Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

SWNCC Files, Lot 52M45

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee ⁹

Washington, 9 June 1947.

SM–8388

Subject: United States Policy Towards China.

In accordance with the request of the State Department, transmitted through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared the enclosed study of the Military Aspects of United States Policy Toward China for the consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Appendix). As requested by the Secretary of State, the views of Colonel J. H. Caughey and Lt. Colonel C. E. Hutchin, Jr., were considered in the preparation of this study.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. G. Lalor

Captain, U. S. Navy Secretary

[Enclosure—Appendix]

Study of the Military Aspects of United States Policy Toward China

1. A study of the military aspects of United States policy toward China indicates that, however other factors in the general situation differ from those found elsewhere in the world where the United States and Soviet policies are in conflict, many of the security factors involved are very similar. In China, as in Europe and in the Middle and Far East, it is clearly Soviet policy to expand control and influence wherever possible. This policy is evidenced by Soviet pressure on those nations lying around the periphery of the Soviet sphere, whenever and wherever conditions are propitious. In the light of this policy, the objectives in China are in most respects similar to those found elsewhere. The principal difference between the situation in China and that in the Near and Middle East is that in China there does not exist a united national government on which effective resistance to Soviet expansionist policy may be based.

2. The Soviet program in China is obviously a long-range one. One apparent objective of this program, as indicated by current communist propaganda, and publicly affirmed by Stalin that “the quickest withdrawal of American forces in China is vitally necessary for the future peace,” (from a release by Tass—Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union—dated 24 September 1946) is to exclude United States influence in China and replace it with that of Moscow. It is believed, however, that the vastness of China, coupled with other conditions which are peculiar to China, such as lack of organization, transportation and communications, have dictated a plan of progressive expansion with the immediate objective limited to the control of the great resources and industrial potential of Manchuria. Except for Manchuria, however, the Soviets probably would be satisfied if internal chaos in the remainder of China were continued. Such chaos in China would serve the interests of the USSR in at least two important respects. It would not only prevent any effective National Government resistance to realization of their aims in Manchuria but it would also facilitate their adoption of a next step into North China or Sinkiang, or both, after they have established and consolidated their control over Manchuria.

3. There is evidence that current Soviet intentions are to remove Manchuria from the Chinese economy and integrate it into the economy of Eastern Siberia. That this is the intention of the Soviets is indicated by:

a. Their obvious efforts and success in preventing the reestablishment of active Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.

b. The stripping of equipment from important Manchurian industries and moving that equipment into Soviet industrial areas in Eastern Siberia.

c. The Sino-Soviet treaties of August 1945¹⁰ which, as a result of Soviet pressure on China, gave the Soviets legal control of Manchuria’s only efficient system of communications and important trade outlets thus channeling Manchuria’s food and raw materials into the expanded Soviet industrial areas, thereby contributing to the self-sufficiency of those areas.

d. The systematic encirclement of Manchuria both through the establishment of strong Soviet military positions in Northern Korea, Port Arthur and Mongolia and through encouragement given communist forces in Manchuria itself.

4. If the Soviets succeed in their efforts to integrate Manchuria into the Siberian economy, they will have gone far toward bringing about the economic and military self-sufficiency of the Soviet Far Eastern Provinces which has long been an important Soviet objective. Their control of the most important economic areas, coupled with a prolongation of internal strife in China, is likely to result in complete economic collapse of the National Government, or in its ultimate submission to Soviet and Chinese communist pressure. In either case, conditions would be such as to facilitate the eventual continued expansion of Soviet power in Asia southward through China and towards Indo-China, Malaysia and India. It is believed that the economic reconstruction of China is essential to her achieving political stability, for, without economic stability, the revolutionary factors underlying the current civil war cannot be eliminated.

