740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–647
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State 54
Discussion:
The attached report by an ad hoc committee of SWNCC55 recommends a course of action to be taken by the US Government in regard to the Korean situation in the event of (1) an abrupt breakdown of the Joint US–USSR Commission negotiations as a result of Soviet initiative or (2) the indefinite prolongation of the present stalemate in the Joint Commission negotiations as a result of Soviet procrastination. General Hodge and Minister Jacobs report that the political situation in Korea is becoming increasingly explosive due to the stalemate in the Joint Commission and the resulting delay in setting up an independent Korea. The matter was placed before SWNCC for urgent consideration in SWNCC 176/27 of July 24, which quoted a telegram from General Hodge and a statement by the War Department of US policy towards Korea.56 The report of the ad hoc committee concludes that the US cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances which would almost certainly result in the complete domination of that country by the Soviet Union with grave consequences to US prestige and world-wide political objectives.
The action recommended in the attached paper is designed (1) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that the US Government is making every possible effort to speed their independence and (2) to prove to American and world public opinion that the US Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly the Moscow Agreement on Korea and the Charter of the United Nations. If the Soviets break off Joint Commission negotiations prior to August 7, an immediate letter should be sent to Molotov with copies to the UK and China, requesting early consultation in Washington to discuss further steps, such letter to include proposals as stated below and such letter to be made public. The letter to the Powers concerned should include as an enclosure a specific US plan providing (1) for the establishment of a Provisional Government by the Koreans themselves through recognized democratic procedures, (2) for UN observation of elections and the other procedures involved in establishing the Provisional Government, and (3) for such aid and assistance (not termed “trusteeship”) as is agreed between the [Page 743] Provisional Government and the Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea.
In presenting this plan to the Powers concerned during discussions in Washington to begin on August 25, they should be informed that, in justice to the Korean people, no undue delay can be permitted and that, if speedy agreement cannot be reached, the US Government intends to present the whole problem of Korea at the earliest possible date to the UN. They should also be informed that in the meantime, in order that there may be no delay in making preparations for a united Korea, the US Government, in the zone of its responsibility, intends to follow a positive program of political, educational and economic help and assistance, and that in carrying out this program the US Government will welcome UN observers.
If the Soviets drag out Joint Commission negotiations, a letter should be sent to Molotov on August 7, calling attention to his original suggestion that the Joint Commission should report in July or August; that the US Government deplores the present lack of progress made by the Commission; that the US Government requests a report by August 17 from the Commission of such progress as has been made so that consideration can be immediately given as to what further steps can be taken to hasten the establishment of a united, independent Korea. On August 18, after receipt of the report from the Joint Commission, the US should present a letter to the Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement along the lines indicated in paragraph 2 above.
Subsidiary recommendations in the report are (a) that, should the Soviet Government refuse to discuss the matter or should it unreasonably delay discussions, the US Government should inform the other adherents to the Moscow Agreement that it intends to submit the whole problem of Korea to the next session of the UN General Assembly; [b] that a State Department working team should immediately be formed to prepare a case for possible submission to the UN; and (c) that a Grant-in-Aid program should be prepared for submission at the next session of Congress.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the recommendations in this paper (Tab 1) be approved.
Concurrences:
Concurrences from the following offices have been given on the report itself: NA, FE, EE, SPA, A-H. War and Navy Departments have also concurred.