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Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in China (Perkins)49
Today I called upon Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan, to pay a courtesy call as we were old friends from [Page 31] Kunming days.50 I had naturally hoped to obtain a few splinters of fact and opinion during a brief call, but Dr. Chiang proceeded during an hour to develop what appears to be a good portion of the present Kuomintang thesis. There are detailed below a few of his observations:
- 1.
- Military. The Generallisimo returned from his recent visit to Hsuchow front with a very hopeful view of the military situation, and the military people now expect the “defeat” of the Communists will be accomplished in a shorter time than had been estimated. The battle is one for annihilation of four Communist armies and the clearance of Reds from Shantung to enable resumption of rail traffic on the Tientsin-Pukow line. The National Government means business. In remarking on the superiority of performance of Stilwell51-trained troops in Manchuria, Dr. Chiang mentioned that two or three Chinese regiments had through incompetent direction been badly cut up in the Shantung fighting. However, he raised no cry of woe about Nationalist lack of matériel.
- 2.
- Political. Dr. Chiang was reticent about the reorganization of the Government, but he indicated a fairly low regard for third parties and their potentialities. He thought the Democratic League was opportunistic and was waiting for the breaks; the effect of their stand was of aid to the Communists and he felt that some League members were little different from Communists. One League member told him that his group, however, desired peace above all, since full-scale war would result in a clamp-down on League activities as being subversively critical during a war. He thought the whole crowd of third party people were doctrinaire and incapable of the responsibilities of power. The Youth Party and the Democratic Socialists received their chief financial support from the Szechwanese.52 The purport of Dr. Chiang’s comments on the political question was that the Kuomintang is the only ponderable force in governmental matters or vis-à-vis the Communists.
- He went on to explain that land reform was on the way; concentration camps had been done away with; censorship lightened; airfield inspection by secret police abolished (for the reason apparently that plugging up only one avenue of travel for subversive agents did little or no good); etc., etc.
- 3.
- Economic. The situation was bad and the next six months was the critical period. He recognized the menace of Communist economic [Page 32] attrition. He then spoke mournfully of the possibilities of the Chinese being driven back to the age of barter. This led to his mention of the loan question: $500,000,000 was a useful sum, yes, but it would actually be only a sprinkling of the ground. What was needed was a sum running into the billions, with construction of railways, highways, industries, a Yangtze TVA, all over a period of years perhaps, but grandiose and sweeping. American advisers and technical people should be brought in by the thousands.
- 4.
- Student Demonstrations. I wanted particularly to get Dr. Chiang’s view on the political effect of student movements today, as compared with former days (when students at one time thrashed a Foreign Minister and brought about the Minister’s as well as Chiang Kai-shek’s resignation). He was not explicit; the impression gained, however, was that students in most instances might well be allowed to blow off steam and that if this were done without violent repression, the total effect of their activity would be considerably reduced.… In connection with the Wen-Li assassinations in Kunming,55 he said, he took special pains to track down responsibility for the shooting and eventually it was pinned on the military people, some of whom received at least a nominal punishment.
Comment: Dr. Chiang, by reason of his high political position, has apparently been influential in the comparatively sage handling of student movements recently (he has agitated in his own day and at one time carried the torch against missionaries, consequently he knows his students). However, such a staying influence has limited power and reach. On the whole, I have tentatively formed two conclusions: student movements under a regime as strong as the present one, and with such apathy and immobility of public opinion as exists today, have much less immediate striking power than formerly; and, as the students possibly do not realize this, there may be some violent scenes in the future if the counsels of people like Dr. Chiang should not prevail.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his covering despatch No. 498, February 14; received February 21.↩
- Mr. Perkins was Consul at Kunming in 1940–1942.↩
- Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, China-Burma-India Theater, 1942–1944.↩
- A reference to lingering war-lord interests in the province of Szechwan, centering on Chengtu, the provincial capital.↩
- Professors Li Kung-po and Wen I-to were assassinated in July, 1946; see telegram No. 1155, July 17, 1946, 5 p.m., from the appointed Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ix, p. 1380.↩