893.00 Manchuria/10–2547

The Consul General at Peiping ( Clubb ) to the Ambassador in China ( Stuart )24

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s instruction of July 9, 194725 directing that a report be made on any existing and potential factional alignments in Communist-controlled areas, and to my despatch of October 20, 1947,26 and to offer below, on a tentative basis, certain observations in regard to the matter in point.

It would be my general observation that, during any such period as the Communists might be successful along the lines of a certain hypothetical policy, the chances of a split in their leadership are comparatively slight; and that, conversely, if they suffer severe setbacks at any particular time, there will be some elements which will possibly endeavor either to mould a different general policy more in line with their particular trend of thought, or will even split off from the main body. The main problems of policy over which a split might occur would probably be 1) the question of the advisability of continuing with armed insurrection in the hypothetical event that there were offered to the Communists a new opportunity of political development through negotiation (if they have no alternatives but to fight or to be exterminated, they will of course fight), and 2) the question of the political profit gained through, and therefore the desirability of, continuing with an overtly pro-USSR and anti-USA policy. The two problems are naturally intimately related one to the other.

There was obtained at Changchun very little concrete evidence to offer in support of any speculations along these lines, but the comments below are submitted for what they are worth.

1.
The leadership in Manchuria is definitely subjected at the present time to what might be called a “Soviet influence”, and that influence has real force by reason of the circumstance that the Manchurian Communists are closely tied to the USSR by the character of the mutual trade being carried on between North Manchuria and the USSR. The Communists are in main dependent upon that trade for getting subsistence articles for popular consumption, and perhaps some materials or commodities of use as well for their industrial and even military effort. In practical terms, cut off from non-Soviet sources of supply, they cannot afford, politically, to act other than [Page 337] in ways which tend naturally to strengthen those ties, rather than to weaken them.
2.
This intimacy of economic relationships, by various unrelated reports, has not resulted in a like cementing of friendship and collaboration between individual Communist leaders and Soviet representatives. There are indications that there have been actual points of friction upon occasion. Those frictions must be viewed as superficial and not affecting basic general policies. There exists nevertheless the basic Chinese feeling of nationalism which tends to give rise to resentment on the Chinese side against any evidence of “foreign interference” with Chinese affairs. This circumstance, together with the fact that, so far as known, the Soviets have not succeeded in introducing into the Chinese Communist leadership any preponderance of Russian-trained Communist leaders of Chinese nationality who would be prepared to do Moscow bidding without question and without consideration for Chinese interests, has tended to keep the Chinese Communist movement politically less than completely integrated into the international Communist movement. This development has been facilitated, in a negative way, by what seems to be a Soviet policy—presumably based on political considerations deemed by the Soviet leaders to be determinative—of refraining from direct politico-military support of the Communist regime in North Manchuria. This refers, of course, to direct intervention, and not either economic exchange or the action of Comintern agents. It is noted in this general connection that the most prominent Chinese Communist who might be considered to be under Soviet influence would be Li Li-san (Li Minjan).27 Chou Pao-chung, military leader, although subjected previously to Soviet influence, is a former subordinate of the Manchurian “resistance” leader Li Tu, and can probably properly be classified as an autonomist in heart. That category would very probably also include Chang Hsueh-szu (Hsueh-shih),28 who, reputedly, originally sided with the Communists in the fall of 1945 with the idea that he was furthering the cause of Manchurian autonomy. Lin Piao himself, although presumably at the present time in line with the thinking which governs Communist policy in Manchuria, is after all a Yenan man who can hardly have thrown off his essential Chinese nationalism excepting on grounds of expediency. Wan Yi would seem to belong to the same category.
3.
