867N.01/11–2447
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Attached hereto is a copy of a personal telegram1 which I have just received from Hamdi Al Pachachi, who was Prime Minister of Iraq during the last year that I was United States Minister to that country.2 I trust that you will read this telegram in full, since, in my opinion, it represents fairly the feelings of the Arab world with regard to the United States and Palestine.
I feel it again to be my duty to point out that it seems to me and all the members of my Office acquainted with the Middle East that the policy which we are following in New York at the present time is contrary to the interests of the United States and will eventually involve us in international difficulties of so grave a character that the reaction throughout the world, as well as in this country, will be very strong.
We are committed to the idea that the security of the Middle East is vital to the United States. We also agree that unless the British continue to remain a force in the Middle East, the security of the Middle East will be gravely endangered. It is impossible for the British to remain a force in the Middle East unless they retain the friendship of the Arab world. By our Palestine policy, we are not only forfeiting [Page 1282] the friendship of the Arab world, but we are incurring long-term Arab hostility towards us. What is important is that the Arabs are losing confidence in the integrity of the United States and the sincerity of our many pronouncements that our foreign policies are based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In Mr. Johnson’s speech of Saturday, the British were castigated before the whole world for not agreeing to suggestions of the Subcommittee which, if followed, would certainly have ruined British relations with the Arab world and would probably have resulted in the British being forced to withdraw from the whole Middle East. It is extremely unfortunate that we should be criticizing the British for following the only kind of policy which, it seems to me, they can follow if they are to remain in the Middle East. I am afraid that the reactions in London to criticisms of this kind will not help us in our efforts to prevail upon Mr. Bevin not to withdraw the remaining British troops from Greece.
I wonder if the President realizes that the plan which we are supporting for Palestine leaves no force other than local law enforcement organizations for preserving order in Palestine. It is quite clear that there will be wide-scale violence in that country, both from the Jewish and Arab sides with which the local authorities will not be able to cope. It is my understanding that Mr. Johnson, on Saturday, indicated before the Subcommittee that if the situation in Palestine should develop into a menace to peace, the matter would naturally come before the Security Council and that the United States, along with the other four Great Powers, would be prepared to share responsibility for removing this menace. Our plan envisages apparently the despatch of American, Soviet and perhaps other troops to Palestine in order to preserve law and order. It seems to me that we ought to think twice before we support any plan which would result in American troops going to Palestine. The fact that Soviet troops under our plan would be introduced into the heart of the Middle East is even more serious. I know that you have so many problems facing you that you cannot keep informed regarding the details of all of them, and I am sending you this memorandum in order to make sure that you realize the direction in which we are headed.3
- Telegram of November 22 not printed.↩
- In 1945.↩
- Mr. Armour noted, in a
marginal notation on November 24: “I entirely agree with the above
memorandum”. In an undated marginal notation, Mr. Lovett stated: “I
read this [memorandum] to the President at the 12:30 meeting today.
I explained that the Dept thought the situation was serious and that
he should know of the probable attempts to get us committed
militarily. We are continuing to refuse.”
The memorandum, except for the first paragraph and the last sentence, was transmitted to Messrs. Johnson, Hilldring and Rusk at Mr. Henderson’s request and with Mr. Lovett’s approval in telegram Gadel 31, November 24, to New York.
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