Editorial Note
Crown Prince Saud handed the reply from King Ibn Saud to Minister Childs at Jidda on the morning of December 16, 1947, to the note which Mr. Childs had given to the Crown Prince as described in telegram 563, supra. The lengthy reply from King Ibn Saud was sent in translation by Mr. Childs in telegram 568 from Jidda on December 16, not printed. (890F.00/12–1647)
To begin with, King Ibn Saud declared his thanks for the explanations given by the United States Government to the first two of the three principal questions discussed in the audience of Mr. Childs with the King on December 2 (see telegram 538 from Jidda on December 4, [Page 1342] ante, page 1335), and chiefly for the reiterated assurances of friendship for the Arabs, support of their independence, and the intention to maintain the status quo.
On the other hand, the King could not conceal his disappointment concerning the response to the third question, namely, the request for American aid to enable Saudi Arabia to take the necessary measures to assure the protection of mutual interests in the event of any emergencies. In the remainder of his long message the King took pains to make detailed observations which he hoped would remove any wrong impression concerning his purposes. He feared that there had been misinterpretation of Saudi Arabian attitudes, particularly in respect of the decision of the United States Government in preventing the export of arms to the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia.1 He declared that any military assistance would never be used against the United States, or for aggressive attack against others. There was an extremely large difference between the position of Saudi Arabia and that of other countries, because there were vital mutual economic and strategic interests there, such as the protection of the oil field and pipe line, which did not exist elsewhere.
King Ibn Saud reconfirmed his guarantee that any military aid would not be used for other than defensive purposes. He pleaded that his real purpose was to establish a modern, mechanized military force to be used only as a means of defence around the airfield at Dhahran and in the area of the pipe line. The King asserted that he intended to ask the United States for the assistance of a training mission to supervise the training of this force and the preparation of such bases as would be required.2 In the light of these assurances and explanations which he had frankly reiterated, King Ibn Saud hoped that the United States would review its position, and inspired by the existing situation could work out a practical way which would lead to the realization and attainment of the King’s purposes.
- Minister Childs reported in telegram 569, December 16, 7 p.m., from Jidda, that he had emphasized to Grown Prince Saud that afternoon that the attitude of the Uniited States toward shipment of arms to the Middle East was not based on any doubt or reservation regarding the friendly intentions and disposition of the King and his Government. The decision to embargo arms shipments had been adopted in the light of general considerations involving the peace and security of the area. (890F.00/12–1647)↩
- On December 22, Minister Childs suggested in telegram 581, from Jidda, that the sending of a military mission to Saudi Arabia would materially enhance the possibility of extending American occupancy of the Dhahran airfield beyond March 1949. (890F.00/12–2247) He was advised in telegram 18, January 23, 1948, to Jidda, that the Departments of State, Army, and Air Force were giving careful consideration to the sending of such a mission. (890F.00/12–1647)↩