851G.00/9–2647: Telegram
The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State
318. ReDeptel 160, September 19. While French at present do not have capability restore prewar status by force arms, their overall tactics, combining military operations with political manoeuvering, give rise grave suspicion that restoration that status by any means possible is the end in view—and great majority natives are convinced of this. French record in past, especially past 2 years, impingement on and unilateral derogation of native rights, certainly inspires no great confidence that French will willingly grant more than such minimum as will satisfy world opinion. Unless some international element should intervene, it seems likely French will achieve eventually and substantially the end in view, although certainly under superficially different setup than prewar regime.
French are aided to this achievement by various factors: (1) strongest opponent is Communist and at this stage in world politics the elimination of Communist menace is to be welcomed; (2) other leaders are wasting time bickering and scrambling for positions of prestige and profit and seem to have in common only the catch phrase “union and independence”; (3) time element, as French well know if they can [Page 142] only hang on their chances for obtaining more favorable peace are greatly bettered—hence present sit-tight attitude.
Morally, end French believed have in view and tactics to achieve such end are to be condemned and US cannot be party to return prewar status or even give such appearance without risking destroying large amount confidence natives still have in US. Practically, however, it is of paramount importance that Indochina does not become prey to an imposed totalitarian regime by use recognized weapons of repression, reprisal and terrorism—natives are divided and majority unprepared for democratic freedom and in such division and unpreparedness the single-minded purpose of the 80 to 100 real Communists could easily gain upper hand. No brief can be held for any solution that would put France and Western democracy influence out of Indochina or lead natives believe US indifferent.
Factually situation is substantially same as in mytels 299 and 307, September 15 and 22—big questions being if Ho can be successfully by-passed and if Bao Dai despite reported agreement with French will hold out for real independence.
Meantime, all sources agree French military believe they can work serious damage Ho’s organization, mainspring of resistance, in 3 or 4 months, especially cutting flow supplies from China and by sea, also agree French military appear be on point putting their belief to trial in Tonkin and further agree military operations may have fair measure success. Present increased native activities in south aimed prevent French sending large reinforcements to north.
Please pass Paris.