740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2747
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)71
Mr. Sebald called upon Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh by appointment at 9:00 p.m., October 26, 1947 at the residence of Lt. General Shang, Chief of the Chinese Mission in Japan. The interview lasted approximately two hours, and despite several attempts on the part of Mr. Sebald to leave, Dr. Wang was insistent upon further discussion. The participants were alone throughout the interview.
Mr. Sebald asked whether, as a result of Dr. Wang’s visit in Japan, he had been able to form conclusions which might be of interest. Dr. Wang replied that in his opinion the present Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Katayama is sincere and honest in its efforts to spread democracy among the Japanese and that he is glad to learn that new elements are in control in Japan. He stated that Mr. Katayama and Dr. Ashida72 (who came uninvited) had called at the Chinese Mission at his request yesterday morning, as he was most anxious to determine by a straightforward answer whether, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, once the Occupation forces are removed, the Japanese Government would be able to withstand pressure from rightist and leftist groups. Mr. Katayama was unable to answer this question directly but asked Dr. Ashida to reply. In Dr. Wang’s opinion, Dr. Ashida’s reply was not convincing nor was it straightforward. Dr. Wang is of the opinion that this question is one of great importance, it is one that must be answered soon, and that the answer will largely determine the type of post-treaty control for Japan.
Asked concerning the underlying reasons for criticism of the Occupation, and specifically the United States’ elements thereof, in the Chinese press and by Chinese Government officials, Dr. Wang stated that this is natural in view of the lack of understanding of Occupation problems and American objectives in Japan. He said that by and [Page 548] large the Chinese people are in full sympathy with the United States but that they are unclear concerning the Japanese picture. There were distorted reports of what is going on in Japan and, in contrast to the chaos in China, they naturally feel that the United States is building up Japan at the expense of China. As an example, he raised the question of the so-called “gold pot”, comprised of looted gold and precious metals. He said that he could not understand why the United States has taken unilateral action in placing this gold at the sole disposal of Japan with a view to building up Japan’s trade. He said that as the gold pot is eventually to be divided among the four Allies, he could not understand why it would not be possible at this time to allow China also to take advantage of the “gold pot” as a credit base upon which to encourage Chinese trade. He said China is also in dire straits for raw materials, but that the United States apparently overlooks this factor. He hoped that something could be worked out along these lines.
With regard to the apparent alignment of China with Russia on the question of the peace conference, Dr. Wang stated that there is no such alignment and that China’s position is predicated upon the realities of the situation. He said that the proposal made by the United States is impractical in that it, in fact, prevents Russia from joining the peace conference. When chided with the remark that Russia was not being kept out but rather that Russia refuses to come in, he said that this argument is fallacious for the following reason: a two-thirds majority could be obtained by the five British Commonwealths and the United States; Russia would have one vote, as would China; the other countries would not count. It would therefore be possible for Britain and the United States (plus the Philippines) to out-vote Russia and China on all matters which these countries might consider of major importance and vital to their respective interests. For example, it might be possible to take away all territorial concessions which have been made to Soviet Russia; it would be possible to establish a post-treaty regime of control which might be entirely unacceptable to China; the question of war loot could easily be settled in such manner as to be detrimental to both China and Russia; the question of external assets might be resolved in favor of Japan; a reparations settlement might be made which would be unacceptable to China, though entirely acceptable to wealthier countries. In Dr. Wang’s opinion, the realities of the situation make it impossible for Russia to join under the conference proposal advanced by the United States.
On the other hand, Dr. Wang continued, his suggestion that the FEC set-up and procedure be adopted in drafting the treaty—with the appointment of more “high-powered” representatives if desirable—appears [Page 549] to be the only practical compromise which might be acceptable both to Russia and to the United States. As the proposer, it would of course be acceptable to China. He said that the FEC has functioned satisfactorily since its inception, much work has been done, major policies have already been agreed upon (including the post-war overall policy for Japan), and above all else, Soviet Russia had not once used its veto in the FEC. He explained that the situation in the Pacific is entirely different from that in Europe where Russia’s interests are predominant. In any event, in so far as Japan is concerned, the United States is the principal occupying power and its weight of opinion is strong enough to carry along the majority of the other FEC countries.
