740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–247: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow
825. Moskco 44. For the Secretary from Acheson. Kosmos 20 Apr. 2. We offer following comments, with which War and Navy agree, on approach to Soviets re Korea.
We feel recommendation of Special State-War Committee on Korea50 that early approach be made to Soviets (copy handed to Cohen51 prior to departure) is sound and agree that it should be done before you leave Moscow.
[Page 629]We believe approach would be most effective, both vis-à-vis Soviets and in strengthening Hodge’s position in our zone, if made in form of letter from you to Molotov.
Letter appears to be drafted with view to making public, which we agree is desirable. In any event we suggest copies be given to British and Chinese. General tone seems appropriate except that it might be desirable to go further toward placing blame on Soviets. Detailed comments on draft follow.
Antepenultimate paragraph contains a factual error. In addition we feel it might be desirable to include in that paragraph reference to reasons for failure to reach agreement. Following redraft of that paragraph is suggested.
“The United States Commander in Korea has several times suggested to the Soviet Commander that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work. However, the Soviet Commander has insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and has reiterated this position in a letter to the American Commander as recently as Feb. 28, 1947. It has therefore been impossible to agree upon a basis for reconvening the Commission. Now in April 1947, almost 16 months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made towards the implementation of that agreement.”
We see little use in reconvening the Commission without some basis to enable it to progress and therefore suggest second sentence of penultimate paragraph be redrafted along following lines:
“To this end I ask that our Govts agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. I further suggest that a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 be fixed for a review by the two Govts of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the United States, mindful of its obligations under the Moscow Agreement, sees no alternative to taking without further delay such steps in its zone as will advance the purposes of that Agreement,”
We do not feel that the last paragraph, which opens the door to a reconsideration of the Moscow Agreement, is likely to serve any useful purpose at this time. On the contrary it gives the Soviets an opportunity either to charge us with attempting to evade our commitments or to make procrastinating or embarrassing counterproposals, and it might give rise to false hopes and disturbing speculation in Korea, We therefore suggest that it be deleted and that following paragraph be added to end of letter.
[Page 630]“I am furnishing copies of this letter to the Brit and Chinese Govts.”52
- February 25, p. 608.↩
- Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department.↩
- Telegram 1269, April 9, 5 p.m., from Moscow (Kosmos 25), reported dispatch of the letter (as amended) of April 8 to Foreign Minister Molotov; the Secretary was releasing the text to the press on April 11(740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–947). The text was transmitted to the Department in despatch 103, April 10, from Moscow, and by the Department in telegram 58, April 9, 7 p.m., to Seoul. It is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1947, p. 716.↩