501.BB Palestine/11–747: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

secret

558. With reference to Negeb question, Dept concurs with decision mentioned in para. C of USUN 1198 Nov. 11. It considers any substantial modification of US position would be most undesirable for following reasons:

1.
Decision to include Negeb in Arab State was approved by Department and later by full Delegation under chairmanship of Secretary.
2.
For Delegation’s information following factors were taken into consideration in arriving at Department’s position:
a.
If partition is to be successful it should be as equitable and just as possible. Among factors taken into consideration in this regard were the preponderance of population in a given area and the end use to which area could be put. Using these criteria, it was found that the Negeb was overwhelmingly Arab and has historically been so. (United Kingdom figures furnished to Subcommittee No. 1 show considerable increase in Arab population of Negeb over figures used by UNSCOP. Furthermore there has been great increase in habitations and settled population. Tribes inhabiting region can no longer be considered as purely nomadic and non-settled population.) It is a barren, arid, and topographically inhospitable area suitable only for marginal cultivation and seasonal grazing, an occupation habitually engaged in by the present inhabitants—semi-nomadic Arabs. Many proponents of Palestinian development admit that there is extremely slight chance of any large-scale development in the area.
b.
One of the major objections by the Arab States to partition as envisaged in the majority report has been the fact that the proposed Jewish State would divide the historic land bridge existing between traditionally Arab areas now constituted into Arab States. By giving the Negeb, with point of intersection at Beersheba, to the Arab State this connection would be maintained, and Beersheba developed as an effective trade and communications center between the Arab and Jewish States. The forcing of a Jewish wedge in an Arab area inhabited by traditionally truculent and fanatical Moslems would immeasurably increase difficulties in connection with implementation.
c.
Frequent reference has been made to the desirability of the Jewish State having an “outlet to the Red Sea and the Port of Aqaba.” It [Page 1256] should be pointed out that Aqaba is not in Palestine. The possibility of developing any part of Palestine bordering on the Red Sea as a port is open to serious doubt, and development of satisfactory communications with such a port extremely difficult.

In view of considerations set forth above Department does not feel that the approved position should be abandoned or substantially modified.

Marshall