Time would ordinarily tend to bring about the development of younger leaders more in line with Comintern thinking, assuming that the Soviets adopted an aggressive, forward policy in respect to Manchuria and Korea. They may adopt such policy. It is nevertheless logically conceivable that, with Soviet interest concentrated primarily in Europe, they would decide to follow a line of “nonintervention” in Asia and thus avoid dangerous dissipation of their energies for a theoretical gain which must inevitably constitute but small direct gain. The available indications thus far have been that the Soviets have steered clear of actual direct involvement in the Chinese civil war. It would appear to be quite within the realm of possibility, especially if they are under American pressure on their main front in the west, that they will choose the prudent course and avoid direct positive commitments in Asia. In those circumstances, there would be less force exercised toward the development of a cadre of Chinese Communists who might be directly subservient to the Moscow command.
4.
The Chinese Communists have suffered certain reverses in North China that cannot be other than painful for them to contemplate. The reputed dispatch of Nationalist reinforcements from inside the Wall into Manchuria will inevitably make more difficult for the time being the achievement by them here of their ultimate aim—conquest of Manchuria. The obvious deterioration of the economic and social structure of the country is something which cannot but affect the Communist economy as well as the Nationalist economic structure, for they are integrally related parts of the same whole. The deterioration would be considered by the Communists to have the more significance for them the farther they progress in the political field (in terms of territorial gains as well as political history). In those circumstances they must look to the future—and a future tied to the Soviet Union alone offers them nothing but bleak prospects in terms of obtaining needed industrial and communications materials, and even to a large degree in terms of consumption goods: they cannot subsist entirely on matches, soap, and vodka. The more the Communists develop in China, the more necessary it is for them to look toward the United States for economic goods. Granted that the Chinese Communists are naive, because inexperienced, in respect to foreign commerce, there are assuredly certain Communists, and particularly such Communists who have attained a certain degree of intellectual maturity, such as Chou En-lai29 and Yeh Chien-ying,30 [Page 339] who realize that, if man does not live by bread alone, the large stock of “inspiration” they get from Moscow will do little toward restoring China’s shattered industry and prostrate finances. That they should in those circumstances tend to strain at the Moscow leash, and look with some longing in the direction of American markets, would only be natural.
5.
There has to date been no considerable defection, whether political or military, from the Communist ranks. If they had a better direction in which to turn, possibly some elements such as the “Autonomists”, or the Mongols, or the Koreans, or sympathetic students and “Fellow-travellers”, might desert the Communist ranks. The fact of the matter is, however, that the Nationalist Government has increasingly failed to convince the politically conscious elements in the country that its worn shibboleths offer real hope of political and economic progress for the nation, and that there exists no third Chinese party with the force to make its will felt against the police batons of the Nationalists on the one side and the “liquidation” policies of the Communists on the other. The politically bent must choose between the two armed opponents. It seems unlikely that Communist defeats have yet been sufficient to cause any considerable fraction of the hardened veterans to think of a surrender without a future. The more probable conclusion appears to be that 1) insofar as there is any change, it will be a general change of policy, for reasons of political strategy, on the part of the Chinese Communist Party; 2) that the change will probably be related to overall Comintern policy; and 3) it will, therefore, be designed to embarrass American policies and further Soviet Russian aims in Asia. The particular form such reorientation might take would seem to be along the lines of portraying the Communists to be the true proponents of peace, and the Nationalist Government and any backers to be imperialistic warmongers. That reorientation would have some real political value as distinct from propaganda value, only if it resulted in the Communists’ obtaining some concrete advantage thereby. With particular reference to my reference despatch of October 20, it is suggested, purely speculatively, that the following advantages would actually accrue to the Communist side in the event that there were new “peace negotiations”, presumably backed up by American mediation, followed by a truce: 1) the immediate pressure would be taken off the Communist positions in North China; 2) the Communists would be enabled to consolidate their gains in Manchuria (very possibly including new gains, still unachieved but planned to be accomplished before a truce really became effective, in the Changchun-Kirin area); and 3) the United States might be embarrassed in the implementation of any project, [Page 340] such as proposed in some quarters (as has undoubtedly come to the attention of both the USSR and the Chinese Communists) for the rendering of positive aid to the Nationalist Government in the form of military supplies, military instruction, credits for purchase of materials, and the bolstering up of Nationalist finances.

