Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

Statement by the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)¹

New York, November 22, 1947

Mr. Johnson (United States of America) asked leave to bring up a number of technical points the following day; for the time being he would make a few general observations.

The representative of Canada had referred to Mr. Johnson’s comments on the attitude of the United Kingdom. While the members of the United Kingdom delegation, in their personal capacity, had cooperated with great courtesy in the work of the Committee, the United Kingdom’s policy had not always helped matters. The United Kingdom had not given its full co-operation and that had rendered the Committee’s task more difficult and had not closed any of the gaps, whether real or imaginary.

Like the representative of the Dominican Republic, Mr. Johnson wondered how a delegation, by abstaining, could promote a solution of the Palestinian question. As the representative of Canada had said, if the peoples of Palestine and the Members of the United Nations co-operated, the suggested means of implementation would suffice, and the difficulties which would not fail to ensue would be reduced to a minimum.

The determining factors in the success of the partition plan were loyal acceptance of the General Assembly’s decision and co-operation both on the part of the peoples concerned and of the Mandatory Power during the period of the withdrawal of its troops. Mr. Johnson believed with the Canadian representative that the United Kingdom, as a loyal Member of the United Nations, would co-operate with the United Nations commission. Under the plan, as conceived, the Mandatory Power would not be burdened with the technical responsibility for implementation.

The plan of Sub-Committee 2 did not propose any means for implementation. The question therefore arose: What would happen if the United Kingdom withdrew its troops without any decision having been reached?

While the plan of Sub-Committee 1 was far from perfect, it offered the best practical solution. Mr. Johnson recalled that reference had been made to the permanent members of the Security Council. His Government had authorized him to support the plan of Sub-Committee 1, in which the Security Council was called upon to play a part. The Council would be responsible for all matters relating to security set forth in the plan. It could send instructions to the commission which, in turn, could submit requests to it. If a situation covered by Chapters VI or VII of the Charter developed, it would be brought before the Council. In that case, the United States Government would fulfil its duty in accordance with the Charter by taking part in the implementation of the Council’s decision.

The matter could wait no longer. The hour of decision had struck. If there were hesitation, the situation would be worse in a year’s time. If action were decided upon, the United Nations would be equal to the task.

1. Made before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question during the evening of November 22; reprinted from GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, p. 180. The text of Ambassador Johnson’s statement was transmitted by New York in telegram Delga 51, November 25, 1:35 a. m.