840.20/11–1748: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Sweden
799. For Ambassador from Hickerson. Brit Emb has given us paper on relation of Sweden to Scandinavian cooperation and North Atlantic security.1 Its substance presumably has been or will shortly be communicated to Brit Ambs in Scandinavia. We agree with much of its substance but feel it would provide something too closely resembling one-way commitment to Sweden by members North Atlantic Security Pact. We are giving Brit following working level views:2
We fully agree every effort should be made induce Norway and Denmark become full parties North Atlantic Security Treaty if one is concluded. We do not favor any one-way commitments. Area within which armed attack would bring into effect mutual assistance provisions of Atlantic treaty would include metropolitan territory of each party and its islands in North Atlantic. Thus if Norway and Denmark were parties armed attack on their islands or metropolitan territory would bring those provisions into effect for all other parties. Armed attack on Sweden if it were not party would merely require consultation. Provided Norway and Denmark were parties to Atlantic treaty it would be desirable to have three Scandinavian countries parties to separate but similar Scandinavian defense treaty limited in geographic extent to Scandinavia and providing for full mutual assistance in event of armed attack within that area and merely consultation in event of armed attack elsewhere. Under such interlocking arrangement for example attack on Belgium would require full assistance from Norway and Denmark but not from Sweden. Attack on Norway or Denmark would require assistance from all parties to Atlantic treaty and Sweden. Attack on Sweden would require assistance from Norway and Denmark but not from other parties to Atlantic treaty unless as result of consultation they choose to give it.
Pls consider foregoing discuss with your Brit colleague and give [Page 273] us your views without discussing it with Govt to which accredited at this time.3 [Hickerson.]
- Paper left with Hickerson by British Minister Hoyer Millar on October 12, not found in Department of State files (840.20/11–1548).↩
- The views summarized below were spelled out by Hickerson in his letter to Hoyer Millar dated November 15, 1948, not printed (840.20/13–1548).↩
- Ambassador Matthews on November 19 discussed telegram 799 with the British Chargé in Sweden, Henderson, and was told by the latter that when the British paper had been discussed confidentially with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Lange had not liked that portion of the paper which offered more favored treatment of Sweden than of Norway or Denmark in the extent of its military obligations. Matthews conveyed to the Department his strong belief that instead of trying to entice Sweden into indirect semi-participation with the West at that time, it would be better to concentrate first on bringing Norway and Denmark into the fold through provision of the arms they had requested, thereby stimulating Swedish fears of being left alone in a completely exposed position. (Telegram 1301, November 19, from Stockholm, not printed: 840.20/11–1948.) Ambassador Marvel, in answer to a copy of telegram 799, informed the Department in telegram 1035 of November 19 from Copenhagen that the British Ambassador in Denmark agreed with the formula contained in telegram 799 but was skeptical as to fulfillment of an interlocking arrangement involving a Scandinavian pact that was not yet certain. Marvel considered the suggested formula satisfactory provided that application of measures for mutual assistance were also brought into play by other than armed attack within the delineated area. (Telegram 1035 not printed: 840.20/11–1948.)↩