5. Communists in China are frequently described as differing basically from communists found in other parts of the world. While they have not always followed the normal pattern of communist operations employed in other countries, it is believed that Chinese communists have merely adjusted their techniques and operations to fit the conditions found in agrarian and undeveloped China and to facilitate progress toward achievement of their long-range objectives in the Far East. That they have in some respects improved conditions in areas brought under their control is believed due not so much to deviations from normal communistic doctrine as to the appalling conditions which existed in those areas prior to their gaining control. That improvement may, however, well prove to be temporary if the communists gain complete control of the Chinese Government. Without United States aid, these conditions are likely to continue and will offer fertile fields to further the spread of communism. It is believed, however, that the Chinese communists, as all others, are Moscow inspired and thus motivated by the same basic totalitarian and antidemocratic policies as are the communist parties in other countries of the world. Accordingly, they should be regarded as tools of Soviet policy. Indeed, the advantageous position which they currently enjoy in Manchuria and in Northern China is in great part due to the assistance which they received from the Soviet armies at the time the Soviets occupied Manchuria. During that period Chinese communist troops enjoyed complete freedom of movement and activity which enabled them to establish control over an area in which they had never previously had any significant influence. National Government troops on the other hand were hampered and delayed by the Soviets in moving troops into Manchuria to re-establish Chinese control, even though the Soviet Government had previously recognized Chinese sovereignty over that area. In addition, the Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria was so timed and conducted as to enable the Chinese communist forces to supply themselves completely with Japanese arms and equipment “abandoned” by Soviet forces. As a direct result of this preferential treatment the communists have gained sufficient strength in Manchuria to prevent National Government forces from eliminating armed communist opposition, except possibly as the result of a protracted all-out civil war which could lead only to further deterioration in Chinese economic and military strength. Had the Soviets not thus assisted the communists in Manchuria it is quite possible that the National Government would long ago have been able to eliminate the communist forces in Northern and Eastern China. While military success of the Chinese communist army would unquestionably facilitate accomplishment of Soviet objectives in China, so also would continuation of the disunity and chaos resulting from a protracted civil war.

6. A factor of major importance, with regard to peace and security interests both of the United States and the world, is the position which China occupies in the United Nations. Due principally to United States support and insistence, China is considered as one of the great powers and, as such, shares with U. S., U. K., USSR and France a predominant responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. A continuation of the current conditions in China, particularly the armed opposition of the communists to the National Government, may well lead to conditions of chaos which will prevent the Chinese National Government from carrying out any of its military obligations and commitments to the United Nations. Furthermore, a Chinese National Government rendered impotent and ineffective by a continuation of internal strife will not enhance the prestige of the United Nations nor will it serve to build up confidence in that organization. As one of the great powers, China is also one of the permanent members of the Security Council and thus possesses the power of veto. A continuation of the Chinese civil war, to the point where the strength of the Chinese National Government would deteriorate and be overthrown by the communist forces, would have the effect of removing from the Security Council a Chinese government friendly to the United States and replacing it with one under the control of the USSR. Such a development would adversely affect United States security interests and, in the light of current unified communist efforts to secure control of the French Government with success quite possible in the foreseeable future, makes it imperative that the United States take positive action to prevent such an eventuality.

7. It is believed that several courses of action are open to the United States with regard to China. On one hand, the United States can give assistance and strengthen the Chinese Government to the extent necessary to prevent Soviet expansion. Such a course of action would allow time for proper political action to be applied by the Chinese National Government and to take effect. On the other hand, the United States can choose to withdraw entirely from China and permit conditions in that country to drift further into chaos and disunity with the probable result that the Soviets will gain complete control over Manchuria and will sweep over the remainder of China. If this should occur, the United States must be prepared to accept eventual Soviet hegemony over Asia.