That the National Government might also benefit substantially from a truce that gave its hard-pressed economy a breathing-spell is obvious.

Conclusion.

The United States is undeniably interested in two major things in the Far East: 1) the strengthening of its own position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and 2) the making of some contribution to the unification of China and the improvement of the lot of its people. Assuming a Soviet-inspired a [sic] move by the Chinese Communists such as outlined above, the opportunity for the United States to further its aims would reside in the chance offered to put a damper on the anti-American propaganda of the Chinese Communists, and to suggest terms of agreement between the warring parties which would, if mutually beneficial, give neither side an advantage tantamount to victory—and would contribute, more than to the political advantage of either party to the dispute, to the general prosperity of the country and its people. It is believed that, while the matter is still on a hypothetical basis, it would hardly be economical of effort to endeavor to set forth now proposed terms of agreement; it is believed, however, that the problem of finding terms which, with a time-limit attached, would be of such a character as to offer to both sides a fair chance of disposing of their differences while giving neither a foothold for new political jockeying in an effort to get the United States to “take sides”, is a subject entirely susceptible of logical solution. That such an approach would be successful of course could not be guaranteed, for the mutual suspicions, ill-will and bad faith which existed between the two sides in 1946–7 have only been deepened in recent months. But the attempt would cost less in terms of materials and money than positive support of one side against the other in a deteriorating economic situation, and might bring political benefits, particularly if the move were strongly backed by a mobilization of public opinion. It is suggested generally that, in the existing circumstances, and having in the background of memory the American experience of Communist-inspired propaganda and of Chinese nationalistic sensibilities during the period of General Marshall’s mediation, one tactical approach might be to meet any new Communist move by a proposal to handle the matter either by 1) an invitation to the Soviet Union to consider the problem jointly with the United States and Great Britain, or by 2) bringing the matter before the United Nations [Page 341] for discussion with the aim of enlisting general support for mediation, even if still by the United States, in the Chinese political struggle.

Such an approach as proposed in the first alternative would place the Soviet Union on record; and if the Soviet Union, refused to participate the United States and Great Britain and interested Dominions could consult among themselves; while if the Soviet Union accepted there would presumably be felt no need by the other participating Pacific Powers to adhere to the veto rule in the reaching of any final agreement. As a matter of political tactics, in fact, the first alternative might be tried, and then, in the event of failure, the second alternative be next taken up. The second alternative would offer interesting possibilities of enlisting support for American proposals, and that support would give to subsequent American action both the legal and moral force which would enhance the possibilities of success. Here too, however, if there were failure, the United States would still be in a position to say that it had exhausted the possibilities of action along multilateral lines and now proposed, with the agreement of the two Chinese parties to the dispute, to endeavor once more to contribute to the stabilization of China. The chief cost of this indirect approach would be time (which would be needed for any approach decided upon), but the political gains during that time would, it is submitted, probably well warrant that cost.

It is believed that it would be fruitless, however, to base any new American move on the premise that the Communists would voluntarily either lay down their arms or renounce territorial gains: being Communists, they aim at total victory, and will not give up any fraction of success already gained. Any American move should be with full appreciation of Communist motives and should be designed to serve American ends with superior strategy and force.

Respectfully yours,

O. Edmund Clubb
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department without covering despatch; received about November 12.
  2. Not printed; see footnote 79, p. 203.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Former head of the Chinese Communist Party, he spent 1931–1945 in the Soviet Union and, on going to Manchuria in 1945 with the Soviet Army, became political adviser to Lin Piao, Chinese Communist general commanding in Manchuria in 1946.
  5. Brother of the “Young Marshal”, Chang Hsueh-liang, former ruler of Manchuria.
  6. Head of the Chinese Communist delegation during 1946 negotiations with the Chinese Government and General of the Army George C. Marshall.
  7. Chinese Communist Party Commissioner of Executive Headquarters at Peiping until 1947.