840.00/10–1448
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Secretary Marshall |
| Mr. Hayden Raynor | |
| Foreign Minister Undén, of Sweden |
Foreign Minister Undén, of Sweden, called this afternoon at his request. He opened the conversation by stating that he realized that his well-known views on neutrality were unpopular in America, and he wished to take the opportunity of my presence in Paris to explain to me the background and reasons for this position.
He talked for perhaps fifteen minutes explaining that neutrality in Sweden was traditional, as it was in Switzerland. He pointed to the record of some one hundred and thirty-five years of peace. He said that he realized that, in the event of another general conflict, it would probably be impossible for Sweden to remain neutral for any extended period of time. He said, however, that if any change in this traditional policy were made now, it would cause a change in Russian policy toward Sweden. He said Swedish relations with Russia were now satisfactory. He said that even when Russia attacked Finland, Sweden had remained neutral and that this was realized and appreciated by the Russians. He said that although Sweden had operated at that time a sort of lend-lease program, it had refused transit facilities. He spoke of strong pressure at the time by the French. He said if Sweden took any step at this time of direct orientation to a western group, the Russians would, because of their suspicious nature, be sure to read into it all kinds of implications, such as bases had been granted to the Americans in Sweden, etc. He implied that Sweden could not afford, because of its geographic position, whatever retaliatory measures the Russians might then take.
He then spoke of the adverse effect such a move would have, in his opinion, on Finland. He said Finland now occupies a unique position as among the states directly bordering on Russia. He said Finland was not being Russianized. He said he believed if Sweden took any direct Western step, that the immediate result would be a direct change in the position of Finland. In concluding his personal remarks, Foreign Minister Undén mentioned the fact that defense talks were being initiated among the three Scandinavian states for the purpose of determining whether it might be possible to form, for purposes of defense, a “neutral” Scandinavian bloc. From what he said, it is clear that in his view such an arrangement would call for joint defense action by the three. It would not provide for an outside tie. He added that he did not know whether these talks had much chance of success.
[Page 265]I then spoke at some length on the subject of neutrality, stating that as the Foreign Minister had talked frankly to me, I also wanted to give him frankly some of our views on this question. I mentioned that there had also been traditionally a strong feeling of neutrality in the United States, especially in the Middle West. I inquired what the effect would have been in the world if President Wilson and President Roosevelt had maintained such a policy.
At this point Foreign Minister Undén interrupted to state that he appreciated that it would have been tragic for the world if we had maintained such a policy, but he added, “The United States is a great power.” In this discussion I pointed out that the United States, among almost all of the other countries of the world, could best afford from its own selfish security point of view to be neutral. I also pointed out that it seemed to me there was a considerable difference geographically in this respect between the position of Sweden and that of Switzerland. I mentioned the vulnerability of Denmark, and the importance in a defense way to the West of Denmark, as well as Norway. I mentioned Greenland and the threat which its occupancy by an unfriendly power could create to the United States and the fact that, as he must realize, Denmark itself can give no assurance of being able to protect Denmark. My implication, in part, was that Denmark needed strengthening in a military way. I explained in the course of my dissertation on neutrality that the world has changed, that military operations were now sudden, and that surprise and quick initiative are at a premium.
After pointing out what the tragic results would have been in the world had the United States remained neutral, I explained what the world is now up against and what we are trying to do about it. I said that, unfortunately, we were confronted by a state which appeared to be utterly ruthless and devoid of all the human decencies of modern civilization—a state which seized and used every expediency to serve its particular ends without regard to ethics. I said that if this ruthless force were not opposed, it seemed to us that we were confronted by the possibility of a gradual establishment over the world of police states, and that this was abhorrent to us. I said we were against such a development, whether it took the form of force, such as the Norwegian experience with Germany, or the new form as exemplified recently in Czechoslovakia. I said that the United States was against the imposition on free peoples anywhere, against their will, of the police state. I emphasized that, since we were up against this type of situation, no one can count on the state in question doing the decent thing.
I then said we had given the most profound thought as to the best method of meeting this ruthless force. I said that the single conclusion to which we had come was that it must be met by a unity of such states as were willing to accept the challenge. I stated that had been an [Page 266] important consideration in the development of the ERP program, and I explained to him its origin. I explained that, both in Congressional and public opinion at home, the hurdle to be overcome was the demand on the part of both that recipient nations act together in a uniform way. In this ERP discussion, I explained in some detail how fantastic the Soviet charge is that this program was initiated by the United States for imperialistic purposes. I said that at the time this program was started, we had not realized that military assistance might also be essential but that now we did. I explained what we were doing in the way of rearmament, and what we hoped to do along similar lines for the Western European states which might be unified in purpose. I told him in the greatest confidence what we had already done in the way of re-equipping certain French Divisions. I explained our three months program of reconditioning world war matériel. I explained that the combined result of the economic and military assistance program, we hoped, would be to re-create a sound and healthy economic strength in a unified Western Europe.
Towards the end of our conversation, Foreign Minister Undén made the comment that the problem of Swedish neutrality was his problem. I agreed that it was, but indicated that as he had spoken frankly to me, I wanted to give him my frank views on the question.