Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

SWNCC 176/30

Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Korea⁵⁰

secret

[Washington,] 4 August 1947.

United States Policy in Korea

the problem

1. To formulate as a matter of urgency a proposed course of action to be adopted by the United States Government to prevent further serious deterioration of the unsettled political situation in Korea.

facts bearing on the problem

2. See Appendix “A”.⁵¹

discussion

3. See Appendix “B”.⁵¹

conclusions

4. It is concluded that:

a. The U.S. cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances which would inevitably lead to Communist domination of the entire country. The resulting political repercussions would seriously damage U.S. prestige in the Far East and throughout the world, and would discourage those small nations now relying upon the U.S. to support them in resisting internal or external Communist pressure. Every effort should be made, however, to liquidate or reduce the U.S. commitment of men and money in Korea as soon as possible without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination.

b. The present unsatisfactory state of affairs in south Korea will not improve until definite action is taken giving the Koreans reassurance that the United States is doing and will continue to do its utmost to carry out its commitment to bring independence to Korea.

c. In the event of early failure of Joint Commission negotiations there is the possibility that the Korean people, discouraged by lack of progress toward their independence, will be led by extremists of either Eight or Left, into such serious internal disorders that U.S. public opinion might require the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea under such circumstances would almost certainly result in the complete domination of Korea by the Soviet Union, with grave consequences to U.S. prestige and world-wide political objectives.

d. The United States must immediately adopt a course of action to expedite a satisfactory solution to the Korean problem. This course of action must be designed (1) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that the U.S. Government is making every possible effort to speed their independence, and (2) to prove to American and world public opinion that the U.S. Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly the Moscow Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations.

e. In the event that the present impasse in the Joint Commission continues until August 7, a letter (Appendix “C”)⁵² should be dispatched to the Foreign Minister of the USSR informing him of the desire of the U.S. Government to receive from the Joint Commission a report by August 17 of such progress as it has made so that immediate consideration can be given as to what further steps should be taken to expedite the establishment of a united, independent Korea. If the Joint Commission is unable to agree on a joint report, the U.S. delegation should be instructed to submit its unilateral report to the U.S. Government. On August 18, after receipt of a report either from the Joint Commission or the U.S. delegation, the U.S. Government should forward a note (Appendix “D”)⁵³ to the other three powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, informing them of the lack of progress by the Joint Commission, and proposing definite steps for early achievement of the aims of the Moscow Agreement. These proposals should provide (1) for the establishment of a Provisional Government by the Koreans themselves through recognized democratic procedures, (2) for United Nations observation of elections and the other procedures involved in establishing the Provisional Government, and (3) for such aid and assistance, (not termed “trusteeship”) as is agreed between the Provisional Government and the Four Powers. This letter to the other three powers should request the early comments and views of the other three powers, and invite informal consultation in Washington through their Ambassadors. It should be made clear at the beginning of these consultations that if no agreement is reached regarding these or substitute proposals, the United States feels that, in view of the already untoward delay in achieving Korean independence, it must submit the matter to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The letters in Appendices “C” and “D” should be made public upon receipt of notification of their delivery.

f. In the event that the Soviet Delegation on the Joint Commission should precipitate a breakdown in the negotiations prior to August 7, the U.S. Government should immediately dispatch to the other three Powers concerned the note contained in Appendix “D” with appropriate modification of the first paragraph. Under such circumstances the United States should follow the courses outlined above with reference to publicity.

g. Should the Soviet Government refuse to consider the U.S. proposals, the United States Government should inform the other adherents to Moscow Agreement on Korea that it is submitting the whole problem of Korea to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and that in the meantime it proposes to take the initial steps outlined in the Annex to Appendix “D”, welcoming at the same time United Nations observers. Immediate steps should then be taken to place the case on the agenda of the General Assembly.

h. Should the Soviet Government propose the immediate simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces, the U.S. Government should agree in principle subject to the limitations set forth in Section IV, B, 4 of the Interdepartmental Committee Report on Korea which are designed to safeguard Korean political freedom and national independence.

i. In the unlikely event that the Soviet delegation begins to cooperate on the Joint Commission, reference to the United Nations must be delayed at least temporarily. The United States should still make a public announcement of the actions being taken in the southern zone to expedite Korean self-government and full independence. A new impasse in negotiations should be met by immediate initiation of the course outlined in subparagraph e above.

j. A State Department working group should immediately be formed to prepare the Korean case for submission to the United Nations. This working group should consult as appropriate with representatives of the War and Navy Departments.

k. In view of the possibility of failure of solution in the United Nations, the U.S. Government must be prepared for the possible necessity of granting independence to south Korea, and must make a continuing study of the political and economic considerations involved in taking such a step.

l. There is a continuing need for a Grant-in-Aid to Korea by the U.S. Government, whether or not it becomes necessary to submit the Korean problem to the United Nations. Plans should be made therefore to submit Grant-in-Aid legislation to the next session of Congress.

m. Immediate steps should be taken by the Foreign Policy Information Subcommittee of SWNCC to revise appropriately the public information policy on Korea.

recommendations

5. It is recommended that:

a. In the event that present impasse in the Joint Commission continues until 7 August, the letter in Appendix “C” be dispatched to the Foreign Minister of the USSR, and on 18 August the letter in Appendix “D” be dispatched to the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, United Kingdom, and China; these letters to be made public upon notification of their delivery.

b. In the event of breakdown in Joint Commission negotiations in Korea prior to 7 August, that the letter in Appendix “D” be immediately dispatched with appropriate publicity, to the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China.

c. If no agreement can be reached between the four powers regarding the proposals contained in the Annex to Appendix “D”, on 10 September the United States publicly announce its intention of submitting the whole Korean problem to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations beginning 16 September.

d. In the event the Soviet Union refuses to consider the U.S. proposals on Korea, or otherwise delays progress, the United States inform with appropriate publicity, the other three powers of its intention to submit the whole problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

e. A State Department working group immediately be formed to prepare the Korean case for submission to the United Nations, consulting as appropriate with representatives of the War and Navy Departments.

f. The Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC, after the receipt of General Wedemeyer’s report, prepare a study of the political and economic considerations which will be involved should it become desirable or necessary to grant independence to South Korea.

g. Grant-in-Aid legislation for South Korea be prepared for submission to the next session of Congress.

h. The information policy on Korea be appropriately revised by the Foreign Policy Information Subcommittee of SWNCC.

50. Submitted to SWNCC on August 4.
51. Not printed.
51. Not printed.
52. Not printed, but see note quoted in telegram 1582, August 11, 6 p.m., to Moscow, p. 748.
53. See document quoted as enclosure to note in telegram 1646, August 26, 8 p.m., to Moscow, p. 771.