Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2847

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

secret

[New York,] October 28, 1947.

Participants:	The Secretary
	Dr. H. V. Evatt, Australian Delegation
	Mr. John F. Dulles73
	Mr. Charles Bohlen

Dr. Evatt repeated his views which he had outlined in his letter to me of October 16, 1947, on the question of the Japanese peace treaty. He said this was an urgent matter and Australia very much hoped that the calling of the Conference to consider the Japanese peace settlement could be expedited. He repeated the vital interest of Australia in the Japanese settlement on the ground of its participation in the war which he said was second only to that of the United States, and neither Great Britain or even China. He said from my reply of October 22nd to his letter he had had the impression that the United States was not as firm as it had been in the past on the understanding which he said had been conveyed to him by my predecessor, Mr. Byrnes, that Australia would have a position second to none in the making of the Japanese peace treaty.

I explained to Dr. Evatt the difficulty we had encountered in our efforts to call a Japanese peace conference. I said that in addition to the Soviet Union, which had refused to attend, the Chinese Government, as he knew, was reluctant to participate in a Japanese peace conference without the Soviet Union. I said from my conversation with Dr. Wang here that it had been clear that the Chinese Government were concerned lest the Soviet Government utilize Chinese participation in such a conference without the Soviet Union as grounds for abrogating the agreements concluded in 1945 between China and the Soviet Union. I told Dr. Evatt that our objectives in the matter of the peace conference, I felt, were identical. The difficulty was how to work out some formula which would make at least Chinese participation possible, and preferably that of the Soviet Union. I said that the whole Japanese peace conference without the Soviet and China was manifestly meaningless.

Dr. Evatt said that he would like to suggest the fixing of the date for what he called a preliminary informal conference of the eleven powers to consider preparations for the peace conference. I told Dr. Evatt that in my understanding that was exactly what we had proposed last summer but that for the reasons I had indicated above neither the Russians or the Chinese would attend such a preliminary meeting until the question of the voting was decided. Dr. Evatt’s suggestion, therefore, would not in effect advance matters at all as I believed the same replies would be received from the Soviet and Chinese Governments. I mentioned that Dr. Wang had suggested to Vyshinsky the adoption of the Far Eastern Commission’s voting procedure but had had a negative reaction from Vyshinsky himself and no further word from Moscow. Dr. Evatt expressed the view that the Russians would eventually jump at the adoption of the Far Eastern Commission’s voting rules as that would give them the veto. He said it would be “intolerable” for Australia to be in an inferior position at the Japanese peace conference since they had made the second largest contribution to the War and certainly more than the Soviet Union. I told him we were considering how best to get around the present difficulty and it was possible that after all the heat and controversy of the General Assembly was over that the possibilities of so doing might be increased.

Korea—Dr. Evatt said that, as he had stated in his letter, he felt that the question of Korea should not be brought before the General Assembly; that it was a question for decision by the countries directly concerned and who had fought in the war. He felt, as he had said in his letter of October 16th, that if the Moscow mechanism was stalled, the question should be referred to the Japanese peace conference. He again emphasized the role of Australia in Far Eastern matters. In reply I told Dr. Evatt that in our view the Korean question which arose out of pledges made during the War on the restoration of Korean independence did not properly belong in the Japanese peace discussions since all that would be required there was the simple statement that Japan would renounce all claims upon Korea. I added that, developing out of the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences, a mechanism had been set up in Moscow in December 1945 which placed the responsibility for the implementation of the pledge of Korean independence upon four powers and more directly on the United States and USSR. I said that this machinery, despite all our efforts, had been stalled and that the situation in Korea was going from bad to worse. I said that the Koreans were very difficult to deal with and their Representative here in New York and the leaders of Southern Korea had been exchanging messages which showed a complete absence of any reality in their approach to the whole problem. In the circumstance, we have merely sought the assistance of the United Nations in breaking the deadlock. The United States wished to see it become possible for the United States, with decency and in fulfillment of its pledges, to withdraw from Southern Korea, but not on the basis of scuttling out which was what the Russians desired to bring about. I asked Mr. Dulles if he had any comment on our Korean resolution.⁷⁴

Mr. Dulles said that we had placed this question on the agenda since we believe that the United Nations was the only organization which could be of any help. Already the simple act of putting it on the agenda had caused the Soviets to make a proposal which, although inacceptable as made, nevertheless was the first break in the log jam. He went on to explain that the United States was merely suggesting a UN Commission which would be an international eye backed by the prestige of the UN on the execution by the powers directly responsible of their obligations in this matter. Dr. Evatt said that his chief concern was the position of Australia should be safeguarded in this matter and he intended, therefore, to suggest that the UN Commission to go to Korea should be confined only to those powers having such a direct interest and who have fought in the war against Japan.

Warmongering—In discussing yesterday’s resolution on warmongering, Dr. Evatt said that there was considerable feeling that he shared that the American press, particularly the tabloids, and certain radio commentators were indeed attempting to provoke a war with the Soviet Union. He felt that the reports in the American press, even including the New York Times, had not been giving dependable and accurate account of what happened. He felt that they had put the Russians in a distorted light. He then, however, went on to say that his rebuttal of Vyshinsky in Committee 1 on the subject had not been given adequate coverage.⁷⁵ (It was not entirely clear from Dr. Evatt’s remarks exactly what he was complaining about in the New York Times reporting.)

I remarked to Dr. Evatt that this whole question of propaganda was an extremely tricky and dangerous one, that no one had yet discovered the proper way of dealing with it whether by meeting fire with fire or avoiding being drawn into vituperative debate. I then told Dr. Evatt that in my opinion, the Russians, in two years, had undone all the good will that had been built up during the War in the United States by its consistently hostile attitude towards this country. I said that I felt that that was the cause of certain intemperate press and radio comments on the Soviet Union. I added that what I was continually endeavoring to find out in my own mind was why the Russians were pursuing this course of action which could only have the inevitable result of angering the American people and producing the hostile comments to which he referred, and I was still trying to find out what the Russians were after.

73. Member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.
74. For text of the American resolution transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations on October 17, see p. 833.
75. For discussion on October 27 in the 87th meeting of the First Committee, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee, pp. 248 ff. For amendments to warmongering resolution, see ibid., pp. 578–579. For further documentation on the subject, see volume i .