121.893/9–1947
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Philip D. Sprouse63
The following are the highpoints of the remarks by Dr. Yeh64 during a long conversation at the Foreign Office on the evening of July 29:
China must have peace, and the cessation of civil war is the most urgent problem. Economic recovery and reconstruction can be accomplished only if there is peace. When reminded that peace would require agreement by both Chinese sides, he admitted the difficulty but reiterated that there must be peace. He did not explain how it [Page 685] could be brought about. The Generalissimo is motivated chiefly by concern for his security and this has resulted in repressive measures against students, contrary to the advice of many Government officials. He has promulgated a National General Mobilization Order, which will give the Government complete power to put the nation on a war footing and enable it to obtain conscripts and grain for the armies. This will cause further opposition to the Government. The Government can continue for some time under present conditions but its authority will slowly grow weaker. With all the faults of the Generalissimo, there is no one to take his place. In spite of his announcement to the visiting U. S. publishers that he can soon wipe out the Communists, there are not many people who believe that this can be done. There may eventually be a divided China with the Communists in control in Manchuria and parts of north China, but the Communists will not be able to gain control over the rest of China and dominate the country.
… He should then be persuaded that he must do something for the welfare of the people and must carry out reforms which will bring to the Government the support of the people. Secret police practices must be abolished and the people must not be allowed to live in fear. The second important step is for the U. S. to do something about the Chinese armies. Ninety percent of the officers from the rank of colonel and up should be eliminated and the armies reorganized and trained properly. Corruption and lawless acts among the army commanders have made the army an inefficient machine and has lowered morale and Government armies are now inferior to the Communists. The U. S. should assist China with loans for reconstruction projects and credits for commodity purchases. The Gimo would not accept complete U. S. supervision over such loans or credits. He is not anti-foreign; he is a Chinese with pride who looks on himself as the savior and leader of his country. He feels that if the U. S. is a friend, it should extend financial aid in a friendly manner and without strings attached thereto. His qualities which enabled him to lead the country through the war against Japan are perhaps an impediment under present circumstances.
The U. S. should not try to persuade him to compromise with the Chinese Communists—this he will not do. The Chinese Communists do receive some assistance from the USSR in Manchuria but direct evidence is difficult to obtain. Soviet-trained Japanese and Korean troops have fought with the Communists and the USSR maintains military advisors with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria. There is the possibility that many Chinese who have worked with the Chinese Communists would leave them if there were a good government [Page 686] for them to support. The Generalissimo is still convinced that he can deal with the Communists by force and does not realize that the only real means of meeting the Communists is through honest efficient government. Asked whether the Generalissimo would delegate responsibility to the many able and honest officials now in the Government, such as Dr. Wang Shih-chieh,65 Dr. Wong Wen-hao66 and others, Dr. Yeh said that this was slowly happening of late because many Government ministries were no longer accepting without question the orders emanating from the Generalissimo and that if the right people could get to the Gimo and discuss things with him he could be persuaded. It was difficult, of course as many officials were afraid to talk openly and frankly with the Gimo. The U. S. has a responsibility for the situation in Manchuria as a result of its share in the Yalta Agreement and its encouragement of the Chinese Communists through its mediation effort.
The foregoing comments are the most frank that Dr. Yeh has ever made to me during the three years I have known him as he is usually guarded in his observations. The general tone of his conversation was admittedly pessimistic.
- This memorandum and the six memoranda following were submitted by Mr. Sprouse on September 19 to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth).↩
- George Yeh, Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Chairman of the Chinese National Resources Commission.↩