856E.01/6–2047

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of South-east Asian Affairs (Moffat)

confidential
Participants: Mr. O. Reuchlin, Minister, Netherlands Embassy;
Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA;
Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA.

Mr. Reuchlin called by appointment to inform the Department of the next steps contemplated by his Government relative to Indonesia. It was proposed, he stated, that the Commission General would inform [Page 954] the Republican delegation that it considered the Republican reply to the Dutch proposals of May 27 as unsatisfactory and offering no further basis for negotiation between the Commission General and the Republican delegation; that the whole matter was therefore being referred to the Netherlands Government. The Netherlands Government expected thereupon to send the Republican Government a friendly letter requesting cooperation in carrying out the Dutch proposals of May 27.

I expressed the personal view that this would not advance a settlement of the situation; that actually I thought the Republican reply had made many important concessions and that, stripped of details, the two sides were not so very far apart; that each side appeared to be magnifying the differences instead of emphasizing how close together they were. It seemed to me, I explained, that the Dutch were wrong in overemphasizing Dutch control in the interim period (and confusing the interim form in this respect with the final form of the United States of Indonesia) and in trying to give undue weight to the two “paper” states of East Indonesia and Borneo; that, on the other hand, the Republicans were wrong in trying to eliminate the Dutch from the interim government as the Dutch obviously continued as the de jure authority. I expressed the view that the Republic with eighty percent of the population and perhaps ninety percent of the wealth and resources of Indonesia was perfectly right in asking fifty percent membership on any federal body but that the Dutch should during the interim period have the presiding officer with at least a casting vote in case of a tie. I thought if this problem could be solved, which I believed quite possible, the details on other matters would fall quickly into place with little difficulty. On the matter of gendarmerie, I thought that the Republicans were wrong but that if the other matters were resolved outside pressure could, if need be, bring agreement on some form of joint and integrated policing. I also expressed the view that the Republic was wrong in asking immediate admission in U.N. of the interim states, as the U.S.I. could not become a formal state until the Dutch constitution is amended.

Mr. Reuchlin showed us an Aneta report which had just been received stating that the Republican delegation had sent the Commission General a further letter accepting many of the Dutch proposals in accordance with a conciliatory radio speech made the preceding night by Sjahrir. Mr. Reuchlin observed that if this were true the whole situation might be resolved quickly.

A[bbot] L[ow] M[offat]