840.20/7–1548
Memorandum of the Third Meeting of the Working Group Participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 15, 1948
Mr. Stone suggested that the breakdown of the agenda1 which the group had before them should be considered as a guide for deliberations of the working group itself. He stated furthermore that the group probably could not finalize any paper on any of the subjects listed until the question as a whole had been studied.
In reference to the first item, estimates of Soviet intentions, Mr. Bohlen believed that one objective should be to ascertain whether U.S. estimates were parallel to those of the Brussels Pact countries, and the group could then proceed to attempt to arrive at some general agreed conclusions in this field. He emphasized that they were dealing [Page 185] with a very speculative subject, that while much concrete information was lacking the Soviet Union must be considered a continuing menace to the Western World, and that the latter should remain in a state of mental preparedness. Mr. Bohlen thought that under this first item the working group should not interest itself in specific intelligence data but rather should direct its attention to the general situation which World War II has brought about in Europe, and attempt to estimate what the Soviet attitude will probably be toward this abnormal situation.
Mr. Bérard stated that his point of view was very similar to that expressed by Mr. Kennan the previous week in the meeting of the Ambassadors, adding that he was not aware of very much positive information concerning Soviet future intentions.
Mr. Reuchlin believed that what we do here will perhaps have a direct effect upon Soviet actions and that, for example, if the countries concerned in the present talks form a weak association it undoubtedly will have a provocative effect upon the Russians, whereas a strong pact should have the opposite, or a deterrent, effect upon them.
Mr. Hoyer Millar expressed the opinion that the threat from the East was a situation old and familiar to Western Europe, but that now, perhaps for the first time, the United States and its way of life, which was diametrically opposed to that of the Soviet Union, was directly menaced. He believed that today the United States was actually in the front line facing this threat, a situation not true in 1917, or even, for that matter, as late as 1939. This was, in short, a common enterprise; the European countries themselves could not stand up against this Eastern pressure but with the United States a union strong enough to resist it could be formed. Mr. Hoyer Millar added that he believed one of the ultimate intentions of the Russians was domination of the United States, having first obtained control over the European nations lying in its path.
Mr. Bohlen suggested that one approach to the question of Item la was to determine whether the threat was primarily military or of some other nature, for if it were concluded that a military threat principally menaced our security our response will be of one kind, whereas if it is primarily economic or political we would react, presumably, in another manner. To illustrate the differing attitudes toward this question, lie cited the criticism in some quarters of the ERP as being merely an economic and not a military measure, whereas military preparations—so the argument ran—were what was required. Continuing, Mr. Bohlen said that as an aftermath of the war Europe had been left in a dangerous state of unbalance, with Germany eliminated as a strong national state and with the Soviet dictatorship and the Red Army on [Page 186] the banks of the Elbe. He had concluded, moreover, that the most dangerous period had been in the immediate postwar years, 1945–1947, when the U.S. military establishment was rapidly disintegrating and the American public had not yet been alerted to the Russian peril; yet it was significant that the Soviet Army did not move during this period. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the Russian Army had not moved beyond the line which we now refer to as the “iron curtain”. He believed our goal should be to create a Europe that is viable economically, strong militarily, and unified and politically stable to a degree that Soviet expansion could be opposed or held. Mr. Bohlen warned again that we must be careful not to adopt measures here which would be weakly provocative, and that care should be taken to provide the substance on which can be built in Europe a total sense of confidence. Referring to the recent Yugoslavian development, he thought that this indicated that Russia, as a country, was dangerously over-extended. He suggested that opportunities for expansion and aggrandizement on the part of the Russians should be removed, noting that historically the Kremlin has usually exercised great caution in the risks it has taken to achieve its objectives. Mr. Bohlen interpreted the Soviet’s anxieties about the eventual success of the Marshall plan as one indication that they perhaps had no positive, specific plans for military aggression in the near future. During 1948, a certain turn in the tide in favor of the Western European nations could be detected, but these favorable developments were also accompanied by certain risks, since the Soviets might react violently to prevent the loss of power, or influence, over their satellites. The Soviet troops in Germany, while numerous, were not generally regarded as being capable of a sustained move westward through Europe; considerable reinforcement of personnel and strengthening logistically would first be necessary, and presumably we would have some indication of this development if and when it occurred. In this connection, he pointed out that the presence of the British and American troops in the sector should have a reassuring effect upon the people of Europe, since if Soviet troops did move westward the United States and Great Britain would be the first two countries involved in the conflict. Mr. Bohlen asserted, however, that despite what the Russians may or may not do we still must not be deflected from our purpose to do all that is required by the present conditions in Europe, adding that the first benefit which should derive from any measures which we may take here would probably be a psychological one, a certain confidence in the future. Mr. Bohlen agreed with Mr. Hoyer Millar that Russia was not in a good position economically to wage a long war, pointing out that the Soviet leaders were extremely dubious of the attitudes and affections [Page 187] of their own people, exemplified in their savage pursuit of displaced persons in Europe.
Returning to Item 3 of the breakdown of the agenda, Mr. Bohlen expressed the opinion that this might be one of the most difficult aspects of the problem, since the U.S. Government, in requesting Senate authorization for any association devised, would have to be able to state that the European countries have done everything possible to achieve a coherent, comprehensive pact or arrangement, and that, for example, if any strategically important country were omitted from the group criticism might be aroused in the Congress. He suggested therefore that it would be especially useful if the opinions of the Brussels countries could be obtained as to what countries outside the Brussels Pact might wish to enter a North Atlantic association or, on the other hand, which countries might impose certain conditions before entering.
Mr. Bérard agreed that some countries, such as Italy, would pose a problem if they wished to join such an association. Again, the question of countries outside the United Nations would have to be considered.
Mr. Bohlen thought that one approach would be to consider the ERP countries, other than the Brussels Pact nations, individually, examining each one in turn to determine what problems would be encountered by association in some North Atlantic pact. This question, it was pointed out, was currently being discussed by the Consultative Commission at The Hague.
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