758.00/2–1648: Telegram

The Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

secret

204. I have endeavored to inform Department in various telegrams of Swedish policy and probable future attitude in light of world situation today. I have now drawn up a twelve-point summary of “basic fallacies of Swedish thinking” which may be useful to Department in appraising Swedish reaction to ERP western union and any future international crises. Following several centuries of war the first Bernadotte laid down the keynote of Swedish policy in 1818 which is as basic today in its narrowest sense as it was when issued in the minds of the Swedish people regardless of the change in conditions of modern warfare. He said: “separated as we are from the rest of Europe our policy and our interests will always lead us to refrain from involving ourselves in any dispute which does not concern the two Scandinavian peoples”.

The twelve fallacies as I see them follow: [Page 24]

1.
Sweden may well keep out of a third war if it comes. Both sides may find Sweden’s neutrality advantageous.
2.
Therefore, Sweden must take no step now which might lessen its chances of avoiding future war.
3.
Any steps toward west in political or military field now will incur future Soviet ire and suspicion and therefore lessen Sweden’s chances of avoiding involvement in war. Present political “neutrality” may keep Sweden out.
4.
If there is no war and great powders compose their future differences Sweden will be left in isolation to incur Soviet reprisals for any present leaning to west. (Look what great power “deals” did to Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1939.)
5.
In last weeks before war Sweden will have ample opportunity to determine policy, i.e. to side with the west or neutrality. Therefore, time is not ripe to choose now.
6.
Sweden’s association with the west now may bring disastrous Soviet occupation of kindred buffer state Finland.
7.
Any possible moral obligation to join other free nations to use moral influence to oppose Soviet expansion is subordinate to Swedish self-preservation through neutrality.
8.
Moral influence of world opinion does not change Soviet policies anyway.
9.
There is no danger that the west will resent Swedish neutrality and therefore leave Sweden to her fate. It is the devil (Russia) that must be appeased.
10.
Because of geographical position Sweden is more vulnerable than west Europe, i.e. a Maginot line psychology in reverse without conception of modern warfare.
11.
Even if “neutrality” is not the wisest policy there must be no agitation against it for this would split the Swedish nation and internal unity in these times must be preserved at all cost.
12.
The east bloc stands for communism; the west bloc may be dominated by “capitalist reaction”. Sweden (Social Democratic majority) must pursue a middle course.

While the pressure of events may modify some of the above, Swedish evolution will at best be slow. I am of course doing my best to hasten the process of education.

Sent Department 204; repeated Paris 67, London 77, Moscow by mail.

Matthews