840.20/12–1048
Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, December 10, 1948, 3:00 p. m.
Mr. Lovett suggested that procedure be established in the light of whatever suggestions or recommendations might have been received from abroad. As for the United States procedure, as soon as a workable paper had been produced the Department would consult the interested executive agencies and make recommendations to the President. Then, following the judgment of the President, discussions would be held with the appropriate Congressional leaders based on a fairly definite document. While it would be difficult to fix a definite time schedule, he wished to move as rapidly as possible.
M. Le Gallais,1 in response to Mr. Lovett’s welcome, stressed the importance which his country attached to the task and his faith in the work of the group and its working party.
Mr. Bonnet recalled that the talks last summer had made it possible to send very complete information to the various governments, which had made a thorough study of the documents in order to concert their views. The Permanent Commission in London had discussed the texts. The Ambassadors had accordingly received the coordinated views of their governments2 and also special instructions from each government. They were ready to resume consideration of the outline of articles of the treaty which had been drawn up by the group last summer.
He thought the first question to be decided was that of procedure. A second question which he was prepared to discuss at any time, was [Page 311] that of which other countries should eventually be invited to join, including when and how they should be approached.
Mr. Lovett asked if there were some basic paper which had been agreed upon by the Brussels Pact signatories on which the present group might work.
Mr. Van Kleffens replied that there had been time to clarify thoughts by trying to find some formulas which might be submitted in a purely provisional way, but not with the intention of confronting the US and Canada with a sort of European draft, a procedure to which they might well object. He thought that the more satisfactory procedure would be to resume discussions by stating frankly the views on each clause, taking the September 9 paper as a starting point. It would be for the US and Canada to decide. He asked whether it would not be more satisfactory to work together on the various provisions and arrive at a solution together rather than to have the Ambassadors present a text the US and Canada to criticize. He thought that the work should represent a common effort.
Mr. Lovett said that his own feeling was that it might serve a more useful purpose if there were a summary of some sort, not necessarily a draft treaty, which indicated the end result of the discussions in Europe.
Mr. Wrong stated that he wanted to know what the discussions sought to accomplish in the near future. Was it contemplated that the conversations would be continued until a tentative draft had been agreed, or did the discussions aim at clarification of the points left vague in the paper of September 9. If the group was aiming at a draft, then a tentative draft from the European Governments should help. On the other hand, expansion of the annex of the September paper would require everyone to put his cards on the table soon anyway.
Mr. Lovett considered that the element of time was important, as well as the necessity for getting the substance accurately set out. He thought it would be useful to aim at the end product, a pact of some sort, rather than to continue to discuss the various points more abstractly. If a treaty were to be concluded it should be presented to the Senate as early as possible in the Session.
He stated that although the US representatives had no draft, they had identified the types of problems and tried to indicate, in dealing with those problems, certain forms of language from the Rio Pact, etc., which might be satisfactory.
Baron Silvercruys said that the conversations had been suspended three months ago because a point had been reached where further progress required that the views of the Brussels Pact Governments be obtained. The views of the Permanent Commission and also of [Page 312] the individual governments had now been received by the Ambassadors. The resulting instructions3 put into a concrete form, article by article, the views of the Permanent Commission on the paper produced in the earlier talks in Washington. Whether time would be saved by the US and Canadian representatives receiving the paper in question was for them to decide. On the other hand, it might be better to go over the September paper article by article.
He remarked that he had been impressed by the observations of Mr. Van Kleffens to the effect that there might be an advantage psychologically and politically in arriving together, in one joint effort, at some sort of draft rather than being confronted by one draft or another independently prepared.
Mr. Lovett suggested that the paper in question be labelled a “summary of suggestions”. He believed that the present type of exploratory discussion had gone far enough and that there was a need for greater definition. Moreover, the discussion, rather than proceeding solely Item by item, should include some summary, either documentary or oral, of the condensed views of the Permanent Committee.
Mr. Hoyer-Millar stated that the group’s instructions had speed as the object and, therefore, it was entirely in the hands of the United States and Canada to decide how the task could best be accomplished. The Permanent Commission had tried to put into writing, and perhaps in more treaty-like form, the ideas which were expressed in the earlier stages in Washington. However, the Permanent Commission had been very conscious of the importance of not in any sense submitting a paper on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If the US and Canada thought it a more desirable and more expeditious procedure, there would be no objection to submitting the document, provided it was understood that it was only a working paper.
