851G.00/7–1147
The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State
No. 273
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Charlton Ogburn Jr., of the Division of Southeast Asia Affairs, and Mr. William C. Bullitt, former American Ambassador at Paris, dated May 29, 1947,24 in which the latter related his impressions of the attitude of certain French officials in France towards the present conflict in Indochina.
It is curious to note that, according to Mr. Bullitt, the present conflict, or war, appears to be popular in France, and that his contacts expressed optimism as to the ability of the French military not only to have the situation under control within two months but also that all questions will be settled within two years. With few exceptions the above does not represent the attitude of the French in Indochina, who are perhaps more realistic in their evaluation of the situation and of the ability of the French military to cope adequately with the situation. The few exceptions are, of course, the perennial optimists and the dyed in the wool colonialists, who, at any price, want to see the good old days restored, when natives had few rights and were subjected to an almost merciless exploitation. On the whole, the French in Indochina find the war too near to home to feel comfortable and life under existing conditions, while superficially hectic, is far from pleasant. In theory, perhaps, the conflict may be popular, as vindicating the [Page 111] power and glory of France, but a person who has seen his life work go up in smoke is either determined to continue the fight at all costs or to pull out—and in the opinion of most observers the majority of French if not altogether of the latter frame of mind are convinced of the futility of an all out war.
The American Vice Consul at Hanoi has reported his opinion that the French military successes in the north are more apparent than real and, as I have reported, the French successes in the south have achieved but a very small part of the task that confronts the military. It would appear that the native strategy is not to force an open battle but rather to engage in hit and run tactics for which the terrain is well suited. So long as Vietnam has the will to fight the French will find themselves mightily mistaken if they think they can control the country and restore its shattered economy by holding only the larger urban centers and by using small mobile units for countryside cleanups. The present campaign, including the extensive use of parachute troops, has proved that by the time a French unit arrives at the scene of action the opponents have quitted the field and are many miles away. What generally happens then is that the French military summarily punish all the natives in the neighborhood, a practice which has not endeared them to the population. Frankly, with the forces now at their disposal the French have little chance to win a decisive battle or to make the countryside safe for living or for enterprise. The attitude of the French in France regarding the Indochina situation may, of course, be based on the optimistic utterances of persons like Tran Van Ty, Vice President of the Provisional Government of Cochinchina, or on the incomprehensible statement of the High Commissioner, Mr. Emile Bollaert, upon his arrival back in France, that the situation had improved. The latter appears to be far from the case.
The French contacts of Mr. Bullitt mentioned that the resistance would collapse with the exhaustion of arms and munitions at its disposal. This would appear to be somewhat of an exaggeration—the loss of arms and munitions might cause a decrease in an open type of warfare but enough will remain and filter in from China, or from other sources, to keep alive the flames of sabotage and guerrilla activities. That is the type of warfare for which the natives are best suited, the type of warfare the French are less able to combat successfully, and so long as the natives do not win at least the major part of their political and social desiderata there will always be the will to fight the French on the part of a not inconsiderable number of natives. The situation in Indochina will not be settled until the countryside is safe, until people can travel other than in heavily armed convoys, until the production of this rich and fertile land can be sure of reaching [Page 112] markets and ports of exportation, and a very few active and determined resistants can prevent this from being achieved. Perhaps the French in France do not realize the heritage of hatred that their colonialists have created—nor do they realize that French actions and political manoeuvering since their return to Indochina under the cover of British arms have detracted nothing from that heritage. Moreover, alongside of this hatred runs a current of frank distrust that the French ever intend to give them the measure of liberty and self-determination that they claim.
