With reference to our conversation of 13 July, there are forwarded
herewith three copies of the instructions given by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the U.S. representatives attending the London Western Union
talks. It is my understanding that two of the enclosed copies will be
[Page 189]
given by the Department of
State to the Canadian Ambassador and that the remaining one will be
retained for use in the Department.
For your information two copies of the enclosure have been given directly
to the British Joint Services Mission.
[Enclosure]
Instructions for the U.S. Representatives Attending the London Western
Union Talks1
The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, will act as executive agent for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in respect to the mission of the
representatives.
The political framework for U.S. participation in the London talks is
evident in Senate Resolution 239 and the accompanying report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in agreements respecting
Western Germany reached between the United States and the Western
Union nations in the recent London conference. Except within this
area of established United States policy, or as may be suggested by
State Department officials consulted, the representatives will
confine their comments to military matters: political problems which
may arise will be referred to Washington for resolution. Military
negotiations in London should, however, be so conducted as to
advance the possibility of eventual close ties, under a United
Nations regional security arrangement, between the United States,
Canada, and nations outside the “iron curtain” in Europe and its
contiguous Atlantic waters.
U.S. participation in the London military talks of the Western Union
nations is undertaken “with a view to participating in conversations
on military plans”2 and with a view to
“drawing up a coordinated military supply plan” on the basis of a
European Recovery Program precedent in which, as respects the
Western Union Nations, “(1) they must first plan their coordinated
defense with the means presently available, (2) they must then
determine how their collective military potential can be increased
by coordinated production and supply, including standardization of
equipment, (3) we would then be prepared to consider and screen
their estimates of what supplementary assistance
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from us was necessary, (4) we would
expect reciprocal assistance from them to the greatest extent
practicable, and (5) legislation would be necessary to provide
significant amounts of military equipment but the President would
not be prepared to recommend it unless the foregoing conditions had
been met.”
The Commander in Chief, European Command, has been instructed to
arrange with the British and French commanders in Germany for the
concerting of plans to meet an emergency military situation in
Europe. It will be essential that conversations in London respecting
emergency military plans be conducted in the light of those already
held or in progress, and with the knowledge, advice, and assistance
of the principal responsible U.S. military commanders in the
area.
In drawing up a coordinated military supply plan, it may prove
advisable to consider supply problems arising out of emergency
military plans. At the discretion of the representatives, this
aspect may be explored, emphasizing the paucity of currently
available supplies, keeping in mind that the principal aspects of
the supply plan are obviously a longer-term problem.
The adequate development of a coordinated supply plan will have to be
predicated on ultimate intentions as well as ultimate capabilities,
and on the development of a practicable longer-term strategic
concept. The short-term problem might well be more effectively
solved against the background of, and as a contribution toward
achieving, the common long-term intent.
For the time being, discussion should not be initiated which has to
do with phases of U.S. planning for an emergency concerning
guerrilla activity in areas which come under enemy occupation, the
support of underground resistance movements, or U.S. action outside
Europe and its contiguous areas.
Information from London indicates that the five powers of the Western
Union propose a pooling of their equipment and resources under a
combined command, that they hope to achieve a maximum
standardization of equipment (including standardization with U.S.
equipment) and military organization, that they are inventorying
their total current military resources and total military potential,
and that they are determined to fight in the event of an attack by
the USSR. Their comments, as transmitted to the Department of State,
are especially significant in two respects.
-
a.
- The current Western Union strategic concept is to fight “as
far east in Germany as possible” with a view to “holding the
Russians on the best position in Germany covering the territory
of the five powers in such a way that sufficient time for the
American military power to intervene decisively can be assured.
The five powers are now assessing
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their resources and fully recognize that
an attack in the near future would find them militarily weak.
They also recognize that their plans must be very closely linked
to the American strategic concept and the deployment of such
forces as they are prepared to provide for the defense of
Western Europe from the outset.” In this connection, the Western
Union powers should be brought to realize in due course that
American forces for the defense of Europe would initially
consist significantly only of those already in Europe. However,
those U.S. Forces employed in long-range warfare would
contribute substantially to the defense of Western Europe, even
though deployed in other areas.
-
b.
- “The extent to which plans for long-term standardization can
be advanced at present depends upon American intentions, since
it is obvious that standardization with the USA is equally
desirable at an early date. However, the acceptance of the
principle of standardization must not be allowed to interfere
with our immediate preparations of rearmament.” In this
connection, standardization with the U.S. on the basis of U.S.
equipment will obviously result, on an emergency basis and to a
limited extent, with any provision of U.S. equipment to meet the
short-term problem of revitalizing the military power of the
Western Union nations. The extent of long-term standardization
with the U.S. on the basis of U.S. equipment, a type of
standardization which appears advisable, should be governed by
the estimated future capabilities of the Western Union nations
with respect to maintaining and replacing such equipment from
their own combined productive capacity. Standardization of items
of U.S. equipment on the basis of procurement from Western Union
nations should not proceed to the point at which the U.S. is, or
is likely to become, largely dependent upon such sources for
important items of equipment or elements thereof. (A somewhat
closer standardization relationship may be expected to develop
between the United States, Britain and Canada than with the
continental powers.)
The area of discussions dealing with standardization should also
include and emphasize the desirability of standardizing
communication procedures, operating techniques, and military
administrative, logistical, and tactical organizations.
The representatives will avoid discussing with any of the foreign
conferees the policy or plans of the United States with respect to
the employment of atomic weapons in warfare.
It is obvious that security restrictions will handicap the United
States representatives in the effective execution of their missions;
they should accordingly feel free to request authority to depart
from these restrictions in specific important cases.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that no U.S. strategic concept
need be, or should be, disclosed, but rather the position taken that
the United States, while having under consideration various
alternative lines of action in the event of a Soviet war of
aggression, has
[Page 192]
fixed on
no rigid course and would welcome suggestions looking toward the
evolution of a strategic concept, or of strategic concepts in
phases, on the basis of which common action might be undertaken.
Consideration of the probable United States part as an ally in a
future war should include recognition of inevitable world-wide
responsibilities we would be required to undertake in respect to:
-
a.
- Conversion of the United States into the major allied
arsenal of war.
-
b.
- Security and operation of sea lines of
communication.
-
c.
- Prosecution of the war in theaters other than Western
Europe and areas contiguous thereto.
The representatives will indicate no acquiescence in:
-
a.
- Any military plans that might jeopardize or even unduly
influence optimum over-all global strategy in favor of
either direct military assistance or distribution of
equipment.
-
b.
- Any command arrangement for an allied military council for
global strategy.
The senior U.S. representative should, at the earliest appropriate
opportunity in closed plenary session during the London talks, offer
a statement which has first been approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and which:
-
a.
- Discloses the keen interest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in the Western Union, and in furthering the accomplishment
of a common security in peace, but if necessary in war,
which is essential to the security of the U.S.
-
b.
- Establishes the purposes of U.S. participation.
The service representatives will make no commitments without specific
instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Supplementary guidance will be forthcoming should the occasion
necessitate. In addition, while it is considered that the purposes
of U.S. initial participation in the London talks can best be served
by holding U.S. representation to a practicable minimum, requests
for additional personnel may be submitted, if, in the judgment of
the representatives, U.S. participation could thereby be made more
effective. Further, while the course of the conversations may well
dictate differently, it presently appears that best results could be
achieved by holding initial U.S. participation in the London talks
to a period of weeks rather than months, with a possibility of later
resumption.
The senior Army, Navy and Air Force representatives are authorized
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direct communication
with their respective departments on matters of unique or special
concern to their respective services.
