Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/12–1348

Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, December 13, 1948, 2:30 p. m.

Washington, December 13, 1948, 2:30 p.m.

top secret

Mr. Wrong gave the following general outline of the views of the Canadian Government.

The discussion, Mr. Wrong considered, fell into two parts: one of them—largely a job for the Working Party¹—was the study of the annex² to the Washington paper in the light of the views of the Permanent Commission. The Canadian Government would wish to make various suggestions in the Working Party about the text and substance of certain articles. The other part of the discussion, which did not arise in connection with the wording of the treaty, concerned several general problems. The first of these was the problem of which countries should be invited to participate, at what stage, and in what way.

The Canadian Government had stated early in October that they were prepared to join a treaty on the general lines of the annex to the Washington paper.³ Mr. Wrong said that the Canadian Government would like to see the commitment clause in the treaty made as definite as possible, which probably meant as close as possible to the formula used in the Brussels Treaty. This was desirable both in order to achieve as exact a definition as possible of the nature of the obligation and in order to prevent the Soviet countries from belittling the importance of the undertaking in the Pact.

In relation to the area to be covered, the Canadian Government considered that no direct obligation should be incurred under the treaty except in respect of an attack upon one of the participants. There should, if possible, be no guarantee without reciprocity. It was recognized, however, that in certain cases it might be necessary to give certain limited or conditional promises of assistance, but that could not be settled until it was known who the participating countries would be.

The Canadian Government, Mr. Wrong continued, would like the original members of the North Atlantic Pact to include Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Ireland, and wished every effort to be made to persuade these countries to join as full members. Italy, they recognized, raised special problems requiring further discussion; the Canadian Government had no pat solution to offer for Italy.

The Canadian Government continued to attach a good deal of importance to including in the treaty some general provision which would encourage economic and social collaboration between the members. Mr. Wrong noted with some regret that the Permanent Commission had not favored the inclusion in the treaty of an article to this effect. The Canadian Government did not wish to advocate the establishment of new agencies in this field between the North Atlantic countries, but they did believe that the Treaty should be something more than a defense treaty or a defensive military alliance. The idea of the treaty was based on a community of principles and ideas, and the Canadian Government wished this to be recognized in the body of the treaty rather than only by a phrase in the preamble. The proposals made in the third article of the annex of the Washington paper would meet the Canadian views. Mr. Wrong said that recent experience had shown that if the resources of different countries in war are to be pooled, it is necessary to have close collaboration between the economic systems of the countries concerned. From the point of view of defense alone, therefore, he thought the treaty should encourage, in explicit terms, economic collaboration.

The Canadian Government believed that a political organ should be established under the Treaty as under the Brussels Treaty. A “Defense Organization”, as proposed by the Permanent Commission, was not in itself sufficient. The proposed treaty contemplated consultation between the parties in the event of a threat to peace anywhere in the world. This would be a matter more for Foreign Ministers or their representatives than for Defense Ministers or Chiefs of Staff. There should therefore be, as the senior agency under the treaty, some sort of council on a ministerial level made up of Foreign Ministers or their deputed representatives. This council would have the task of creating any other agencies necessary to give effect to the treaty.

Mr. Wrong urged that the treaty should be drafted in such simple and direct language as would be intelligible to people everywhere.

Finally, Mr. Wrong suggested that a target date should be set for the final signature of the treaty. This might encourage governments to deal promptly with questions referred to them. He asked if the end of January would be a suitable date.

Baron Silvercruys said that the Brussels Powers and the Canadian Government had given their views on the Pact. It would be helpful to have the attitude of the US Government. Could this be given?

Mr. Lovett answered that from the American point of view, it was desirable that the Pact be completed as rapidly as possible. If there was a drift and a failure to settle upon a target date, the driving force of the new Congress and the favorable tide of opinion might be lost. We should aim at concluding a treaty by the First of February.

American participation in a Pact of this kind would represent a material departure from traditional American policy. The only precedent was the Rio Treaty, which fell into the special category of inter-American agreements. It was essential that the Treaty should define exactly the obligation undertaken by the signatory countries. He thought it would be necessary to include in the body of the treaty, as well as in the preamble, a reference to “constitutional processes” if Congressional opinion were to be satisfied.

Mr. Lovett said it would also be necessary to emphasize in the text that the treaty was concluded in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The Vandenberg Resolution had stressed the connection between the United Nations and pacts of this kind. Moreover, there were powerful organizations in the United States which thought that international associations should be formed on a global rather than on a regional basis. The way to counter them was to rub in the blanket authority given by the Charter to regional pacts.

Mr. Lovett indicated he thought it would be unfortunate if the Pact were to emphasize the military aspect alone. He thought it should cover a wider range both from the point of view of its practical value and in order to make the treaty more acceptable to the American Congress. Furthermore, if the treaty were to appeal to American opinion, membership should not be confined to the seven countries now represented at the talks. From the point of view of the Western Atlantic powers, the desirability of an association limited to these seven governments would be materially less, if it existed at all. Mr. Lovett hoped there was no doubt in anyone’s mind about the earnestness with which the United States Government was approaching this subject. In all circles, legislative and administrative, there was every indication of a readiness and desire to proceed promptly. Nevertheless, there was a general feeling that the treaty must offer something which would be of benefit to the United States and the advantages of which could easily be recognized by American opinion.

Mr. Van Kleffens shared the opinion of Mr. Wrong: that two sets of questions had to be studied. The first set was related to the actual drafting of the provisions of the treaty; the other set was of a more general nature and included such very delicate problems as the security area, the duration of the treaty, the participation of other countries, and the method of negotiation with these countries.

