851G.00/9–2447: Telegram
The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State
301. ReDeptel 73, September 19.11 French military in both Saigon and Hanoi, when they speak campaign 3 or 4 months, seem refer campaign in middle and upper Tonkin directed against present Vietnam Government.
Believe military feels confident such campaign would result (1) seizure Lao Kay and Caobang, thereby closing Chinese frontier to in-trickle arms and supplies Vietnam Govt; (2) disruption Vietnam Government with at least some if not most leaders such as Ho and Giap killed, captured or effectively neutralized; (3) destruction of major portion regular Vietnam army and capture most its arms; (4) destruction Vietnam communications including broadcasting facilities.
Throughout summer, felt French unable with troops then here to accomplish this campaign. In light reports of recent influx troops in apparently sizable numbers from south, believe it possible French have capacity at least close Chinese frontier and serious[ly] disrupt Vietnam Government.
Doubt, however, if even French military feel situation can be stabilized on their terms immediately following such campaign. They point out complete pacification Morocco took 20 years, and Tonkin took 10 or more. However, they believe after organized Vietnam Government dislocated sufficiently, armed units will tend disintegrate to piracy.
While elimination present Vietnam Government as organized armed force would seriously weaken position other Nationalists vis-à-vis French (which Bao Dai from his recent Hong Kong statement regarding [Page 141] urgency of opening negotiations seems to realize), it would not enable French immediately reinstall something which resembles prewar regime. However, French administrative history Indochina such that promised concessions are eaten away by administrative practice despite sincerity in which concessions originally offered. This tendency has shown no evidence changing in past 2 years.
French ability reinstall prewar regime in coming years would depend largely on factors external to Indochina. Am inclined believe, however, in long period, given among other things a [no?] third world war or third party intervention, continued instability China and India, reasonable economic recovery France and world, French could reinstall something which minus trimmings would resemble status quo before war.
Such action would, of course, be catastrophic US prestige, would turn Vietnamese who distrust and hate French into violent anti-white bloc, and would insure irretrievable orientation intellectuals and people toward communism and Moscow and against West.
Summary sent Saigon.
Repeat to Paris.