Dr. Wang also stated that in his opinion, even if Soviet Russia should refuse to accede to his (China’s) compromise proposal, he felt that the United States could safely go along with the Soviet proposal that a treaty be drafted by the CFM as was done in the case of the European treaties. He said that these treaties were drafted (admittedly with difficulty) and have become acceptable, even though it did take a long time. In the event that this method of drafting the treaty should bog down by reason of Soviet obstructionism, the United States could always review its position, go to the American people and say that a fair trial has been given to the Soviet method but has failed. This would be the time for an alternative procedure, even if unacceptable to Russia, to be adopted. All in all, however, Dr. Wang feels strongly that his own proposal is the most practical one. He said that as yet no reply has been received from the Soviets on his proposal and that as soon as he returns to Nanking, he intends to press for an answer. He felt that Mr. Vishinsky is so busy in New York with his vituperation and invective that he does not have time to devote to Japanese peace treaty matters. Dr. Wang believes, however, that eventually the Russians will accept this compromise arrangement. Dr. Wang stressed again and again his belief that the FEC procedure is the only realistic one which could be employed—he said that this statement is made not because it is his own plan, but because the United States’ proposal is unrealistic and unworkable for the reasons previously stated.
Dr. Wang stated that most of the basic principles of the treaty are already agreed upon by all FEC nations. The most difficult problem, which can only be determined when the conference takes place, is the question of post-treaty control. He is not convinced that a sudden withdrawal of all troops from Japan is the proper answer although he said he does not at this time feel strongly one way or the other. In any event, it appears reasonable to him that Soviet Russia, in any post-treaty control which is set up, is bound to gain something which, she [Page 550] does not now have. It is therefore in her interest to make a treaty of peace with Japan. The problem is to find a formula which is acceptable to Russia.
When asked whether China would join the conference in the event that Soviet Russia should turn down the Chinese proposal, Dr. Wang stated that he does not presently know what China would do, and that it would be necessary for him to submit the problem for decision to the Political Council. He expressed considerable fear that unilateral action on the part of China would give the Soviets a free hand in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria and that they would use the Chinese “violation” of the Sino-Soviet treaty as an excuse for such action. He said it is obvious that China can now ill-afford to have Soviet Russia take the offensive in this respect.
Dr. Wang was strongly of the opinion that any peace treaty without Soviet Russia would be a failure and could not possibly work. He counselled a United States’ policy of firmness and patience, stating that the United States is firm but not patient. Finally, he wondered whether the time is ripe for a peace treaty with Japan and whether it would not be wiser to await the outcome of the present discussions in the UN. The results of these discussions will, in his opinion, be largely determinative of the Soviet’s approach to and attitude towards the Japanese peace treaty.
Dr. Wang then commented upon the 25-year, Four-Power Security Treaty which had been proposed by the United States. He said that this proposal is still resting in the Foreign Offices of China and Russia, and that, in effect, it amounts to a commitment by the United States. He failed to see how it could be withdrawn, unless it is overridden by a peace treaty to which China and Russia subscribe. He posed the question: “What if Russia were now to accept the proposed security treaty?” He saw only a gain on the part of the Soviets in the Occupation of Japan, and wondered whether the United States would, under present conditions, welcome the arrival of a Soviet contingent of troops in Japan.
With regard to American policy vis-à-vis China, Dr. Wang said that the United States is being very cautious, not necessarily for its own good but rather because of fear that anything which is done might make matters worse in so far as Russia is concerned. He said this cautiousness is misunderstood in many quarters in China but that he fully understands. In any event, however, he hopes that some aid will eventually be forthcoming from the United States and that China will not be forgotten as she was during the war.