Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.00/8–648

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State, to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] August 6, 1948.

Mr. Bérard, the French Chargé d’Affaires, came to see me this morning to convey the concern of the French Government over certain aspects of the problem of security of the Western Union countries and, in particular, the course that the Washington conversations on this subject appeared to be taking.

Mr. Bérard gave me the following expression of his Government’s views:

1. The French Government believed from statements of the Secretary of State and the President that once the Brussels Union was formed and steps were taken for the coordination of their military strength and the inventory of their state of military supply etc. the United States would consider U.S. association with the Brussels Union and at the same time examine the question of military supplies with a view to supplementing the needs of the participating countries.

2. The discussions seemed to be turning towards a larger arrangement called the North Atlantic Pact which would include other nations in a very loose and indefinite arrangement; that the analogy with the Rio Pact had disturbed the French Government which felt that the provisions for consultations, in the absence of any precise engagements of a military character, contained therein would be insufficient for the European problem where the menace of Soviet aggression was very real and immediate.

3. The French Government understood that as long as the American troops were in Germany a political pact was more for the future than for the present but felt that for the future a more precise and definite mutual obligation would be necessary; that in every democratic country the vote of the Assembly or Parliament was required for entry into war but that this should not prevent any arrangement from being precise as to the nature of the obligation and assistance which would occur in the event of hostilities.

Mr. Bérard said that he was giving me the above because these views would be reflected in the working party discussions here in Washington and he wished to forewarn me. He went on to say that the French Government felt that while it looked to them as though any form of assistance to Western Union, particularly in the form of military supplies, would be long delayed, the developments in regard to Germany and in particular our attitude thereto might well bring matters to a head in Europe before then. I asked Mr. Bérard what he had in mind when he said “our attitude towards the German situation” since I felt that basically it was identical with that of the French and British Governments in regard to Berlin. He said what his Government had in mind was the fact that General Clay¹ had been making very strong statements from Berlin about armed convoys and not getting out of Berlin short of war. I told Mr. Bérard that we were fully aware of the risks which had been involved in the Berlin situation and that it was for that reason that the United States Government had been very strong for the oral approach to Stalin as we felt that a more formal course of action as originally favored by the French and British Governments would have tended to increase the risk of war by crystallizing in formal notes the position of the Soviet Government; that we had felt that an oral approach offered the best way of finding out how far the Soviets were prepared to go and of exploring the means of some arrangements to avert the deterioration of the situation without either surrender or a real risk of war. Mr. Bérard agreed with this and admitted that he had left Paris before the interview with Stalin had taken place and possibly his Government’s views on this point had been altered.

I took occasion to point out to Mr. Bérard that we did not feel here that Berlin was really the issue; that the real issue was the Soviet determination to disrupt the recovery of Europe and above all to prevent, if possible, the very point in which the French Government was primarily interested, namely, the revival of some military strength on the continent. I said that with full recognition of the present military position on the continent, nevertheless, to yield to Russian pressure would be certain to invite it very soon at another place under worse conditions. Mr. Bérard agreed fully with this statement but reverted to the French view that the important thing was to accelerate the development of some military strength on the continent. He said that his Government felt that the Brussels Powers had taken certain very definite steps along the lines which he thought corresponded with the views of the United States and that they, in effect, constituted a hard core of European association and it would therefore be quite logical, without waiting for other powers, that some measures be worked out to help the Brussels countries to become more of a factor in the security of Europe and of the world. He specifically inquired whether the idea of a North Atlantic Pact could not be accompanied by some arrangements directly with the Brussels Union countries which had already begun to coordinate their military planning and supply problems. I told Mr. Bérard I would discuss this idea with the Under Secretary and Secretary and that it would undoubtedly come up in the course of the talks here in Washington.

I told Mr. Bérard quite frankly that our difficulty was that under the intent of Congress, as expressed in the Vandenberg resolution, it was important that our relationship to Europe for defense purposes would not be piecemeal and with a whole series of individual countries or separate groups thereof; that we felt that the ERP formula with certain obvious exceptions was the right approach to the problem of security and defense. I pointed out that to form some association only with the Brussels countries would leave outside of any such arrangement the majority of the Marshall Plan countries, many of whom were more exposed than the Brussels countries themselves to Soviet attack; that the problem, as we saw it, was to endeavor to work out a formula that would in effect cover as much of the free nations of Europe as would be militarily and politically and geographically possible. I told him I thought it would be difficult to get Congressional acceptance for any such arrangement with a few countries in Europe which would in effect merely deal with a small portion of the problem of European security. The same considerations would apply to any material assistance in the form of supplies; that it would be difficult to have one supply program for the Brussels countries and then have a series of unrelated and isolated requests from other countries such as Norway and Denmark. I told Mr. Bérard that in so far as any supplies were concerned, we had no surplus available now and that any program which might be submitted to us by the Brussels countries would have to be screened and submitted to Congress at the next session. I said, in any event, the matter of needs and supplies was being examined in London and not in Washington.

It was apparent that the French Government is primarily interested in the question of obtaining military supplies as soon as possible for the Brussels countries and somewhat less in the question of political commitment which, according to Bérard, they recognize from a realistic point of view would only apply to the future. Mr. Bérard, in leaving, repeated that he was giving me this information so that we would be forewarned before these views were expressed in the present conversations in Washington.

Charles E. Bohlen

1. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and Military Governor, U.S. Zone, Germany.