893.00/6–1847
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 24.]
Sir: I have the honor to report on developments especially as they concern President Chiang K’ai-shek. The situation in general continues [Page 186] to deteriorate alike in its military, economic and psychological aspects. These are, of course, all interrelated. The growing discontent with or even hostility toward the Government has been stimulated among intellectuals by the extremely harsh measures against students and among the unthinking masses by the mounting costs of livelihood. In its simplest terms the complaints center around freedom and food.
President Chiang believes that he had conclusive evidence of a Communist plot to create widespread disorders on June 2 and is no less convinced that the measures taken thwarted this. He unquestionably overestimated the Communist influence in the recent student demonstrations and probably realizes this now himself. There were divergencies in what occurred in the principal cities. The tragic death of three students in Wuhan University and the serious wounding of three others, together with a number of minor casualties were on the initiative of the Hankow garrison commander, who has been summarily dismissed.
The PPC peace resolutions (see my despatch no. 779 of June 4, 1947) have been presented through the Standing Committee of that body to the State Council, which approved them in principle but has asked that they be made more concrete for final action at the next meeting of the State Council. Meanwhile, the Communist Party has contemptuously rejected this approach as another evidence of the Government’s insincerity.
President Chiang has been thinking very earnestly both over the situation as he is compelled to recognize its realities and over advice given him which, so far as I can gather, has all been very much to the same effect. In general, this is that the demand for peace is widespread and insistent, and the Government should be able either to persuade the Communists to stop fighting and resume peace discussions or to place the responsibility for continuing the civil war upon them, and furthermore that the Government should win back popular confidence by at once proving by deeds its capacity for reform and by official statements calculated to keep the people much better informed than they have been hitherto of the problems and intentions of the Government. In my personal conversations with President Chiang I have been as frank as seemed permissible and have been cheered especially during the latest interview by what seemed to be on his part something more than a general assent in principle.
In contrast with almost all the other higher officials President Chiang is maintaining his calm self-control and a somewhat sobered confidence. There is a general feeling of frustration among the others due primarily to the objective facts with which they are all [Page 187] familiar but intensified by the nervous fear of the Communists. Actually much of the apparent strength of Chinese Communism is due chiefly to the inefficiency and corruption of the Kuomintang, and—with an alarming acceleration—to popular loss of faith in the Government. One can be reasonably certain that with sufficient evidence of competent statesmanship and determined moral reforms the Government could recover its hold alike on the intellectuals and the masses.
It requires a certain temerity to attempt any forecasts, but it would seem that one of three possible consequences will follow without much delay from the present critical conditions:
- 1.
- President Chiang will assert himself as the leader of an attempt to settle the Communist issue either by securing their assent to renew negotiations or by demonstrating that they are in effect an armed rebellion and as such opposed to the national welfare. I have been hoping that he would be able to do this in a dramatic, revolutionary way that would catch the imagination of his people. This is probably expecting too much, but he has gone so far in discarding his earlier preconceptions and adopting progressive ideas that I believe he can be influenced to further advance. This will perhaps be slower and much less satisfactory than a more spectacular procedure but it has real possibilities and is perhaps by all odds the most hopeful solution.
- 2.
- With the threatening catastrophe drawing closer it is quite possible that a nucleus of enlightened, non-partisan leaders may emerge who will attract the more liberal elements from within the Kuomintang, be supported by the politically conscious public and come to terms with the Communists. President Chiang would presumably disappear from the scene, Premier Chang Chun, T. V. Soong, or some other outstanding figure might assume leadership, and an ad interim coalition government be established. Among the disadvantages would be the inexperience of the new group and the inability, especially conspicuous among Chinese, of a loosely formed body to cooperate effectively.
- 3.
- There will be complete disintegration of the present Central Government with the Communists in control of their own territory, which they would use every effort to extend. Sectional governments would be established under the strongest man or group in the area with all the evils of such chaotic and unstable conditions.
Respectfully yours,