121.893/9–447
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt)
Mr. Tsui21 called by appointment to discuss informally, and as lie indicated, without the knowledge of his Ambassador his personal views in regard to the Wedemeyer Statement and the official Chinese reaction thereto.
Mr. Tsui said that it was originally his thought that the Wedemeyer Statement had probably only been made with the prior knowledge and consent of the Generalissimo and that the purpose of the Statement was to support any action which he might wish to make in connection with a possible reorganization of the Government and removal of incompetent or venal officials. He had assumed, for example, that the statements made by certain of the more prominent Chinese officials had been made on their own initiative, or perhaps under pressure from the groups they represented. However, because of the similarity of views expressed by officials representing such diverse interests as do Chang Chun, Sun Fo, Wu Teh-chen and Chen Li-fu, he had reluctantly reached the conclusion that they must have been inspired by the Generalissimo himself.
Mr. Tsui said that apparently the Chinese Government had, perhaps prematurely, reached the conclusion that the Wedemeyer Statement presaged a recommendation from General Wedemeyer that the Chinese Government was not worthy of support. He said that it was his personal opinion that this was not necessarily the case and that notwithstanding the tenor of the Wedemeyer Statement it was nevertheless possible that General Wedemeyer would recommend substantial aid to China, perhaps with strings attached. He expressed considerable concern that the Secretary and General Wedemeyer would resent these public statements by prominent Chinese officials to the extent that it would prejudice any recommendations which they might otherwise have made on the basis of the findings of the Mission. He expressed relief that the Generalissimo himself had not attacked the Wedemeyer Statement as his failure to do so had left him free to repudiate the expressed views of his subordinates as being without authority.
I informed Mr. Tsui that I had no information in regard to what recommendations General Wedemeyer would make on his return to this country, but I assured him that both the Secretary and General Wedemeyer would understand that the Chinese reaction was largely [Page 769] the result of hurt pride and that it would not unduly influence them in their recommendations. I added, however, that these public statements could not help but have a considerable influence in molding public opinion in this country and indirectly on the Congress which is responsive to public opinion and in the final analysis would have to pass upon any major program for assistance to China.
Mr. Tsui said that he would like to make a suggestion in the interests of our two countries. He asked whether it might be possible in a future press release or by other means for the Chinese to be informed that the Wedemeyer Statement did not necessarily indicate that China could not expect any substantial aid from this country (if indeed, such were the case). He indicated that this was a matter of some urgency as otherwise the Generalissimo might by some public statement or other action make any program which General Wedemeyer might be prepared to recommend increasingly difficult to implement.
I informed Mr. Tsui that I would discuss his views with Mr. Penfield.22