Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.00/6–1448

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] June 14, 1948.

Participants:	The British Ambassador
	Sir John Balfour
	The Secretary
	Mr. Kennan
	Mr. Wailes1

The British Ambassador called by appointment at 12:15 today and said that he had been requested by Mr. Bevin to take up with me three matters of some urgency, the first and principal one relating to the proposed quadripartite discussions on Western Europe. The other two, which I will cover in separate memoranda, dealt with (a) a personal message from Mr. Bevin on general Anglo-American relations,² and (b) the former Italian Colonies.³

After summarizing for me the contents of the attached telegram from Mr. Bevin, dated June 1, the Ambassador said that there were several questions which Mr. Bevin had asked him to raise. First, he would like to know, if possible, our views on the preliminary reply with respect to military cooperation of the Western European powers.⁴ I replied that we appreciated receiving this information. I said that we would hope to have more detailed information later but realized that there had been little time to prepare the reply and that certain of the questions, such as standardization of arms, would have to be worked out over a considerable period of time.

The British Ambassador then inquired when we might be prepared to start quadripartite discussions, which he amplified by saying that by quadripartite, Mr. Bevin had in mind representatives of the U.S., France, the U.K., and one from the Benelux Powers. If agreeable to us, Mr. Bevin would also like to see the Canadians included. I said that as he knew the House of Representatives was now considering a Resolution similar to the Vandenberg Resolution, it would seem desirable to await the House’s action. If they failed to come to a decision before Congress adjourned,⁵ we would be prepared to go ahead on the basis of the Vandenberg resolution. If, however, they modified it we would wish to take this into consideration. In discussing the matter further it developed that two series of talks would be necessary, one by the military experts and the other on the political side where careful consideration would have to be given to the form which our cooperation was to take, as this obviously would have its effect on the Scandinavian countries, on the USSR, et cetera. I then told the Ambassador that the question of timing was of great importance and mentioned as an example our hesitation about even presenting to the Soviet Government a note requesting them to reduce the size of their establishments in this country to that of our establishments in the USSR. In this connection, I pointed out that with the Vandenberg resolution, the ECA program, increases in air force appropriations, recent direct speeches about the USSR, et cetera, we were building up quite a pressure so that a small matter such as even the size of diplomatic establishments would have to be carefully considered from the standpoint of timing.

Returning to the question of the quadripartite political conversations, Mr. Kennan expressed the view, in which I concurred, that these should be entirely exploratory and directed toward ascertaining the area of agreement among us concerning the requirements of the situation and the probable effects of the various possible courses of action. He added that it would be a good thing if the Canadians could be included.

[Marshall]

[Enclosure]

Substance of a Telegram From Mr. Bevin of June 1st

I thank Mr. Marshall for his message of May 28 and I fully realise all his difficulties and fully agree with the general statement of principles contained in his admirable speech in Portland, Oregon.⁶ It seems to me, indeed, that these principles are equally valid as regards the conduct of foreign policy by any democratic State, and I was particularly struck by what Mr. Marshall said about the short-term advantages possessed by totalitarian diplomacy, based as it is on deliberate and cynical propaganda.

2. I was also much impressed by Mr. Marshall’s insistence that only “a firm and determined course can save the situation for the democracies”. Faced as we are by a determined opponent of everything that democracy represents, I am quite sure that we can only be saved by a collective display of firmness and determination. In fact the essential thing is to get a clear agreed policy. We should know what our ultimate aim is and clear the details so far as possible and then unwaveringly pursue our policy. This is why it is so important that the long promised quadripartite discussions about Western Europe should be no longer delayed.

3. I cannot agree that the situation in Europe will not further deteriorate if conversations on security are postponed until after Congress rises. As Mr. Marshall is aware, the recent Soviet peace offensive has had a considerable success, at any rate on this side of the Atlantic, and it seems above all necessary to give the French some additional hope of a really workable Security System if they are to be induced to accept the plan for Germany. We must also keep in mind the danger that a separate “neutral” Scandinavian System will develop if the question of mutual support as between Western Europe and the United States is left in the doldrums. I would therefore earnestly beg him to consider the possibility of holding the quadripartite talks as soon as possible.

4. It is true, of course, that the situation would not be completely met if the United States is not able itself to sponsor an Atlantic System in the quadripartite talks. But the summoning of the talks would probably in itself hold the position for a period and it would enable the Western Powers to advance their own ideas as regards general regional security.

5. As regards attendance at the talks, I should certainly hope myself that the Benelux Powers would agree to one of their number acting as a spokesman even if they insisted upon separate representation and I should trust that the Americans would indicate firmly that this would be the right course. We should be delighted if the Canadians were also present. No doubt an agreed explanation of their presence could be worked out between us beforehand.

1. Edward T. Wailes, Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.
2. Infra.
3. Memorandum on former Italian colonies not printed.
4. Reference here is to the contents of May 14 telegram 2128 from London, p. 123.
5. Congress adjourned without House action.
6. An address made before the General Federation of Women’s Clubs in Portland, Oregon on May 28, 1948. See press release of the same date or, for excerpts, see Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1948, p. 744.