Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] January 27, 1947.

General Hodge, in his telegram Jgcg 98,¹⁴ outlines the present serious situation in Korea and concludes that unless the US–USSR Joint Commission reconvenes or positive action is taken on a national (government to government) level within the next two months, the U.S. may lose the opportunity of accomplishing its mission in Korea and lose the confidence of the Korean people with consequent increased danger of outbreaks of violence.

General MacArthur, in a separate telegram CX69369,¹⁵ expresses serious concern over the problem and makes the following four recommendations:¹⁶

1. Submission of entire Korean problem to UN;

2. Request by U.S. Government for formation of commission which might include disinterested nations for purpose of making thorough survey of existing Korean problem and making recommendations for solution of matter;

3. A further meeting between Governments of U.S., U.K., China and U.S.S.R. with a view to clarifying Chapter III of Moscow Agreement insofar as it relates to Korea in the hope of coming to a workable solution;

4. A highest level meeting between representatives of U.S. and U.S.S.R. in effort to resolve all the issues now preventing successful development of Korea as political and economic unit with its planned emergence as an independent state.

Progress toward establishment of administrative machinery on a national basis to prepare Korea for independence is dependent upon understanding between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. There can be no question but that the first three recommendations by General MacArthur are sound in principle and would be desirable in practice if circumstances did not strongly militate against their success. A broadening of the scope for consideration of the problem to include other powers, either in the Security Council or in a commission or conference of more limited membership, would, it is believed, be highly desirable but, in the absence of US–USSR understanding, bringing other powers into the picture would not, it is feared, produce the progress desired. The only useful result might be to focus world interest on the problem without any reasonable promise of concrete results.

The procedure described under General MacArthur’s recommendation 4 has, in the past months, been considered frequently and with great care in the Department, not only by the officers directly concerned but by Secretary Byrnes himself. The conclusion has been reached, at least for the time being, that the initiation of a further approach to the Russians on a government to government level would not produce the results desired. General Hodge has, during the past half year, initiated a number of attempts to get the Joint Commission back into session. His efforts have so far proved unavailing. With the Russians in their present frame of mind we do not see that initiation of an approach by us on a government to government level would have any greater promise of success and might quite likely be misinterpreted and taken advantage of by the Russians as an indication of over-anxiety to get forward with a liquidation of our responsibilities in Korea. Our position in this matter, however, does not preclude our being open to the initiation by the Russians on a government to government level of a new approach on the Korean problem. It is felt that we should be prepared to consider seriously any reasonable suggestions made by the Russians, either within or outside the framework of the Moscow Agreement, which held promise of getting on with plans for a unified, democratic and independent Korea. Should the Russians initiate discussions we might be prepared to offer for discussion a plan, now under consideration in the Department, which provides for the immediate setting up of a 4-power trusteeship, without going through the machinery of the Joint Commission providing for prior agreement on the establishment of a Korean provisional government. The plan we have in mind makes provision for setting up a provisional Korean government and the formation of a Korean constitution after the trusteeship has been established.

While awaiting initiation of an approach from the Russians we should give not only all our assistance but encouragement as well to the War Department to obtain from Congress the funds requested in their next annual budget for relief and rehabilitation purposes in Korea. We should if possible secure an increase in those funds as approved by the Budget Bureau.

After the present budget has been approved by the Congress we believe that consideration should be given to special legislation establishing a “Grant in Aid” for Korea of, say, $50,000,000 to enable us to carry out a program more extended than that contemplated by the War Department.

To date we have been unable to obtain the services of a really high level Political Adviser for General Hodge, although he has indicated clearly his desire for such assistance.… What is needed is a man of well-known ability and judgment whom General Hodge could feel assured came to him with the full backing and confidence of the President and the Secretary of State.

It is felt that positive measures such as those recommended above to get along with our own program would have a sobering effect upon the Koreans and a healthy effect on the Russians. Faced with evidence that we are prepared to carry out a long-term program in Korea, it is not at all improbable that the Russians would become less obdurate in the matter of reaching an understanding for the unification of Korean administration.

There is attached a telegram to General MacArthur for your signature, if you approve.¹⁷

J[ohn] C[arter] V[incent]

14. Received via Tokyo on January 22, 8:01, a.m., not printed.
15. Received January 22, 1:56 p.m., not printed.
16. As choices for consideration.
17. Telegram 28, January 28, 6 p.m., to Tokyo, stated that the Secretary was giving his personal attention to the telegrams from Generals Hodge and MacArthur and added: “We are all fully alive to the seriousness of situation and to the need for positive action to carry forward our program and objectives in Korea.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2847) On January 29 the Secretary requested Mr. Vincent to “have plan drafted of policy to organize a definite government of Southern Korea and connecting up its economy with that of Japan.” He informed the War Department that the State Department would support the “Grant in Aid” appropriation for Korea. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747)