Apart from the attitude that a military solution is possible, the most interesting comment was that concerning the investment of United States capital in the rehabilitation of Indochina, and equally Mr. Bullitt’s thought that the French were in a frame of mind to relax their economic grasp and to allow the United States to participate in the commerce and production of Indochina. Observers here feel that any concessions the French will make, in admitting participation in what could be a most lucrative economy, will be forced from them or will be so conditioned as to ensure more than substantial benefits for the French. The past record certainly shows no willingness on the part of the French to lightly give up any part of her former policy of economic exclusivism—any concessions made in the past to American business and enterprise have been literally wrung from the authorities in Indochina. It is possible that the French, while in France, are more liberal minded, but something seems to happen to them when they get to Indochina and American businessmen can relate from bitter experience the difficulty of doing business here. The Department has only to recall the background and long drawnout discussions which finally resulted in the Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Company being allowed to open an office for the distribution of films in this country. Inter alia I might mention that the Department has reported that the French are not inclined to enter into a reciprocal agreement providing for duty free treatment of consular officers—this is a small matter but it is indicative of the French attitude of squeezing out revenue by all possible means.
There is of course a political aspect to this question of the investment of foreign capital. I am convinced that the French would not willingly encourage the investment of such capital, particularly American, for fear that the results of such investment would be to further emancipate the natives from French control. Thus, the Department is aware that many French, in Indochina at least, are suspicious of American motives and the Department will recall newspaper articles charging American interference in affairs in this area for the purpose of securing a position of economic domination. Many of these articles, if not officially inspired, were with the tacit blessing of the [Page 113] authorities, for these articles appeared when the authorities exercised a very large degree of control over the press. The French, at least in Indochina, have always believed that the Americans favored the native cause and this belief has colored their actions and reactions to Americans and to American organizations and institutions. The Department has only to recall the difficulties that have beset the United States Information Service to be convinced of the suspicion that many of these French hold of the United States and American motives. Corroboratory of this suspicion are the activities in Indochina of the Sûreté and the French Military Security Service, which for example have hinted to consular personnel that any information obtained in the consular establishments should be passed on. As mentioned above, the French in France may regard Americans differently from many of the French in Indochina, but the intrigues of these latter and their often open campaign against Americans are too apparent but to fail to instill any great amount of confidence in a sincere welcome of American investment and the correlative influx of American businessmen. Laws in the past have been, if not discriminatory, so phrased as to make it difficult for foreign companies to work in Indochina. Some of these are understood to be still valid although force of circumstances and their own financial and commercial plight have caused the French not to insist upon their enforcement.
An interesting comment was made to me recently by a French businessman, who has spent considerable time in the United States and who may be considered as definitely pro-American. He said you Americans are much too easy—you give help and financial support to many countries, including France, and what do you get out of it? You should publicize the help you are so generously extending and you should insist that some quid pro quo be given you. Instead, you Americans follow a straight path, open and frank, and you do not realize, or at least ignore, that many people do not like you just because you have done them favors or because you oppose those people trying to do things that are not exactly “according to Hoyle”. He then spoke of the situation in Indochina and made the same comment as I have made above, regarding the difference between the French in France and the French in Indochina—some opposition to the Americans arises from the fact that the Americans did not back the French for the reconquering of Indochina, that the Americans wanted to be fair towards native aspirations, and because many French here fear that the United States, by opening up this country, will reap a part of the rich profits that formerly flowed into French coffers. The only saving grace, he added, was that in France there were a few sane people who recognized their debt to the United States and who might be willing, but they must be [Page 114] pressed, to give the United States more commercial opportunity in Indochina than in the past. The only saving grace, so far as the French in Indochina are concerned, is the fact that they would prefer American participation in the Indochinese economy to Chinese participation, perhaps because they believe the Americans would be easier to deal with than the Chinese.
The reaction of Mr. Bullitt’s contacts regarding dealing with Ho Chi Minh is, of course, stereotyped. The French do not want to deal with him despite the fact that he is still the outstanding representative of the native peoples and despite their heralded desire to treat with the real representatives of those peoples. Instead, stressing Ho’s Communist background, they are still dickering with the idea of bringing Bao Dai back to power, to set up a government with a front of independence, but which will be completely French dominated and which will protect French interests, protect the business of those powerful French concerns which if they did not “play ball” with the Japanese at least made a handsome profit from their transactions with them. Thus, at the present time, we have in the press articles which appear to be building up to the return of the late Emperor, the reputed playboy of Hong Kong, whose only sincere following appears to be a few of his former cohorts in Annam and whose greatest following are those whose pockets will be benefited if he should return. If the French believe that their position is stronger than that of the British and the Dutch, as they explained to Mr. Bullitt, they can only be anticipating a French return to power in Indochina—and a French return to power will not be exactly for the benefit of the natives. I agree, however, with Mr. Bullitt that the alternatives are not entirely pleasing, i.e., (1) allowing an independent Vietnam State which would be run by orders from Moscow, and (2) keeping the natives down by force of arms. For the good of the world, as we Americans see it, perhaps intervention as discussed in my despatch no. 267 of July 1,25 may be the only possible solution.
