740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–447
The Secretary of War ( Patterson ) to the Acting Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your letter of 28 March as regards our policy in Korea. I am pleased that the Secretary of State [Page 626] has indicated his intentions of discussing the Korean problem with the Soviets before the end of the present Moscow Conference and hope he will achieve a definitive solution of the current stalemate.
The current situation in Korea is potentially explosive. There exists always the danger of the development of an internal situation which would force our precipitate withdrawal under conditions gravely detrimental to our position in the Far East and in the world. I feel that this danger will remain to a certain degree so long as we continue to occupy Korea because I do not believe that any program, no matter how enlightened, will satisfy the intense Korean desire for independence. On the basis of equivalent strengths of occupation forces,47 Korea is the most difficult occupation area to maintain. From the standpoint of U.S. security the probabilities of long-term remunerative results are low, particularly if some solution is not achieved with the Soviets which unites the country in the near future.
I am convinced that the United States should pursue forcefully a course of action whereby we get out of Korea at an early date and believe all our measures should have early withdrawal as their overriding objective. In urging this course of action, I appreciate the view that it is important to attain a solution of the Korean problem in some form other than abandoning Korea to the Soviets. I recognize that the apparent inability of the U.S. to carry out its policies in Korea may have some impact on the Japanese people and on U.S. security interests in the Far East. It is also apparent that, from the standpoint of U.S. security, our policy in the Far East cannot be considered on a piecemeal basis, and logically the policy concerning Korea must be viewed as part of an integrated whole which includes Manchuria and China.
The War Department has striven in every way in its power to support our foreign policy. A high proportion of the Army’s available means are now directly so engaged. This support is definitely limited by the resources of men and money made available by the Congress. It is to be expected that decreasing funds and manpower will, in the near future, result in a material reduction in the Army’s capability to continue present programs of support. This decreasing capability will exist in non War Department programs with which the Army is associated in supporting our foreign policy. Hence it is now essential that we review critically all programs with the realization that non-availability [Page 627] of means will force us to drop the least remunerative of them in the near future.
As to the specific proposals in your letter, I agree that General MacArthur’s political—but not his military—responsibilities should be terminated and that a political advisor of ambassadorial rank should be appointed. This, I feel, is a necessary preliminary to undertaking the civilianization of our government in Korea, an objective with which I am in agreement. This cannot be done, however, within the next two or three months. When examined from the practical standpoint, it is apparent that it will take a much longer time. I agree with your subparagraphs d, e and f, which envisage setting up a provisional Korean government in south Korea and appointing a civil commissioner directly responsible to the State Department for direction of civil affairs. At the time the change is made from military to civilian control, funds appropriated for civil affairs in Korea, and the responsibility for administering these funds, should be transferred to the State Department. It seems essential that such action be preceded by public and forceful action which proves to the U.S. people that we have done our best to make Korea one nation and that the U.S.S.R. is responsible for the current unsatisfactory situation. I agree with your proposals in paragraphs (4) and (5) concerning dispatch of a business and industrial group to Korea and for intensifying the information and education program, on the assumption that the expenditures envisaged by these proposals would be met from funds to be made available to the State Department, rather than those now being requested by the War Department for the prevention of disease and unrest.
As to the proposal to request Congress to authorize $540,000,000 for the next three years and an appropriation of $215,000,000 for the fiscal year of 1948, I question seriously that Congress will be willing to agree to such action. I fear that the request will occasion an adverse reaction resulting in a net reduction of the funds provided to the War Department and other agencies for support of U.S. policy throughout the world. Such an adverse reaction seems certain if the ground for the request is not prepared by measures which will convince the U.S. people and the Congress:
- a.
- That every effort has been made on the international level to solve those economic ills of Korea arising from the division on the 38° parallel;
- b.
- That the U.S. has determined upon a program and taken a decision which will assure reduction of the cost of the Korean commitment at an early date; and
- c.
- That, in the event we cannot reach agreement with the Soviets regarding Korea, this program envisages carefully considered alternatives, such as referral of the problem to the United Nations or the establishment of an independent government of [Page 628] south Korea, or both, whereby we can still achieve our objectives; as I have indicated above, we cannot resort to such alternatives until our forceful action has gained public recognition of the fact that the Soviets have abrogated the Moscow Agreement.
The whole tenor of the hearings on the Greek-Turkish matter48 indicates that such expositions and assurances will be required in public hearings. Further, I believe that a critical analysis of the funds proposed to be authorized should be made to determine what reductions; would result in case a sensible solution were worked out with the Soviets, and also to determine what portions, if any, of the program beyond the minimum required to prevent disease and unrest can actually be expended remuneratively in Korea. Even though the funds were made available, there is some question in my mind that the entire proposed rehabilitation program is feasible or remunerative.
It is recognized that an authorization by Congress along the line that you suggest will greatly strengthen the hands of our negotiators in dealing with the U.S.S.R. If a plan is worked out, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, which offers some chance of acceptance of the program by the Congress and appears to assure at least a very substantial reduction at an early date of our commitments in Korea, I agree that a program of the nature you envisage in your paragraphs; (1) and (2) should be undertaken and the War Department will support it.49
Sincerely yours,
- In a memorandum to Mr. Acheson on April 8, Mr. Vincent, discussing this phrase, remarked: “… it is my understanding that it has never been our intention to match forces in Korea with the Russians. I believe that General Eisenhower made this point clear at a meeting of the three Secretaries about six weeks ago.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–847) General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Chief of Staff; the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy met at intervals to consider matters of interest.↩
- See vol. v, pp. 1 ff.↩
- In the memorandum to Mr. Acheson dated April 8, Mr. Vincent advised Mr. Acheson that “we can, in large measure, go along with the suggestions he [Mr. Patterson] makes and, with regard to reduction of our commitments, we can point out that our program seems to us to be the only feasible way of accomplishing this end once we rule out the alternative of abandonment of Korea to USSR domination.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–847)↩