Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under
Secretary of State (
Lovett
)
top secret
[
Washington
,] March 9, 1948.
Subject: Senator McMahon’s amendment to S–2202
| Participants: |
Senator McMahon |
|
Mr. Bohlen, Counselor |
|
U—Mr. Gullion |
Mr. Gullion showed to the Senator parts A and B of the attached
memorandum.
Mr. Bohlen emphasized to the Senator that the chief danger presented by the
amendment was the possibility that it might cause Sweden and Switzerland to
reject or limit their participation in the economic cooperation plan.
These were the very countries to which the Soviet Union might look for
manufactured equipment of a possible atomic energy application; [Page 698] the Soviets could get little of this
material elsewhere in Europe. Satisfactory agreements were already in
existence covering disposition of any ore controlled by the ERP countries.
The Senator thought that it might be a good idea to force the issue in order
to alert Europe as well as the Russians to the importance we attach to
preventing the exportation of anything to Russia capable of increasing its
potential in atomic weapons.
Mr. Bohlen doubted the amendment would have that effect. It would, however,
strengthen Communist parties and propaganda in Europe, The Senator
discounted the importance of any contribution made to Communist propaganda
which he explained would be as violent and as untruthful no matter what we
did. Mr. Bohlen explained that a matter of timing was involved. Once a basis
of economic cooperation was established, and efforts toward European unity
were thereby assisted and given a surer base, the time would come for
undertaking in concert measures of general economic defense against the
Soviet Union, taking into account requirements of east-west trade. The
position of the western powers would be stronger; they could exploit their
advantage of being considerably less dependent on eastern imports than the
east was on the west.
Mr. Gullion explained the contents of some of our existing agreements and the
degree to which they achieved, or set a pattern for the achievement of the
objectives desired by Senator McMahon. He decribed some of the efforts which
had been made to draft some alternative language, and the difficulties of
including any such language in the ECA bill.
Mr. Bohlen explained that the objections which the Department had to the
bill were of such nature that they could not very well be discussed openly
on the floor. For that reason, if the amendment were to be offered, the
Secretary and others thought it ought to be discussed in committee or
executive session.
At the close of the interview Senator McMahon indicated that he might not
press the amendment.1 He would
consider the matter further and think what he might give as a reason for
renouncing the effort. Mr. Bohlen said that if there was any way in which
the Department could help, it would be glad to do so.
[Annex 1]
[Here follows a memorandum by Gullion to Marshall headed “Part A” and
dated March 9. Its text is identical with that of “Part A” of Gullion’s
memorandum to Marshall, supra.]
[Page 699]
[Annex 2]
Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A.
Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of
State (
Lovett
), to the Secretary of
State
1
top secret
[
Washington
,] March 9, 1948.
Memorandum for the Secretary
Subject: Senator McMahon’s amendment to the Economic
Cooperation Bill (S–2202)
Part B
In summary, the amendment, is undesirable because it may well cause the
very countries, i.e., Sweden and Switzerland, in a position to supply
the Soviet Union with materials other than atomic ores and who receive
relatively little or no aid under the Act, to limit or reject
participation in the Economic Cooperation plan; on the other hand the
amendment is not necessary for the other ERP countries. As explained below, we either already have
satisfactory agreements with respect to the disposition of ores
controlled by them, they are not in a position to contribute, or would
not contribute other materials to the Soviet program, and we have at all
times a powerful lever on them through our ability to cut off aid under
the Act. The amendment would only needlessly trouble our relations with
these countries.
- A.
- We already have agreements with, or satisfactory assurances
from, the U.K., Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands with
respect to disposition of ores known to be controlled by ERP countries. The British are
negotiating another agreement with Portugal which we would
share. The U.K. policy toward export of items related to atomic
energy, other than fissionable materials, is generally similar
to our own, and in any respect where it differs significantly we
believe it can be brought into line through the operation of
existing consultative machinery, without resort to pressure or
quid pro quo stipulations in the
Act.
- B.
- Sweden derives relatively small benefit from the Economic
Cooperation Act; she has, however, agreed to inform us of any
orders for equipment or material which might have possible
atomic energy application. We have evidence that she will refuse
to fulfill orders when we so recommend. It is altogether
possible that the same arrangement can be concluded with the
other ERP countries, including
most importantly Switzerland. The Act gives us no strings on the
latter country which receives no aid. Consequently the suggested
amendment would, if anything, only irritate the Swiss and lessen
our chances of getting the kind of undertaking we want from her.
So far as the other ERP
[Page 700] countries are
concerned, the aid extended by us (which we can cut off at will)
would be a powerful lever in the discussions. Such a separate
approach would be a better way of obtaining the objectives
envisaged by the proposed amendment, than making the tie-up in
the ECA legislation itself; or
such arrangements could be discussed in the framework of Western
European efforts toward a closer union.
- C.
- Belgium. The amendment would be particularly offensive to
Belgium on whom we are chiefly dependent for our raw materials
and who has only recently firmly rejected Soviet pressure for a
uranium understanding. It would appear as an attempt to gain an
advantage beyond that already secured to us by existing
commitments given and taken in good faith. The position of the
Belgian Government would be weakened vis-à-vis both the extreme
nationalist and the Communist element. A change of government in
Belgium would jeopardize our whole atomic energy ore procurement
program.
- D.
- The discussion of this amendment in countries with whom we
have secret agreements would present security risks.
- E.
- The amendment gives opportunities to Soviet propaganda which
we have hitherto sought to avoid by keeping words like
“strategic” or “military” or “atomic” out of the bill.