I say this with Mr. Bullitt’s comment regarding the character of the Annamites in mind. Here too, the Annamites that Mr. Bullitt met in France are apparently different from those in their native land. While there are of course numerous exceptions I do not believe that many people find the Annamites attractive and even lovable. With the exception of the Tonkinese, whose poverty has forced them to be so, few of the Annamites are particularly industrious. Including the Tonkinese, the Annamites are generally not noted for their honesty, loyalty or veracity. As an example, before the war it was impossible to obtain burglary and theft insurance in Indochina, because of the [Page 115] frequency with which native servants robbed their employers or were concerned with such robberies, and I am given to understand that the same condition exists today. Certainly theft and armed robbery are on the increase—and I must say that during the period following the fall of Japan few native servants showed themselves loyal to employers even after years of service. It may well be, however, that the abovementioned lack of admirable traits is a direct and pernicious result of decades of French maltreatment and lack of consideration. The corruption, intrigues and scandals of the colonialist era, and even now, were certainly no moral lesson. Nevertheless, whatever the cause, most observers feel that the real trouble with the Annamite is that he lacks “face”, and an Oriental who lacks this attribute is a pretty hopeless sort of person. That is not to say that there are not many worthwhile natives and that the natives should not have more of an opportunity than they have had in the past. They should! But knowing the rank and file it is queried as to what would happen in Indochina if they were given independence with no measure of check and control, A great many observers believe that there would be misgovernment and chaos and, as has been repeatedly proffered, a fine opportunity for a third party, be it Soviet or Chinese, to gain a foothold in this country. Perhaps the best way to obtain a fair deal for the natives, and also to protect legitimate French and other interests from a native oppression and venality, would be to insist upon some sort of intervention and subsequent period of control. As it is, settlement of the situation is no farther progressed than almost two years ago, the French are trying to regain their position by procrastination and double dealing, and the Tonkinese group is still intransigent in its desire to have complete power over all this land, despite what a substantial number of Annamese and Cochinchinese may think and want.
One cannot blame the French for wanting to return if not to the status quo of before the war then to a political setup in which they will still have the balance of power, nor for not wanting to turn this country over to a group which may indeed draw strength and direction from anti-democratic sources. One cannot blame the natives for wanting at least a substantial share in the determination of their lives and futures, nor, after years of exploitation and poverty, for wanting a fair share of the fruits of their own lands. But one must reconcile these two positions and, unless the High Commissioner is able to pull a political rabbit from his hat in the not too distant future, it seems that intervention and possibly a period of tutelage may be the only way to end this conflict equitably and, it is hoped, to prevent the creation here of a Soviet-dominated state. However, I am loath to believe that the French will be so foolish as to stubbornly insist on conditions [Page 116] that can only mean a continuance of conflict and I am more inclined to believe that they will accept a Federated Republic of Viet Nam, as previously described. It then remains for the native leaders to make concessions, unless at all costs those leaders, like their Soviet mentors, will continue to insist on their program, come what may. In the latter contingency the only possible solution would appear to be pressure on the Vietnam to play the game fairly and reasonably.
Mention has been made of intervention and supervision. The form of this, if both the French and the natives should prove politically irreconcilable, might well be determined and imposed by the United Nations, under the urge of bringing security and peace to this troubled area. A neutral commission could be set up which would oversee the establishment of an acceptable form of government, which would watch that neither side encroached upon the rights of the other, and which would be able to guard, authoritatively, against the setting up of a totalitarian regime. Although the natives have agitated for some such intervention, but not for supervision, the French, I feel, would consider this a loss of prestige and would resist any such procedure so long as they have any cards to play, say the bringing back of Bao Dai.
Respectfully yours,