851G.00/7–1947: Telegram
The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 28
233. ReDeptel 64, July 16.29 Indications here of future French policy are obscured by virtual state of siege which exists and struggle between French military and civil authorities.
However, it remains curious that French discovered no Communist menace in Ho Chi Minh Govt until after September 1946, when it became apparent that VN Govt would not bow to French wishes. Break between French and VN Govt developed not because VN Govt was Communist but because it was too strong for French to impose conditions they desired. It is further apparent that Ho’s support (which French to present have consistently underestimated) derives from fact he represents symbol of fight for independence. He is supported because he is acting like nationalist, not because he was or is Communist.
As stated in mytel 197, June 20,30 I believe that French ability to diverse [divert?] nationalist support from Ho remains theoretical [Page 121] possibility but that this will require giving to some govt what was refused VN Govt.
To present, if French policy is to win nationalist support from Ho Chi Minh, it is failure in Tonkin, With reinforced Sûreté using very repressive measures, arbitrary arrests, widespread torturing in prisons according to International Red Cross representative visited them, Administrative Committee which is literally laughing stock of populace, reestablishment of direct French administration by use of “délégués” etc., heavy handed custom controls, and widespread graft, particularly in lower echelons French services, French have gained very little support in zone they control.
French desire to set (built around Bao Dai or nationalists or Catholics or various combinations of this) up group in opposition to Ho seems clear. It is logical step, after admission by Coste-Floret31 that French have insufficient forces to reconquer country, to increase their relative strength by dividing Vietnamese.
However, it seems improbable that French intend to offer “complete internal autonomy” (unless French define “autonomy” very narrowly) to Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China, particularly if this means leaving present “federal” services such as Sûreté and customs hanging in air. It is highly doubtful that colonial French would accept policing by Vietnamese nor would they accept that Vietnamese courts have jurisdiction over them.
There has been, however, considerably less talk of Indochinese federation in recent past. If French define control “military affairs and foreign relations” as broadly as to mean French control of Sûreté, customs and justice, there exists possibility that they intend eliminate federation at least in name.