856E.01/6–2947: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
444. Vredenburch appears to have receded somewhat from earlier interpretation as unsatisfactory Soekarno’s reply and have modified personal views which are reflected in Netherlands Govt comments contained Embtel 443. He sees divergence between Sjahrir and Soekarno position considerably narrowed if verbal purported conciliatory interpretation in reply given Van Mook can be confirmed by Indo Republic on paper. In order achieve this end, he stated it has been suggested Van Mook put following questions to Republic:
- 1.
- Does it recognize authority of Crown in interim Govt?
- 2.
- Does it agree it is US Indo which is sovereign and not Republic and that it is US Indo which will send diplomatic representatives abroad?
- 3.
- Does it agree to organization of federal bodies (centralized food, foreign exchange, etc.) under interim Govt as proposed by Netherlands Govt May 27?
- 4.
- Does it agree that estates of non-Indo owners be returned as proposed May 27?
- 5.
- Does it accept joint responsibility of maintenance law and order in territories which are under Republic’s de facto authority?28
In above connection Vredenburch states that occasion submitting above questionnaire may be another opportunity for US action as we stressed the view that main influence rests with US as Indo recognize British has little to offer situation besides moral persuasion. He again referred to time element, stating that his estimate gives outside limit 2 weeks when matter must be received particularly interims of Dutch deteriorating financial position. Another consideration heard was approach and observance Ramadan beginning mid-July, that after fasting had begun it would be almost impossible to carry on effective negotiations.
Again terms of time he stated that morale of troops who were constantly being sniped at must be considered. He said that he believed [Page 967] that restraint of military had to date been exemplary in face of constant provocation and should be commended; the sooner pressure was taken off troops possibility for incidents would be reduced. In this connection, he inquired if Foote could not urgently press Republican authorities to desist not only from sniping but from continued destruction of property.
It appears that Van Mook has requested instructions to tell Foote that it will be impossible maintain morale of troops much longer if Dutch must keep purely defensive position.
I feel that the tolerance of the Dutch is reaching a critical point and I respectfully suggest that in urging the Dutch to refrain from use of force we may have assumed high responsibility in settlement of Indonesian problem. By so doing we have unquestionably aided bargaining position of Republican authorities in removing use of force as alternative in any event up to present. Consequently, I feel that in next few days we should exert greatest possible measure of our influence to urge Republic to be reasonable and give Dutch reason to believe their good faith and cooperation may be counted upon; and that they in turn will be held to strictest accountability for sabotage and destruction of American interests and property in Republican controlled area, and more especially as outlined your (Deptel 320, June 28).
Sent Dept as 444, repeated London as 58.
Dept pass to Batavia.
- Telegram 450, June 30, 8 p.m., from The Hague, reported that a communication based on these points was addressed to the Indonesians on June 29 (856E.01/6–3047).↩