His personal preference—he had received no instructions from the Netherlands Government to that effect—would be to draw up a document covering the first set of questions, which would bring out clearly the areas of agreement and disagreement. The discussion on the participation of other countries and the way in which they had to be approached could be more specific, when such a document was available. He thought it would be helpful if the Working Party went into this matter and then appointed a rapporteur who could report to the full meeting. This would emphasize the spirit of teamwork in which these negotiations were taking place; the rapporteur could inform the full meeting of those subjects on which there was no difficulty and others where further discussion and decisions of principle were required.

Mr. Bonnet drew attention to the distinction between the question of what other countries should participate in the Pact and the question of the timing and mode of approaching these countries. Whether this two-fold question is to be discussed by the present group or the Working Party, Mr. Bonnet thought it essential, before approaching the different countries, to have a text so that they would know to what undertakings they were expected to subscribe. It might be necessary to study the problem from the viewpoint of limited partnership. He agreed with Mr. Lovett’s point about avoiding the impression that the proposed Pact was by-passing the United Nations. He thought that any such misunderstanding might be removed by some clear-cut statement in the preamble.

Sir Oliver Franks suggested that the whole question should be remitted to the Working Party. The Working Party would not by itself be able to solve all the differences. But it should be able to make progress on drafting some of the articles, while on others it would be able to clarify the alternatives. On questions of principle which did not arise directly in connection with consideration of the text of the articles, the Working Party could likewise be of service. It could list the principles in dispute, setting out clearly the various arguments and indicating the best order for discussion by the full meeting. It might be necessary to refer to governments on a number of points and it was therefore important that the Working Party should begin its studies as soon as possible.

Mr. Lovett, in answer to a question by Mr. Van Kleffens, said he thought it would be necessary at the appropriate stage to bring the military authorities into the discussions. Before this was done, however, it was desirable that further progress should be made and the nature of the Pact more clearly indicated. This need for greater definition also applied with respect to approaches to other countries.

Mr. Van Kleffens thought this led to the conclusion that the working party should first concentrate on the problems which were of vital importance in respect to the consultation of these countries such as the extent of the obligations to be assumed and the scope of the defense zone.

The discussion of various clauses, which were not of primary importance for the answer to the question which countries might be found ready to join, could be deferred to a later phase of the conversations.

Mr. Lovett emphasized the need for strict security throughout the next stage of the talks. It was agreed that the metric procedure for despatching papers to London should continue.⁴

Mr. Lovett explained that after the present state of the talks had been concluded, the subject of the Pact would have to be referred to the President. Thereafter it was proposed to consult a selective group of Senators from both Parties and perhaps the Senate Foreign Relations Committee itself. It was possible that consultations would also take place with leaders from the House of Representatives. Appropriations and supplies would be required to implement the Pact and it might therefore be desirable to keep House leaders informed.

Mr. Lovett said he realized it might be difficult to complete the Pact by February 1. Even if it is not possible to secure the signature of more than the present seven powers to a North Atlantic Pact by that date, it should be possible to have some definite indications by then that other countries were willing to come in.

Sir Oliver Franks stressed the importance of speed and said the more that could be done this week and next week, the better.

Mr. Van Kleffens spoke about the delay which might be involved in consulting other countries. Some of them, for instance Sweden, had a very cumbersome Parliamentary procedure, and it would be most unfortunate if the present enthusiasm for the treaty were to be lost through interminable delays in waiting for a few countries.

Mr. Lovett said it would also be desirable to ensure that the delay in depositing ratifications which had occurred with the Rio Treaty did not occur in this case. After discussion on how long the different countries might take to deposit their ratifications, it was considered reasonable to hope that if the Pact were signed by the beginning of February, the ratifications of the seven countries represented around the table could be deposited by spring.

Mr. Wrong suggested that delay might be reduced either by providing that the Pact come into effect when a certain number of the signatories had deposited their ratifications, or by concluding simultaneously with the Pact some agreement which would establish a provisional council to begin working out the agencies which would be needed to implement the Pact. It was considered that this latter suggestion might cause difficulty in getting the Pact ratified by the US Senate.

It was agreed that the Working Party should attempt to define those articles of the treaty in which agreement could now be reached. They should also clarify the points of difference on the other articles and set out the questions of principle (e.g., the question of other countries’ participation) which the full meeting would subsequently have to discuss. It was also agreed that the Working Party should be asked to advise upon the order in which the full meeting should discuss these subjects so that progress could be as fast as possible.

It was tentatively agreed that the next meeting would take place on December 17, subject to the Working Party having made sufficient progress.

1. An “International Working Group” was established by the Ambassadors Group on December 13, composed of the five Brussels Powers, the United States and Canada. The U.S. delegation was headed by George Kennan, and those of the other countries consisted of high ranking officers of their respective embassies. Action summaries of three meetings, December 15, 16, and 17, not printed, are in the NATO Research File, Lot 57 D 271, an informal collection of material on NATO for the period 1948–1952 gathered by the Historical Office of the Department of State. The group decided to discontinue such summaries after December 17.
2. Ante, p. 245.
3. Reference here is presumably to a visit by Ambassador Wrong to John Hickerson on October 13, when he conveyed this message orally (840.20/10–1348).
4. This procedure was referred to in the first paragraph of the minutes of the second meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, 1948. See footnote 1, p. 152.