893.00/6–1847
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 24.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that on the afternoon of June 14 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, asked me to [Page 188] call. He opened the conversation by describing the events which have recently occurred in Sinkiang,66 the invasion by Outer Mongolian cavalry, who combined with Uighur troops against anti-Soviet Cossacks, driving them toward Chinese Government troops. The latter have been ordered to avoid all provocation but not to yield. The airplanes assisting in this operation seemed to have Soviet markings but these may have been Outer Mongolian. The latter in any case would not act without approval from Moscow. The Moscow broadcast is reported to have denied Soviet participation in the incident. The Chinese Government feels that, whatever the explanation may finally be, it should meanwhile give full publicity to the reports it receives. Dr. Wang took occasion to add that there was indubitable evidence of Outer Mongolian aid to Chinese Communists operating in Manchuria, although there was no reliable information as to the extent of this.
Dr. Wang then referred to recent conversations I have had with President Chiang K’ai-shek and indicated that suggestions of mine were being given careful consideration but that President Chiang was forced by conditions now prevailing to plan very carefully to avoid further aggravation of the already extremely serious military, economic and other factors. He himself felt that the most urgently needed reforms could be roughly grouped under three headings: (a) military reduction and reorganization; (b) improved provincial and local administration; (c) economic rehabilitation, communications, industry, agriculture. We discussed each of these in some detail.
I then told him how glad I was to repeat to him the substance of my recent conversations with President Chiang, which really contained nothing new except a certain note of urgency. Stress had been laid on the people’s desire for peace as genuine—including the student demonstrations—and on the desirability of either persuading the Communists to renew peace discussions or convincing the leaders of opinion that the Communists were responsible for the failure and for the continuance of the civil war. The Government should recover the support of its own people through its handling of the popular demand for peace, the proclamation and protection of civil liberties and other evidences of democratic and socialized tendencies. All such progressive developments would be heartily welcomed in Washington.
I pointed out again some of the practical difficulties in American financial aid to China,67 entirely apart from Chinese internal affairs, such as the regulations governing Export-Import Bank loans, the early adjournment of Congress, etc.
[Page 189]Dr. Wang described some of the tactical problems President Chiang was thinking of, such as the present troop dispositions, before he could make any statement as to limiting the Government to purely defensive military action. But he assured me that the matter was being thought of in concrete terms, and that these would be presented to the meeting of the State Council on June 20.
Respectfully yours,