840.20/11–2048
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Mr. Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway |
| Secretary Marshall | |
| Mr. Hayden Raynor |
Foreign Minister Lange of Norway called on me this morning at his request.
He opened the discussion by stating that there were certain questions with respect to regional defense arrangements which he wanted to ask me, realizing that quite possibly I would not desire to reply to them off hand.
He stated that considerable progress had been made in Scandinavian defense talks between Norway and Sweden and Denmark, but that it was impossible at the moment to tell what the result would be. He then stated his first question as follows: Would it serve the purpose of the present situation if Sweden could be drawn into the Scandinavian defense arrangements on the basis of assuming an obligation for the joint defense of all Scandinavia with no tie between the Scandinavian arrangement or the participants therein with the broader regional arrangement. I stated that as he had realized, this was a question which I would desire to turn over in my mind before making a reply. [Page 280] In the discussion of this point the Foreign Minister stated that it might be possible although he was not certain, to persuade the Swedes under such an arrangement to agree that this was a regional arrangement as defined in the Charter of the United Nations.
He then stated his second question as follows: Would it be possible for a country such as Norway to receive military supplies from the United States on a lend-lease basis in the absence of a formal tie with a broad regional arrangement? Mr. Lange argued in a mild way that it should be to our advantage to strengthen Norway militarily, even in the absence of a formal tie. He also spoke of the financial problem involved, stating that outlays for military purposes would compete with and could not help but hinder the economic recovery program. He stated that Norway was deficient in almost all kinds of military supplies. I replied that this also was a question which I did not wish to answer off-hand and that I personally could not give the answer as it would be up to Congress.1 I pointed out, however, that in view of the limited availability of military supplies and in light of the many claimants that I questioned if such an arrangement would be feasible.
Foreign Minister Lange then stated that because of the limited availability of military supplies, both from the U.K. and from the U.S., that from a short-term point of view an arrangement such as described under his first question might be the most beneficial to Norway in as much as Sweden did have military strength. At this point I described in some detail what we have been doing on the three months program of rehabilitation of old World War II matériel. I mentioned the re-equipping of the French divisions and made the point that there definitely would be matériel available for distribution. I then spoke, however, about the claimants mentioning in addition to France the distributions which had been made to Greece, Turkey and China. I told Lange our objective was to strengthen Western European countries in a military way.
I said that as I evaluated the situation that the most critical point from a point of view of possible overt Soviet aggression would probably be the time when this military matériel was flowing to Western Europe. I added, however, that I did not think in all probability this by itself or incidents arising from the situation in Berlin or any incidents except a planned incident would be the determining factor. I said the determining factor in my judgment would be a general decision, pro or con, made by the Soviet rulers, and that such a decision, pro or con, possibly had already been made.
[Page 281]I mentioned that in my judgment the main deterrent to Soviet aggression has been the possession by the United States of the atomic bomb. I added that until fairly recently I thought the Soviet leaders probably had felt that the American people never would permit the use of the bomb but that in the light of developments of recent months, including Berlin, and of developments here that I felt the Soviet leaders must now realize that the use of this instrument would be possible and hence the deterrent influence now was perhaps greater than heretofore.
In this part of the conversation Foreign Minister Lange stated that he wished to ask a third question, which he stated approximately as follows: Is it your feeling that impending doom is approaching? I replied that I could not answer this question, that no one knew what was in the minds of the Soviet leaders or what they may have already decided, but that I thought as I had said before that the decision one way or the other would be a coldly-calculated one and not the result of any particular events taking place at this time, and that possibly the decision, pro or con, had already been taken by the Soviet leaders.
During the conversation I referred to my discussion of the question of neutrality with Foreign Minister Undén of Sweden, and mentioned that he had based his case in discussion with me on the principle of neutrality much more than on the question of proximity. In my discussion with Undén I therefore put the case of what might happen in the world should the United States adopt the principle of neutrality. I mentioned that while Switzerland could maintain neutrality based on geography, that Sweden could not. I referred as I have previously, to the extremely exposed position of Denmark for which I had the greatest consideration, and also realized that Norway was in an extremely difficult position, although not as bad in this respect by far as Denmark.
- In telegram Delga 863, November 20 from Paris, not printed, Marshall invited the Department to forward its recommendations if it wished Lange to be given an answer in Paris to his first question or further elaboration of the substance of his second question (840.20/11–2048).↩