The attached memorandum has been prepared for the Secretary’s use at the
CFM meeting in London on the
question of the Japanese Peace Conference. You will note that the
memorandum proposes, on page 2, that we propose circularizing the
Chinese note of November
[Page 570]
17 to
the other FEC countries, stating that
while the United States still favors a two-thirds voting procedure, in
order to facilitate with the calling of the Japanese Peace Conference,
the United States would, though reluctantly, be willing to accept the
Chinese proposal if agreement could be obtained for calling a conference
on that basis. You may wish to raise this question with the Secretary if
you think such procedure is not acceptable to him.
[Annex]
Memorandum on Japanese Peace Conference
secret
Problem: To determine the United States
position on action to be taken in reference to the Japanese Peace
Conference.
Action Taken: On July 11 the United States
suggested to the eleven countries members of the Far Eastern
Commission that a peace conference be called on August 19 composed
initially of deputies of the FEC
countries, that voting be by a two-thirds majority, that other
states at war with Japan be consulted and that a final conference be
held of the states at war with Japan to give final approval to the
draft of the treaty. All of the countries except the Soviet Union
agreed with the proposal for an 11-power conference and 8 of them
agreed with our proposed voting procedure.
The Soviet Union, in a reply of July 22, maintained that the question
of convening a conference for the drawing up of a peace treaty for
Japan should be provisionally examined by the Council of Foreign
Ministers composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and
the United Kingdom. On August 12, the United States rejected this
proposal and stated that it was hoped the Soviet Union would be
willing to attend a conference of FEC countries, such a conference being free to decide
its own procedure. On August 29 the Soviets reiterated their former
position.
On October 9 the Chinese Foreign Minister left an aide-mémoire with the Secretary in which it was proposed
that the peace conference adopt a voting procedure similar to that
in the Far Eastern Commission whereby decisions should be taken by a
majority vote including the concurrence of the Big Four. The Chinese
Foreign Minister explained that he feared that if the Chinese
participated in a peace conference which the Soviets refused to
attend, such action would have serious consequences upon
Soviet-Chinese relations because of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.
Dr. Wang approached Mr. Vyshinsky to
[Page 571]
obtain the Soviet reaction to his proposal for
voting but received no reply from the Soviets prior to his return to
China. The Embassy in Nanking reported that Dr. Wang was considering
the advisability of formally proposing the Chinese plan of voting to
the Foreign Ministers Conference in London. He has requested the
views of the Department on his suggestion and inquired whether it
would be expedient to make such a proposal after the adjournment of
the United Nations and before the Foreign Ministers Conference in
London. Dr. Wang further stated that no reply has yet been received
from Moscow to his approach to Mr. Vyshinsky. The Department
answered Dr. Wang that it has no objection to his sending notes to
the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, USSR and United States
proposing his voting procedure, but that the Department does not
consider it appropriate for the question of the Japanese peace
conference to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Council
of Foreign Ministers, pointing out that it is not on the agenda. The
Chinese Government delivered a note on November 17, 1947, to the
United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union proposing
that a preliminary Japanese peace conference be called, at a date to
be agreed upon by the Four Powers, of the states members of the Far
Eastern Commission, decisions of the conference to be taken by a
majority of the member states composing the conference, including
the concurring votes of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the
United States and China. The United States proposes to circularize
the Chinese note to the other countries on the Far Eastern
Commission together with a note from this Government. The United
States note would contain a statement of the position which the
various countries had taken to date and would emphasize the fact
that this Government’s endeavors to obtain agreement on a two-thirds
voting procedure had failed. The note would further state that while
the United States still favored a two-thirds voting procedure, as a
contribution to facilitating the calling of a Japanese peace
conference, the United States would, though reluctantly, be willing
to accept the Chinese proposals if agreement could be obtained for
calling a conference on that basis. The United States would request
the views of the other countries concerned.
The Australians have been constantly pressing for an early Japanese
peace settlement. On October 16 Dr. Evatt wrote the Secretary that
“definite action should be taken to fix the time and place of the
conference”. Dr. Evatt was told by the Secretary on October 28th
that the difficulty was how to work out some formula which will make
at least Chinese participation possible and preferably that of the
Soviet Union, as it would be manifestly meaningless to have a
Japanese peace conference without the Soviet Union and China. It is
proposed
[Page 572]
to inform Dr.
Evatt personally of the contents of the Chinese note, of our
intention to circularize it to the states members of the Far Eastern
Commission for their views and of our willingness to accept the
Chinese proposals if agreement can be reached for a conference on
that basis.
In a note from the Chinese Foreign Minister dated November 5,
1947,84a the Chinese Government
stated that while the drawing up of the peace treaty for Germany
“may be entrusted to France, the United Kingdom, the United States
of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Powers
signatories to the terms of surrender for Germany, China is entitled
to participate in discussions to determine the time and place for
the German Peace Conference, its composition, agenda and other
related matters. It also follows that China has the right to be one
of the inviting Powers.” Identic notes have been sent to the Foreign
Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. The United States has replied that, as on
previous occasions, this Government favors the inclusion of China as
a sponsoring power for the conference to consider the peace
settlement for Germany.
Recommendations:
- 1)
- The United States should refuse to discuss at the Council of
Foreign Ministers the question of the Japanese peace settlement
since it is not on the agenda. It should hold firm to its
position that formal discussion on this question should not be
restricted to China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and
the United States.
- 2)
- Before the United States note summarized above is circulated
to the other members of the Far Eastern Commission, a copy will
be telegraphed to London so that it can be handed informally to
Mr. Molotov in an attempt to determine whether the Soviet Union
will be prepared to enter a peace conference on the basis of the
Chinese proposals.
If it is not possible to obtain agreement for a conference, the
United States must publish the record indicating that it has taken
all reasonable steps to bring about a peace conference. It is
important that the United States be thus placed in a position to
proceed with the requisite changes in the character of the
occupation of Japan to achieve so far as possible those conditions
which a peace treaty would otherwise have produced.
