896.24/9–1247
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines
No. 31
Sir: Reference is made to Public Law No. 454, known as the Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Act, and to the Military Assistance Agreement signed between the Philippines and the United States on March 21, 1947.31 It is now desired to inform you of the present status of plans to extend certain additional military assistance to the Philippines in accordance with the aforesaid Act and Agreement and to ascertain your views with regard to a specific Philippine request for assistance and your views with regard to the long-range military plans of this Government in the Philippines.
As you are aware, the Philippine Ambassador to the United States in a note to the Secretary of State of May 13, 1947 formally submitted on behalf of his Government a request for military assistance to the Philippines to the extent of $9,440,667.98 covering subsistence, clothing, and fuel required by the Philippine Army for the fiscal year 1948. A copy of the Philippine Ambassador’s note is enclosed.32 Following the receipt of the Ambassador’s note, a SWNCC subcommittee was created to study the policy which should be followed and the reply which should be made to the Ambassador’s note. This subcommittee has held several sessions at which the whole question of military assistance to the Philippines was thoroughly considered. In the study made by the subcommittee and in its deliberations, full attention was given to the views and information on the matter supplied by the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Philippines.
As the study of the situation progressed, it became apparent to the subcommittee that it would be exceedingly difficult to grant the request for assistance contained in the Ambassador’s note of May 13, 1947. In the view of the subcommittee, the report and recommendations of the Joint Philippine-American Finance Commission failed to provide adequate justification for the extension of the type of assistance requested by the Philippines in the Ambassador’s note. With the adjournment of the United States Congress late in July, the possibility of presenting the matter to the appropriate committees of the Congress passed, at least until a new session of Congress in January. Even had the Congress been in session, there was no unanimity of feeling that the Philippine request could justifiably be brought to the attention of the Congress under present circumstances. Agreement was general [Page 1118] on the point that, however deserving of attention the Philippine request might be, it would, if granted at all, have to be reduced to the extent of perhaps fifty to seventy per cent of the original Philippine request.
In the discussions of the SWNCC subcommittee, it has been emphasized that the total denial of the Philippine request was fraught with possible ominous political consequences. In a paper presented to the SWNCC subcommittee by the representative of the Department of State, the following statement on the subject was made:
“The United States Government has in the good will of the Filipino people an asset of tremendous value in the development of our Far Eastern foreign policy. A cardinal objective of this Government is to maintain and strengthen the type of good will which now exists between the two countries. While war was going on and the United States was in great need of the support of the Filipino people, this country pledged all its resources to make Philippine independence, promised for July 4, 1946, effective and meaningful. President Roosevelt, three weeks after Pearl Harbor, declared, ‘I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected.’ The President also recommended to the Congress that certain military bases be retained by the United States in the Philippines after independence. It was also subsequently recommended that a program of military assistance be developed for the Philippines. The Congress responded to the requests of the President in this regard and passed Public Laws 380 and 454 providing for military bases and military assistance. Following the congressional authorization, agreements regarding military bases and military assistance were signed at Manila between the two governments on March 14 and March 21, 1947 respectively.
“The Philippine request of May 13, 1947 is in conformance with the Military Assistance Agreement. It is made in good faith and according to the pledges of this Government.”
The subcommittee has been impressed and made duly cognizant of the point of view expressed by the representative of the Department of State and has given this point of view its sympathetic consideration. The subcommittee, nevertheless, felt that it would be most difficult to accede to the Philippine request for such reasons as have been previously mentioned.
To sum up, the present attitude of the SWNCC subcommittee with regard to the Philippine request may be said to be as follows:
- 1.
- It is recognized that the Philippine request has important political implications.
- 2.
- At the same time, it is believed to be impossible to accede to the full Philippine request.
- 3.
- It is considered significant that no inquiry has been received from the Philippine Government since the submission of the original Philippine note of May 13.33 In view of the findings of the Joint Philippine-American [Page 1119] Finance Commission, President Roxas may realize that his chances of getting the assistance requested are not very good.
- 4.
- The question of whether any part of the assistance requested by the Philippines is to be granted is still under consideration; the prospect of even a portion of the assistance being granted at this time is not good. The Department has even had under consideration the possibility of making no formal reply to the request in question. This would be done simply by withdrawing the proposal from the SWNCC subcommittee and merely holding it in inactive status.
The examination of this particular Philippine request by the SWNCC subcommittee has brought to the fore the much broader and important question of the extent to which this Government is actually committed to military assistance and operations in the Philippines. It is strongly believed by the Department that the Philippine Government and Filipino people in general have gained a most mistaken idea regarding the extent to which this Government is committed to extending military assistance to the Philippines. It is considered altogether undesirable and unwise that such a feeling of utter and complete dependence on the United States should be allowed to persist. General MacArthur34 in a telegram to the War Department of July 26, 1947 suggested that the Philippine Government be informed more definitely as to what the plans of the United States Government were in the Philippines. The Department has shared this concern that the Filipinos be made more aware of our actual military plans in the Philippines.
The views of the Department of State and of other concerned officials in the Government are accordingly brought to your attention in order that you may be fully acquainted with the position of your Government in this important matter. The Embassy’s despatches No. 1120 of August 23, 1947 and No. 1185 of September 12, 194735 have been carefully noted and are in the opinion of the Department further evidence of the need for reaching some sort of clarification between the Philippines and the United States concerning the exact military program of the two governments in the Philippines. As one step in this direction, the Department believes that consideration should be given to the possibility of informing the Philippine Government that in our best judgment the military strength which we formerly concurred in as a minimum for the Philippines is not only larger than that Government requires but larger than the resources of the Philippines from a financial viewpoint justify. The military estimate of the situation prepared by the United States Military Advisory Group to the Philippines and transmitted to the War Department by Colonel R. H. [Page 1120] Kreuter, Military Attaché, under date of August 15, 1947, contains the statement that “It is further agreed that since the Republic desires to have an Army, the most feasible plan is to develop a small military organization within the financial capabilities of the Republic, which can train a reserve civilian army capable of conducting resistance to any aggression, pending aid from the United Nations or other friendly powers.” It would appear to be most desirable that this program for the Republic be carried into effect, and if the Philippine Government insists on carrying through a much larger military program, it is possible that this Government may have to inform the Philippine Government very frankly that it may be counting on assistance from this Government in maintaining its military organization which for a number of reasons will not be forthcoming.
You are requested to give careful study and consideration to the views expressed in this instruction and to advise the Department of your views in the matters under reference. Pending further instructions from the Department, no discussions of this matter should be undertaken with the Government of the Philippines.
Very truly yours,
- At Manila; 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3283, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1662.↩
- Not printed.↩
- This instruction (No. 31) was drafted before the inquiry recorded in the memorandum supra. ↩
- General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan.↩
- Neither printed.↩