Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/8–2348

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

top secret

Washington, August 23, 1948.

I have just completed a lengthy discussion with Secretary Forrestal, Secretary Royall,¹ General Bradley and General Gruenther regarding a decision that has to be taken by us prior to the meeting tomorrow in London regarding the Western Union organization of the defensive forces. It has not been thought advisable to attempt to see you personally because of the fact that the meeting might be reported, and in view of the tense situation in Moscow, that would be unfortunate. Hence this memorandum.

It is the unanimous opinion that our observer should go ahead in agreement with the organization on the continent of a Western Union supreme commander and staff, this to be done as secretly as possible, no American representative being formally included on the staff at this time, but a place reserved for an American deputy supreme commander. Further, that we support the appointment of a Western Union supreme commander from among the list: Montgomery,² Alexander,³ or the French General Juin,⁴ now in Morocco. The probability is that the French would not put forward General Juin, but someone else less desirable. Our feeling is that under the circumstances, considering the extreme difficulty of the position in the early stages of hostilities, should that develop, a man of the forcible character of Montgomery would probably be preferable.

The point of this memorandum is that we did not want, without advising you, to commit ourselves to the support of the appointment of a supreme commander of the Western Union forces, who would automatically become the supreme commander of the Western front and, as such, would be exercising command over the American troops now in Germany. We are all in agreement at the present time that during the preliminary phases of hostilities, should that occur, it would not be advisable to have an American commander. Incidentally, the British are very insistent that there should be an American commander.

We will make a specific reservation regarding the control and employment of the strategic air force, which will be the most powerful weapon and almost entirely American, except for fighter aircraft and medium bombers.

This memorandum is being carried to you by General Gruenther. In view of the urgency of the situation, I hope you can give him immediate approval or modification so that the British can be oriented this evening.⁵

G. C. Marshall

1. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army.
2. Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
3. Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis, Governor-General of Canada.
4. Alphonse Juin, Resident General of France in Morocco; Commander in Chief of the French Theater of Operations of North Africa.
5. The following handwritten message with signature appears on the file copy under Marshall’s signature: “Suggestion approved August 23, 1948, Harry S. Truman.” In a separate, handwritten communication to Marshall, also dated August 23, President Truman cautioned: “I have approved your memo of August 23, ’48 today. It is my opinion however that we must be very careful not to allow a foreign commander to use up our men before he goes into action in toto. H.S.T.”