Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/7–648

Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, 1948, 4 p. m.

Washington, July 6, 1948, 4 p.m.

top secret

Security

Sir Oliver Franks distributed copies of a proposal (copy attached¹) from the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission concerning security of records of the Washington talks. It was agreed that, in the interests of secrecy and of keeping the respective Governments uniformly informed, the proposal should be accepted, the agreed minutes to consist only of a summary as brief as possible of the principal points brought out at each meeting.

Meetings

It was agreed that for the time being the group should meet once daily, at 10 a. m. Mr. Lovett suggested that the chairmanship should rotate, At the suggestion of Ambassadors Wrong and Van Kleffens it was agreed that the chairmanship, which would in reality provide merely guidance for the discussions, should be held by the U.S. representative.

Item (1) The situation in Europe as it affects security including estimates of Soviet intentions. M. Bonnet thought the approach to item (1) should be the question of what could be done to end the present feeling of insecurity in Western Europe. This feeling was general despite the absence of any specific evidence of immediate military aggressive intentions on the part of the USSR. What immediate measures could be taken in the military as well as other fields, and how would it be possible to reconstruct as soon as possible the military potential of the parties to the Brussels Treaty?

Mr. Lovett believed we should consider what had created the sense of insecurity and what was the nature of the threat. Was it one of immediate military action, of invisible penetration (as in Czechoslovakia), or was it an indefinable threat? We should then consider the opinions of our respective intelligence agencies and military staffs on the problem, including whether the Russians contemplated war now or in, say, two years. Certainly the time element would affect the nature of the decisions taken. M. Bonnet said we must consider the effect on Russian intentions of the strength or weakness of Western Europe. Mr. Lovett thought we should also consider the bearing of logistics on timing.

Sir Oliver Franks believed the whole agenda should be considered from the point of view of the community of interest on both sides of the North Atlantic. Whatever their superficial differences, the countries here represented had something in common apart from geography, namely, one great common conception of democracy, the conviction that the state exists for the individual. Freedom was essential to us but a corrosive poison to the countries of the East. Therefore we are inevitably the objects of suspicion or aggression in one form or another from the East. The internal logic of the Soviet system demands an attempt at world domination, and their first objective would be the eastern side of the North Atlantic. The Old World would then be in their power and the countries on the west of the Atlantic immediately threatened. The threat was of common concern to all members of the North Atlantic community. The Russians had two possible techniques: aggression and infiltration. Their forces were strategically organized and disposed to make movement rapidly possible. Determination by the members of the North Atlantic community would minimize the risk of overt aggression. The threat was real. How could it best be deterred? If these talks should fail, it must be assessed much more gravely. Its imminence would depend on what we did.

Mr. Lovett said that the United States had sought peace through weakness but that after many heartbreaks it had reversed its policy and was seeking to deter aggression by proof of determination. The only question was how its determination should be implemented.

Mr. Wrong felt that in the long view the Soviet Union must be considered a dangerous potential aggressor. It could afford to wait. Consolidation of the North Atlantic community would be the best means of postponing and perhaps eliminating the threat permanently. There might be short-range crises but consolidation should progressively reduce their seriousness.

Baron Silvercruys considered that the fact this meeting was being held proved the feeling of insecurity. When freedom was threatened in vital parts of Europe, it was threatened everywhere. Insecurity is often aggravated by uncertainty as to the determination of other nations. Collective strengthening of our countries should eventually bring real security. In the meantime, the fullest measure of certainty as to the will of the nations involved would be the best deterrent to aggression.

Mr. Lovett recognized the bearing on the problem of uncertainty as to U.S. intentions. Free institutions could only be preserved if free peoples were prepared to go to the ultimate in defending them. The forces of evil had highly effective techniques and the only defense was full determination to resist. Agreed determination would remove uncertainty. There might be accidents or wars started to save face, but, considering the potency of new mass weapons, no nation could expect victory. We must make clear both our determination and the methods by which it would be backed up.

Mr. Van Kleffens was impressed by the unanimity indicated by the previous speakers. Before considering the cure he believed we should first discuss the evil. Russia has always shown expansionist tendencies. Like a gas, it filled every cranny it could. So far, its foreign policy has usually tended to move as a pendulum between the East and West. The question is whether that is still so, or whether Russia is at present active on both fronts at the same time. He had heard it said that Soviet pressure on Europe was coming to a close but he was not convinced. The Soviet Union was politically on the offensive with corresponding freedom of action. It could only be deterred by resolution and determination from the start. The threat was both military and ideological and we should deal with both aspects. The importance of the presence in Central Europe of Allied forces of occupation should not be forgotten. Western Europe was relatively weak and its anxiety natural, but he was convinced that the majority of people were too resilient, determined and devoted to freedom to submit as the Czechs had submitted.

Mr. Lovett noted a consensus of opinion that the Soviet Union was a threat and that the efforts to meet it should be directed to the ideological as well as the military threat. The respective countries should be strengthened to resist internal as well as external threats.

Baron Silvercruys inquired as to the significance of the Warsaw Communique.²

Mr. Bohlen expressed the opinion that the Russians had recently become alarmed at losing ground on many matters, including their relations with their satellites. Their hopes of getting control of Germany were diminishing. Intensified Soviet propaganda in Germany had aroused Polish and Czech fears that an East German state might become the favorite satellite. The Communique was designed to reassure the satellites and at the same time to make a bid to get back into the German picture, particularly into the Ruhr. The blockade of Berlin was a means to the same end. The only new element in the Communique had been the proposal for evacuation of the occupation forces. Mr. Lovett added that the Russians clearly were seeking a new meeting of the CFM, that the rapid restoration of Europe under ERP was causing them constant and growing concern and that the Berlin situation undoubtedly represented an international danger of the first importance.

Procedure

M. Bonnet stated that the Governments represented were awaiting not merely generalities but agreed proposals as to how the situation could be improved. Mr. Lovett said that before we could deal definitively with Item (4), much more information would be needed on what arrangements had actually been made in Europe. The United States would need the views of its military representatives on their return from London. M. Bonnet observed that the development of European arrangements would also depend on the contribution of the U.S. military representatives to the work of the Permanent Commission. It was agreed that all four items on the agenda should be covered in a preliminary way this week and then be considered in greater detail.

1. The proposal, not printed, outlined a procedure known as Metric which precluded the transmission of documents except by accompanied bap: direct to the Metric registry of the Foreign Office in London for distribution from that point, insisted upon abstention from all telegraphic and telephonic communications, and limited to a very restricted number the persons permitted access to the documents in question. The proposal is in the form of an annex to the minutes (840.20/7–648).
2. On June 24, 1948, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania and Hungary, meeting in conference in Warsaw, issued a declaration critical of the decisions reached at the recently concluded London Six-Power Conference on Germany. For documentation on the London Six-Power Conference and the subsequent Warsaw Declaration, see vol. ii, pp. 1 ff. and editorial note, p. 370.