Mr. Bonnet supported Mr. Hoyer-Millar. He thought that all present were anxious that the US representatives might facilitate dealings with the Executive agencies and the Congressional leaders. Therefore, it was largely up to the US and Canada to decide on what procedures should be followed.
He said that the views he had expressed earlier were prompted by conversations he had had with newspapermen who had stated that it would create many difficulties if a treaty text were presented to the US and Canada by the Brussels Treaty representatives. He did not want to compromise the success of the whole mission by creating such false impressions.
Mr. Lovett stated that the US and Canada were confronted with a somewhat difficult problem. A communiqué had been issued by the [Page 313] Consultative Council on October 264 in which it was said that there was agreement in principle on the desirability of concluding a North Atlantic treaty and on the next steps to be taken. On November 26 there had been a further report from London to the general effect that the Permanent Commission had finished its work and that instructions had been sent to the five Ambassadors. Consequently, the press wanted to know exactly what the treaty was before it was drawn up. In his conversations with various Congressional leaders, Mr. Lovett found them by and large very sympathetic to the North Atlantic community but wanting definition as to what was actually being discussed, countries involved, etc. The State Department could not discuss that aspect with them, but could only discuss the broad principle of association of the general agreement.
There was also some embarrassment caused by the fact that many of the signatories in the Rio Pact were getting apprehensive lest, through the formation of the North Atlantic Pact, they might more easily be involved in conflict. These questions had been disposed of simply by reference to the Rio treaty, but the apprehension still existed in some cases. Consequently, it was necessary to stop speculation at the earliest reasonable date and time was really the element which should be considered as of primary importance in the discussions. On the main question, he thought it had not occurred to the US and Canada that the suggestions received from the Permanent Commission would be something in the nature of a blueprint.
Baron Silvercruys suggested that the matter might be presented to the US and Canada as suggestions of the Permanent Commission in the light of exploratory conversations that had taken place in Washington and the exchange of views which subsequently had taken place in London.
Mr. Lovett agreed that the paper should be regarded as a series of suggestions, many of them in response to queries as to the point of view of various countries, representing a composite view of the Permanent Commission and, in addition, the individual views of the individual countries.
Mr. Van Kleffens added that whatever experience he had gained in making treaties showed that having a text as a basis for discussion saved time. He was authorized to present a paper, understanding that it contained only suggestions, if this was deemed desirable by the group.
Mr. Lovett proposed that in order to be absolutely secure with the [Page 314] press, nothing be given him as a complete document, but that the suggestions be given to the working group at some later date. It was arranged that Mr. Hoyer-Millar should present them on the following day.
Mr. Wrong, referring to the question of publicity, said he had been considerably concerned by the discussion of the different effect of certain forms of the clause defining the casus foederis, and the differences between the Rio formula and the Brussels formula and possible compromises. He was worried because he did not want to see the value of the Rio formula depreciated, although the Rio formula was not as strong as his Government would like.
Mr. Lovett agreed and proposed that in order to dispose of the question at the beginning, a simple press announcement be issued. He went on to say that nothing was said about the discussions during the preceding session and that the best procedure would be to continue that practice.
A suggested announcement (text attached) was approved and released to the press after the meeting.5
It was agreed that the next meeting would be held on Monday, December 13, at 3:00 p. m.
- Hugues Le Gallais, Luxembourg Minister in the United States.↩
- The most comprehensive papers prepared for the renewed discussions in Washington were 1) the so called “London Paper” entitled “Notes on Paper of September 9,” prepared in London by the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Powers and submitted in Washington on December 11, 1948, and 2) the Canadian Government’s “Commentary on the Washington Paper of September 9,” dated December 6, 1948. These papers, neither printed, are in the PA/HO Research Files of the Department of State, Lot 57–D271.↩
- The “London Paper.” See footnote 2, p. 310.↩
- For telegraphic text of the communiqué issued by the five Foreign Ministers of the Brussels treaty at the conclusion of their meeting of October 25–26 in Paris, see Department of State Bulletin, November 7, 1948, p. 583.↩
- Text not found attached.↩