856E.01/6–2947: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
443. Deptel 318[316], June 26. Under instructions from Foreign Ministry, Vredenburch today advised Embassy that while realizing message transmitted by Embassy June 27 was drafted before Sjahrir’s [Page 964] resignation and that passing events had somewhat superseded terms message Netherlands Govt still considered it desirable make some comments on message.
With reference to passage in paragraph 2 reading “provisions which will obviously provoke future disagreement and thus impede successful functioning of federation”, Vredenburch stated that Netherlands Govt wished to emphasize that it is unaware that tolerance has not been persistently shown by them. On other hand he makes point that notwithstanding signing Linggadjati Agreement the Indo Republic has so far shown no willingness practice tolerance in sense suggested by Dept as essential to the success of the agreement. As examples of lack such tolerance on part Republic he cited following points:
- 1.
- Continued military and subversive activities have been and are being carried out by Republic in Malino-territories.
- 2.
- Nearly 2 years after the defeat of Japan many thousands who were interned during the Jap occupation have as yet not been freed.
- 3.
- Altho an agreement was concluded some time ago with regard to demilitarization of Modjokerto-region Republic attacks in that area still continue.
- 4.
- It is a well-known fact that Indos who loyally cooperate with the Netherlands are threatened with retaliation by the Republic authorities.
- 5.
- Economic assets both Dutch and foreign-owned which are indispensable for rehabilitation of country are wantonly destroyed on ever increasing scale.
He went on to say that it was not clear to Netherlands Govt as to which provisions US Govt had in mind when stating “will obviously provoke future disagreements”. He said that Netherlands Govt desired point out this connection that it has requested Republic Govt accept essence proposals submitted Indo delegation May 27 which were considered “fair and reasonable” by Under Secretary State Acheson on June 6 (Vredenburch visit). He added that it was Netherlands Govt understanding that US Govt at that time considered Dutch proposals offered in good faith, as effort implement Linggadjati Agreement and as providing reasonable basis for effective interim govt pending formation of sovereignty United States Indonesia and Union. He also recalled opinion expressed by US Govt that Republican Govt would be well advised respond promptly in spirit good faith and compromise as demonstration its sincerity of pledges undertaken at Linggadjati.
Vredenburch, in considering Dept’s view that Dutch should not push for acceptance their position to point likely to strengthen extremists, said that it could be shown that policy of appeasing extremists had only lead to resignation of Sjahrir and apparent rejection Netherlands proposals by Soekarno. He said that Netherlands Govt [Page 965] moreover wished to stress that their proposals had been drafted with view make all possible concessions concomitant with fact that they retain sovereignty ultimate authority and consequent ultimate responsibility in NEI until US Indo and Union have been established. He added that the Netherlands Govt hardly could be expected to accept an agreement which placed them in position where such ultimate responsibility could not be put in effect. He added that the answer received from Indo Republic indicated that US expectation regarding establishment interim govt with Netherlands maintaining authority in transition period had apparently failed of fulfillment.
With reference to the proffer of financial aid to assist economic rehabilitation of Indo, Vredenburch made following statement: “The Netherlands Govt wishes to express their sincere appreciation for this renewed demonstration of American willingness to assist in rehabilitation of distressed areas.”
He went on say that in view dilatory tactics continuously pursued by Republic authorities that Netherlands Govt fear long period time may elapse before mutual cooperation along constructive path is assured. This, Vredenburch said, was point which he had particularly stressed while in Washington, adding that financial position of Netherlands Govt had reached stage where further protracted negotiations or discussions with Republic cannot be considered.
Reverting to oral discussion of other points reflecting Dept’s opinion (Deptel 316, June 2[26]) as they became subject of conversation, he indicated some modification from earlier position reported Embtel 435, June 27,27 in that he stated Dutch would not insist on unanimity voting procedure provided Dutch retain ultimate authority. Under such understanding Netherlands Govt could accept majority principle. This also applied, he said, to question 50 percent Republic membership interim council but with added proviso this case that East Indo and Borneo concurred. Insofar as joint military force was concerned, Vredenburch stated that Netherlands Govt would wish to retain discretion to decide when considerations called for maintenance of law order. Regarding recruiting armed forces, he pointed to recent Republic authorities announcement that number their troops to be increased and that especially the Heihos (Indos in Jap military service during occupation) had been remobilized. He also stated that it probably would not have escaped Dept’s attention that in his reply June 27, Soekarno makes allegations that Republic troops have in fact been reduced. The conclusion could only be drawn, Vredenburch said, and [apparent garble] at Washington is Govt’s view that official Republic utterances destined for foreign consumption [Page 966] were at variance with facts, these being admitted by Republic military authorities.
Sent Dept 443, repeated London 57. Dept pass Batavia.
- Not printed.↩