8. It is the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the fundamental objective of United States policy toward China is to expedite the establishment of a stable representative government over a strong and unified China friendly to the United States. Soviet expansionist aims in China, furthered by the operations of Chinese communists, are clearly incompatible with this United States objective. In China, as elsewhere, it would appear that the threat of Soviet expansion will only be finally averted when, as a result of political development the Western concept of democracy and rights of the individual has proven to the Chinese its practical and ideological superiority over communism and other forms of totalitarianism. The nature and timing of this political action are matters beyond the competence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, that the military security of the United States will be threatened if there is any further spread of Soviet influence and power in the Far East. Early countermeasures are called for if this danger of Soviet expansion is to be halted. With a disarmed and occupied Japan, the only Asiatic government at present capable of even a show of resistance to Soviet expansion in Asia is the Chinese National Government.

9. It is recognized that serious and difficult practical problems are involved in giving aid to the present Chinese National Government. Much American money and material assistance have been given and absorbed by China since the end of the war without any noticeable effect on the steadily worsening internal affairs of that country. China is so vast, the need of her people so great, and the politico-military situation so complex, that there may be some doubt as to whether any conceivable outlay of United States money and resources could be effective. It should be recognized, however, that the assistance which the United States has provided China since the end of the war has been piecemeal and uncoordinated. There have been no firm objectives based on a definite United States policy toward China other than the aspiration to influence the two major political elements to achieve a peaceful solution of their irreconcilable differences. Regardless of the corruption and the political shortcomings of the present National Government, it is believed that recent events have proven conclusively that under present circumstances the Chinese communists will only accept a solution which would assure their early control of the government and ultimate communist domination of China, which would jeopardize the military security of the United States.

10. The military problem in China involves important political, psychological and morale factors. A strengthened military posture on the part of the Chinese National Government may be of more importance, as the result of morale factors involved, in bringing about military success in their operations against the communists than will the operational use of any material assistance which we may contribute to the attainment of this posture. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not have authoritative information on the specific needs of the Chinese National Government in the form of military equipment, assurance and advice, nor what material and economic aid and advice will be required to develop the sound economy necessary to build and maintain a strong military posture and unification of the country. This will require a detailed military and economic study. It is believed, however, that the latent resources and manpower of China are such that even small amounts of United States assistance to the National Government will materially strengthen its morale and at the same time weaken the morale of the Chinese communists. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the President’s 12 March 1947 message to Congress¹¹ had this effect on the morale of the opposing elements of the Greek populace torn by dissidence strikingly similar to that in China. It is conceivable that the announcement of firm United States support of the National Government might cause the Chinese communists to accept the terms which have been offered them by the National Government in order to bring about cessation of hostilities. If the Chinese communists do not accept these terms, it would appear that a relatively small amount of military assistance, in large part merely ammunition and replacement parts for American equipment furnished the National Government forces during and immediately following the recent war, should enable the National Government to establish control over areas now under communist control.

11. In the light of the foregoing discussion it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, from the military point of view, carefully planned, selective and well-supervised assistance to the National Government, under conditions which will assure that this assistance will not be misused, will definitely contribute to United States security interests. Such assistance should facilitate the military development which appears essential for the unification and stabilization of China. It should enable China more effectively to resist Soviet expansionist efforts in the Far East and will thus contribute to the military security of the United States. In addition, it should be a stabilizing factor throughout the Far East. A firm United States position in this regard, as in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, would serve the cause of peace as well as the other aims of the United Nations.

12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared specific comments from the military point of view with regard to the eight point policy proposal of the Secretary of State in his memorandum dated 11 February 1947¹² and the comments of the Secretaries of War and State in their letters of 26 February 1947 and 4 March 1947 (Appendix¹³). The Joint Chiefs of Staff have attempted to limit their comments to the military security aspects of the problem. It has been necessary, however, to take cognizance of the fact that this is in reality but one element of the global problem with regard to the military security aspects of over-all United States policy. For example, it has been necessary to consider the world-wide impact of the broad policy which the President has recently proposed, and which has been approved by the Congress in connection with aid to Greece and Turkey. The over-all purpose of this policy appears to be to further the ideals of the United Nations and of the Western Democracies and at the same time to oppose further territorial and ideological expansion by the Soviet Union. From the military point of view it is believed important that if this policy is to be effective it must be applied with consistency in all areas of the world threatened by Soviet expansion. Otherwise, if temporarily halted by our action in Greece and Turkey, the Soviets may decide to accelerate expansion in the Far East, in order to gain control of those areas which outflank us in the Near and Middle East.

