Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.00/5–2548

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] May 25, 1948.

Participants:	The Turkish Ambassador—Huseyin Ragip Baydur
	U—Mr. Lovett
	GTI—Mr. Jernegan

During the course of a call to request the agrément for the appointment of Mr. Erkin¹ as Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Baydur asked me about the question of guarantees or assurances which might be given by the United States to certain European countries.

I said that the extension of such guarantees was, of course, contrary to the whole tradition of the United States. Under no circumstances could this Government agree in advance to an arrangement whereby it would be committed automatically to come to the direct assistance of another country. We would always have to consider the circumstances and determine our action in the light of those circumstances at any time. The most that we could do would be to agree to consider the assistance that might be given to foreign countries if necessity arose.

I remarked that nearly every country in the world had requested some sort of assurances from us. In particular, the signatories of the Brussels Pact, the so-called Western European Union, had approached us in this regard. We had felt obliged to inform the French Government, in answer to its request for a guarantee, that such a guarantee could not be made.

I went on to say that the most important thing was that we should maintain and increase our own strength and avoid undertaking too much. The most disastrous thing for the whole world at the present time would be for the United States to exhaust itself financially in such a way that we could neither build up our own military power nor assist in defending other countries. The great deterrent to aggression would be the knowledge that the United States was strong and in a position to repel aggression. We were, of course, taking steps at the present time to increase our military strength through the program for enlarging the Air Force, Selective Service, and the like.

The Ambassador agreed that it was all-important that the United States should be strong and that the steps we were taking were highly desirable. He argued, however, that it was also necessary to make clear to the potential aggressor the limits beyond which we would not permit him to go. It was essential to show, by means of guarantees, agreements, associations or whatever they might be called, that the United States would defend those countries which were most exposed and would be most likely to be subject to attack. If this were done, the Ambassador was confident, based on his personal knowledge of the Soviet Union, that the USSR would refrain from any action which would precipitate a war. He considered that if Britain had been strong and had made its guarantees of other countries early enough, Hitler would never have provoked World War II. The British guarantee of Poland in 1939 had come too late and Britain had been too weak to convince Hitler that an attack on Poland would mean war. Mr. Baydur spoke of the Munich Conference, asserting that the failure of France and Britain to defend Czechoslovakia at that time had convinced Hitler that he could pursue his objectives without danger. We must prevent a similar development today by making it clear that the United States would come to the assistance of threatened countries.

I remarked that the cases of Czechoslovakia and Poland could also be used to prove a different argument, namely, that it was a mistake to make promises which you could not fulfill. France had had a mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia and Britain had given a guarantee to Poland, yet both countries had fallen because France and Britain lacked the strength to live up to their commitments.

I referred to the so-called Vandenberg Resolution which was now before the Senate and pointed out that this Resolution was extremely important. If it were passed, it would provide a basis for our future action and would set the limits for that action. I emphasized that we would not necessarily go as far as the Resolution would permit but that it would at least indicate how far we could go if it seemed desirable. I further pointed out that the Resolution contained four criteria which must be fulfilled in connection with any sort of agreement or association by the United States with any group of foreign countries. First, the countries must do everything possible to help themselves and to cooperate with each other in assuring their own security; in other words, we did not propose to use our strength to replace the potential strength of any foreign country; we would only supplement that strength. Second, the countries concerned must continue their efforts, both individually and collectively, and must make them effective; they could not make an agreement with us and then sit back and rely exclusively upon us to protect them. Third, any association or agreement which we might enter into within the terms of the Vandenberg Resolution would have to be clearly in the national interests of the United States. Fourth, it must be approved by the Congress of the United States. If the Resolution were passed, we would be in position to consider whether we should enter into negotiations for any sort of arrangement within the terms of the Resolution, and would study the different situations presented to us in order of priority.

The Ambassador concluded the conversation by reiterating his belief that it was important for the United States to give some sort of clear guarantees or enter into some arrangements of the sort suggested in order to preserve the peace. It was not a question, he felt, of arranging for another war but of preventing such a war. Unless the Soviet Government was confronted both with the reality of American military force and a clear statement of the determination of the United States to use that force in defense of other countries, there would be no reason for the USSR to desist from its present tactics of constant expansion. I observed that the recent communication by Ambassador Smith to Mr. Molotov² had been intended to make clear to the Soviets that our policy was firm and that we would not allow ourselves to be pushed around. The Ambassador agreed that this was the case but said that he would have preferred to see this communication made after the American rearmament had progressed further and after the United States had extended the guarantees which we had been discussing. He believed that it would have been much more effective in those circumstances.

The Ambassador did not at any time raise the specific question of a guarantee to Turkey, but it was clear that his remarks were made against the background of his previous talks with the Secretary and Mr. Henderson and that his object was to keep before us the Turkish Government’s point of view.³

L[ovett]

1. Feridun C. Erkin presented his credentials August 20, 1948.
2. See telegrams 835 and 836 from Moscow, May 4, 1948, vol. iv, p. 845 and p. 847.
3. The Secretary received Baydur on May 11 at the latter’s request with Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, participating. For text of memorandum of conversation by Henderson covering Turkish concern over the apparent failure of the United States to grant Turkey guarantees against aggression similar to those the Ambassador believed were being extended to Western Europe, see vol. iv, p. 83.

   On May 18, Henderson and John D. Jernegan, Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, met with Baydur who pursued the subject of the May 11 meeting. A memorandum of conversation dated May 18 is in Department of State file 867.00/5–1848.