtful whether it also belonged to the first group. On the other hand, he agreed with M. Le Gallais that something must be done to keep Italy turned towards the [Page 332] Western Powers. This did not necessarily mean that Italy should be a full partner but that Italy might, like Greece, Turkey, Syria and North Africa, be told that should it ever be subject to attack, the consultative provisions of the present treaty would at once apply. All these countries should also be told that the extent to which they identified themselves with the western world would naturally influence the deliberations under the consultative clause.
Mr. Hickerson thought that, in the earlier meetings, it had been decided that the best thing was to have only one type of membership in the pact and to provide for special situations in the specialized bodies set up under the pact. The Italian Ambassador had tried frequently to get an invitation for Italy to participate. This seemed to indicate that Italy was genuinely interested in membership.
M. Le Gallais raised the question whether the duration of the Pact—for 20 or for 40 years—could have any influence on Soviet foreign policy. He expressed the view that it was all-important that the Soviet Union should know now what our line of action is going to be, for instance for the next 20 years; however, what it will be at the end of that time could perhaps be made known later on. This policy could create some doubts on the Russian side and eventually strengthen the position of those members of the Politburo who might be opposed to war.
Mr. Lovett referred the question to Mr. Kennan who said that he would prefer to give an answer at a later date.