13. The following are the major conclusions arrived at as a result of this study:

a. The United States must seek to prevent the growth of any single power or coalition to a position of such strength as to constitute a threat to the Western Hemisphere. A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major threat to United States security.

b. United States security interests require that China be kept free from Soviet domination; otherwise all of Asia will in all probability pass into the sphere of the USSR.

c. It is to United States military interests that the nations of Eurasia oppose Soviet expansion.

d. Soviet expansionist aims and long-range objectives are being furthered in China by the military operations of the Chinese communists.

e. Soviet expansionist aims in China, furthered by operations of Chinese communists, are clearly incompatible with United States security.

f. With a disarmed and occupied Japan, the only Asiatic government at present capable of even a show of resistance to communist expansion in Asia is the Chinese National Government.

g. Unless the Chinese National Government is given military assistance sufficient to resist effectively communist expansion in China that government will probably collapse, thus terminating the only single and unified opposition to Soviet expansionist aims in Asia.

h. United States commitments to the United Nations in which China at United States insistence is one of the designated five great powers, require our support of the National Government’s efforts to gain control over Manchuria; otherwise China’s military potential of raw materials essential to her future development into a great power will be lost to her.

i. Time works to the advantage of the USSR in China. The continuation of chaos can be expected eventually to result in the fall of the Chinese National Government. United States assistance, including military aid, is necessary at an early date if any degree of stabilization for China is to be attained.

j. United States assistance to those nations on the periphery of Soviet controlled areas in Eurasia should be given in accordance with an over-all plan. This plan should take into account the necessity for the maintenance of the Chinese National Government’s resistance to the communists and should eventually provide sufficient assistance to that Government to eliminate all communist armed opposition, the latter in accordance with the priorities established by the over-all plan.

[Subenclosure—Annex]

The following are comments from the military point of view with regard to the eight points contained in the memorandum of the Secretary of State dated 11 February 1947,¹⁴ the comments of the Secretary of War and the further comments of the Secretary of State:

1. “We continue to encourage China to achieve unity by democratic methods of consultation and agreement.”

This is primarily a political matter and is not within the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. “We maintain a constructive and sympathetic (as distinguished from exacting) attitude in determining the extent to which conditions in China should improve as a prerequisite to giving economic assistance.”

This is primarily a political matter and is not within the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. “We withhold military aid to China in any form which would contribute to or encourage civil war.”

A strict interpretation of a decision to withhold aid which would contribute to or encourage civil war must mean a decision to withhold assistance of any sort to China, so long as there is armed opposition to the Chinese National Government. Any economic or financial support to China must inevitably, even though indirectly, improve to some degree the over-all position of the National Government in its present war with the Chinese Communists. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that to withhold military aid which might support or encourage civil war is consistent neither with our policies in other parts of Eurasia, nor with our desire for stability in China. Furthermore, the withholding of military assistance is wholly incompatible with other proposed elements of the policy toward China, such as the maintenance of a military advisory group and the delivery of non-military items and ships to China. Although indecisive in themselves, these non-military items would have a definite beneficial effect on the Chinese economy. Accordingly, they may be construed as contributing to or encouraging the National Government to continue the civil war. By providing such indecisive aid we are to some extent prolonging the period that the National Government is able to conduct operations in the current civil war, and are thus furthering the overall deterioration of China’s ability to resist Soviet infiltration. Under these circumstances either a military stalemate or the ultimate collapse of the National Government appears to be inevitable.

