Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, 26 [29] September, 1947.

Subject: The interest of the United States in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States.

Pursuant to the request in SWN–5694 (copy attached),²⁶ initiated by the State Member of the Committee, the following views have been received:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea for the reasons hereafter stated.

In the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.

If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to establish and maintain strong air and naval bases in the Korean peninsula, he might be able to interfere with United States communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and adjacent islands. Such interference would require an enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area where they would be subject to neutralization by air action. Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less costly than large scale ground operations.

In light of the present severe shortage of military manpower, the corps of two divisions, totaling some 45,000 men, now maintained in south Korea, could well be used elsewhere, the withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair the military position of the Far East Command unless, in consequence, the Soviets establish military strength in south Korea capable of mounting an assault in Japan.

At the present time, the occupation of Korea is requiring very large expenditures for the primary purpose of preventing disease and disorder which might endanger our occupation forces with little, if any, lasting benefit to the security of the United States.

Authoritative reports from Korea indicate that continued lack of progress toward a free and independent Korea, unless offset by an elaborate program of economic, political and cultural rehabilitation, in all probability will result in such conditions, including violent disorder, as to make the position of United States occupation forces untenable. A precipitate withdrawal of our forces under such circumstances would lower the military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States.²⁷

James Forrestal

26. September 15, p. 789.

27. Copy of this memorandum was referred by Mr. Lovett to Messrs. Kennan, Saltzman, Armour, Bohlen, and Butterworth on September 29. On the same day the Secretary of State discussed the matter with Messrs. Lovett and Kennan. On October 1 Mr. Kennan wrote down his understanding of the conclusions of this discussion as follows: “That we will not turn down the Soviet proposal for evacuation of armed forces but will pass it on to the UN together with our recommendations as to what should be done to prepare the Koreans for national independence before troops are withdrawn.

    Copy of this memorandum was referred by Mr. Lovett to Messrs. Kennan, Saltzman, Armour, Bohlen, and Butterworth on September 29. On the same day the Secretary of State discussed the matter with Messrs. Lovett and Kennan. On October 1 Mr. Kennan wrote down his understanding of the conclusions of this discussion as follows: “That we will not turn down the Soviet proposal for evacuation of armed forces but will pass it on to the UN together with our recommendations as to what should be done to prepare the Koreans for national independence before troops are withdrawn.

    “In doing this, however, we shall be careful not to commit ourselves too firmly to this program of preliminary steps, our aim being to get the best bargain we can but not to tie our own hands unnecessarily.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647)