893.00/8–1947
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 27.]
Sir: I have the honor to make a few supplementary comments on the general problem of American aid to China.
As reported in my last despatch (No. 923, August 11, 1947) President Chiang requested that General Wedemeyer become Supreme Military Advisor to himself with the same promise he made to you of bestowing on him all the authority he himself possessed. General Wedemeyer felt unable to consider such an offer but at once mentioned two others either of whom might be a possibility. When I reported this to President Chiang he showed his disappointment and remarked that issues of Chinese national prestige would be embarrassing in such a situation but that in the case of General Wedemeyer (as in your own) he could delegate his own authority without going through any formal procedure, although there were no others whom he knew and trusted sufficiently well to do this. He expressed the wish that you might insist on such an appointment in view of the supreme importance of this matter.
The activities of the Wedemeyer Mission have of course aroused a great deal of Chinese comment ranging from vituperative Communist denunciation and the serious misgivings of the liberals who fear that it will play into the hands of reactionaries to the overconfident hopes of many in the Government. The reliance of these latter upon our country to solve their problems for them irritates or angers or at times is merely amusing. But there is a growing number both within [Page 255] the Government and outside of it with whose opinions I must confess to a large measure of sympathy. They admit the logic of all that we argue about what Chinese should do to help themselves, get their own house in order first, etc., but feel utterly impotent in view of the conservatism, feudalistic ideas, selfishness, narrow prejudices and similar limitations prevalent among those who have the power to effect reforms, while the Communists are rapidly making gains. The best among these would not have chosen such a course nor do they intend to stand idly by while we attempt to do it all, but things being as they are in this country, they simply do not see any other way out. Nor do I. Where I perhaps differ from many of them is in being somewhat more hopeful of the moral and psychological influence upon the responsible leaders and the public generally once they all begin to see some hope ahead.
The signs of willingness and ability to institute progressive reforms are still sadly lacking but there are some. President Chiang recently summoned the Provincial Governors for a Conference and along with some vehement criticism and pertinent instruction promised certain benefits. From now on provincial revenues should be principally used for provincial needs. Officials from Central Government Ministries and other agencies should be under the provincial authority. He has since then argued with me that, while in theory these Governors should be civilians, yet until the Constitution is actually in force and the army reorganized, it would be very difficult for any civilian to hold out against military domination. He added that under existing conditions the best men could not be induced to accept such posts as he had learned from several such efforts. He is making definite plans to dissociate the Kuomintang from the Government at the coming meeting, September 9th, and compel it to accept a status somewhat analogous to our political parties. He has been studying memoranda on this subject. He is also working on the scheme for enlarging the powers of the local police and having them deal with such matters as civil liberties, rather than the military police (practically accountable to him alone), the secret service men, etc. I pointed out that when he is fully prepared to effect this change there should be civilian trials, prompt and public, and authoritative statements explaining the new policy and procedure. The reduplication in Central and local bureaux, in the ordinary officials and those representing him, in unnecessary employees, should be corrected both to reduce expenditure and for greater efficiency. Slight beginnings are being made. Much of this is due to the age-long suspicions by the Central Authority of those away from the Capital and the system of protective devices employed. President Chiang has practised to the full this method of [Page 256] personalized control. In his case it is acutely aggravated by his fear of ubiquitous Communism which largely explains, if it does not excuse, the terroristic measures against the student strikes last May and similar repressive violations of civilian rights.
The hindrances President Chiang encounters in attempting to launch out on these progressive movements may be illustrated by some of his recent dealings with Dr. Chen Li-fu. The existence of such hindrances is of course largely due to his own past habits of thought and action in long association with comrades of this type. Some two or three months ago he sent an order to General Wu Tieh-cheng, as Secretary-General of the Kuomintang, dismissing Dr. Chen from the headship of the Party Bureau of Organization and instructing him and Premier Chang Ch’un to select a substitute. Since they are both members of a rival clique which often works with the C. C. Clique for a common objective, this put them in an awkward predicament. They finally suggested that Dr. Chen name his own successor to which he neatly replied that as he did not know in what respect he had himself proven unsatisfactory he could scarcely be expected to find the right successor. There the matter still stands. Some two weeks ago when President Chiang was intending to go to Kuling for a short period, he sent for Dr. Chen and after reprimanding him severely told him that during his own absence he was to stay inactive. He has, however, been extremely active of late and has been entrenching his clique in power by extending its economic control over government banks, industrial plants, etc. In all such machinations he has a sinister influence on Premier Chang, due in part no doubt to the joint political scheming of the two cliques, in part also to the Premier’s tendency to compromise or yield in his extremely difficult position when President Chiang is always the final authority. This applies especially to any pressure from Dr. Chen in view of his well-known relations with President Chiang. Last week at the close of an interview with President Chiang I suggested that Dr. Chen be sent to the United States for the observation of our political parties, pointing out that his previous experience there had been in technical and labor matters. He laughed heartily and said that he had himself been thinking of having him make a trip to Europe but that for the immediate present he could not spare him in view of the approaching elections. It was especially because of these that I had hoped to have him out of the country. Since that occasion, however, General Cheng Chieh-min has told me that it might be possible to arrange for Dr. Chen’s departure earlier.
It is generally agreed among those who are interested in some form of American aid to China that there be advisers closely associated [Page 257] with each specific project. My personal preference has been that all such be selected and employed by our Government, with, of course, a procedure by which this was at the request of and the individuals approved by the Chinese Government. It goes without saying that such persons should be the very best we can supply. But it is being argued that the schedule of salaries our Government could offer would not be able to attract those most suitable for the purpose, whereas the Chinese Government would have no such limitations. I recognize the cogency of this argument and yet in view of the patriotic and humanitarian values involved am reluctant to admit that first-rate men could not be secured on our terms. Indeed the somewhat idealistic motive in accepting such appointment would be one of the best qualifications.
This is a lengthy and rambling despatch but it will at least be another evidence of my keen interest in the problem and of my desire to help despite the many perplexities in any positive course of action.
Respectfully yours,