740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 85
urgent
2266. Foreign Minister on the morning of November 19 handed to the Ambassador copy of a note dated November 17, regarding the Japanese Treaty, which was delivered to the Secretary of State by the Chinese Ambassador in Washington. In handing this document to the Ambassador the Foreign Minister said he had told the Soviets he felt they should compromise by accepting the enlarged preliminary conference and that he hoped the US would compromise by accepting retention of the veto. He said he had asked Soviets for a definite yes or no answer in the early future. From a Chinese standpoint Foreign Minister said he felt retention of veto might be necessary to assure protection of vital Chinese interests.
At the same time Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in conversation with Embassy officer elaborated on Chinese position. Vice Minister expressed doubts that the Soviets would agree to the Chinese proposal in which case China would be forced to reconsider its position, although he added it would be premature to express any opinion, personal or otherwise, as to what that position might be. Vice Minister then added that the question of Japanese Treaty places China in an extremely difficult and relatively impotent position: It would, in the first instance, be a mockery to have a peace treaty without Chinese participation; on the other hand, a peace treaty without Soviet participation would place China in the impossible situation of having made commitments which it would be incapable of carrying out simply because the Soviet Union has already obtained most of its primary and major objectives in China. It is therefore in a position to exploit and develop what it has, while at the same time simply refusing compromise on grounds that in not being a participant to the treaty it would be under no obligation to carry out its provisions. Vice Minister indicated that referred particularly to Manchuria and Korea as well as certain provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.
Vice Minister then expressed doubts that the Russians have any intention, for the time being at least, of participating in any kind of Japanese Peace Treaty, preferring to rely on the Yalta Agreement, Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and the advantages obtained following its entry into war against Japan.
[Page 574]Vice Minister then referred to veto question and said that although the Foreign Office does not believe retention of the veto to be necessarily essential, this question is periodically discussed in the State Council and the various Yuan where the consensus is that at Yalta, the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union without previous approval by China made commitments which will seriously damage Chinese interests for years to come. What assurance is there, they ask, that circumstances in the future will not again dictate decisions by the same three powers and again without the consent and at the expense of China. The Foreign Office professes to have no answer to this question.
With reference to numbered paragraph 3 of London’s 5880, November 5 to the Department86 which states that the British Foreign Office considers the Chinese are merely quibbling over Sino-Soviet Treaty terms while seeking clarification of American policy toward China, the Embassy believes Chinese attitude stems from more basic causes. In the opinion of the Embassy, so-called quibbling is in reality genuine fear of the consequences to China should a treaty be concluded without Soviet participation. Large and vital areas of China are presently under the explicit or implicit domination of Soviet Union. The Chinese well realize that a peace treaty without Soviet participation would give Moscow the pretext for retaining and increasing its control of these areas. To this situation should be added the threat of expanding Communist influence in China proper to say nothing of areas such as Manchuria, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. China must also realize full well its own incapacity under present circumstances of single-handedly regaining control of all Chinese territory. Furthermore, Nanking does not see, or at least professes not to see, where it will get that kind of external aid which will enable it to do the job it cannot do alone. Hence Nanking, in groping for some solution, is reluctant to take that kind of action which it believes would probably evoke counter-action that might irrevocably damage its vital interests and alienate its sovereignty over Chinese territory.