Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

851G.00/5–2147: Telegram

The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Saigon, May 21, 1947—5 p.m.

162. As matters stand there are two main contenders for position of power in Vietnam (1) Vietminh with Ho—still leading figure, and (2) National Union Front, with Bao Dai—not personally popular but important only through former position, but must be noted not much fundamental difference between parties as both claim unity and independence with guaranty France’s “legitimate” economic cultural interests in French Indo-China.

Bollaert’s Hanoi speech and Front’s proclamation (my telegram 161, May 20⁶) present definite statements of position and when Ho’s terms are known road to negotiation will be open; many believe terms already communicated Bollaert through Mus-Giam meeting⁷ and Bollaert prepared make definite recommendations upon return Paris end of month.

Progress has been made and several official sources intimate all will be settled in 3 months. Reasonably certain French will not install any puppet regime and in fact am not certain how long will maintain Cochin-Chinese regime. Bollaert’s speech (my telegram 155, May 17⁶) and Front’s proclamation indicate unlikelihood French dealing solely with Ho and some indication communication between Bao Dai and Ho.

British Vice Consul Hanoi informs British Consul General Saigon [that] Bollaert so shocked by destruction and so fearful possible floods, famine, that will go far in recommendations restore peace and order and increasing activity near Saigon can only help convince French their hold French Indo-China still precarious.

Opinion Saigon press is divided as to Front proclamation but majority believe it helps clarify situation.

Please pass Paris.

Reed

6. Not printed.
7. In airgram A–13, June 20, from Hanoi (received July 21), Vice Consul O’Sullivan gave the text of a Vietnamese account of this meeting between Ho Chi Minh, Hoang Minh Giam, and Paul Mus. He stated that this text conformed with various Vietnamese reports and concluded: “If these were the conditions actually proposed upon which French would admit no discussion, it can only mean that Bollaert had no intention of treating with the Viet Nam Government.” (851G.00/6–2047).
6. Not printed.