From the military point of view a most serious consequence of a stalemate in China would be to assure that Manchuria is lost to China by incorporation into the eastern Siberian economy. Such incorporation would be serious for the following reasons. It would deny China her richest mineral and agricultural area, with its great industrial potential, and thus will prevent her from achieving, within the foreseeable future, the ability to defend herself from her enemies. Furthermore, the addition of Manchurian potential to the self-sufficiency of the already formidable economic and military development of eastern Siberia, and the simultaneous weakening of the remainder of China would enable and encourage the Soviets, when they deem conditions favorable, further to expand their control in eastern Asia on through China, Korea, Malaysia and India.

On the other hand, should the Chinese National Government collapse, the eventual triumph of the communists who will control the only remaining organized force of considerable strength in China, will be certain with results identical to those which may be expected to result from a military stalemate. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the strictly military point of view do not concur in withholding military aid to the Chinese National Government.

4. “We maintain a modest Military Advisory Group in China and to this end support in Congress the general Military and Naval Missions Bill.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in favor of the maintenance of a Military Advisory Group in China of sufficient size to carry out the functions assigned by the Presidential directive of 26 February 1946, and feel that the size now contemplated should be satisfactory provided the group is given proper support.

While strongly favoring the maintenance of a Military Advisory Group to China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this group would serve no useful purpose if it were United States policy to give no assistance to China which might encourage or contribute to civil war. If the Military Advisory Group makes any progress toward its objective of increasing the efficiency of the Chinese National Army, it will inevitably have some influence on the conduct of that army in the war against the communists. This can hardly be reconciled with any United States non-interference policy. It is believed that if the ultimate decision taken is that no military aid is to be given China, the influence of the Military Advisory Group will not be commensurate with the effort involved in maintaining the group, and under such circumstances it should be withdrawn. The Joint Chiefs of Staff visualize, however, that the political consequences of such withdrawal would be most serious and might influence the Chinese National Government to yield to Soviet pressure. They believe that United States personnel should be available to assure that any assistance which may be furnished China will not be misused by the National Government to entrench corrupt and inefficient control of China, but will be used entirely to attain the end of a strong and democratic China. From the military viewpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in Point 4 above subject to the deletion of the word “modest”.

5. “We defer action on a Military Advisory Group Bill.”

It is the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Military and Naval Missions Bill, now before the Congress, will provide adequate legislative authority for a Military Advisory Group to China. It would appear, therefore, that the Military Advisory Group Bill is not vital at this time. Additional legislation may be required, however, to provide specific authorization for military aid to China of the general nature envisaged in this study. See comments under Points 3 and 4.

6. “In any legislation authorizing the supply of military equipment to China the Secretary of State has final decision with regard to the time, type and quantity of disposals of such equipment.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the views of the Secretaries of State and War that the Secretary of State has the primary responsibility for advising the President with regard to the timing and political aspects of transfers of military equipment to any foreign nations, including China, following consideration of all aspects of the issue by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy.

7. “We continue to withhold for the present delivery of additional military-type equipment under the 8⅓ Air Group Program.”

The discussion under Point 3 above contains the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this regard. It is noted, however, that the Chinese Government apparently believes that the United States Government is firmly committed to the fulfillment of this program.

8. “We approve the transfer to China of the 159 mercantile ships, subject to determination of China’s ability to operate them effectively.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the advisability of transferring these ships to China under the conditions specified. It is understood that steps have already been taken to accomplish this transfer. As indicated in the discussions under Point 3, however, this transfer does not seem to be in accord with a United States policy of withholding aid which might contribute to or encourage Chinese civil war.

9. Circulated by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as SWNCC 83/22, June 11; copies of the enclosure were forwarded to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.
10. Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10 p. 300.
11. Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1947, p. 534.
12. See footnote 20, p. 794.
13. Subenclosure printed herewith.
14. See footnote 20, p. 794.