501.BB Palestine/10–2547
The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to Mr. Eraser Wilkins
personal
Dear Fraser: Many thanks for your letters of October 31 and November 1.1 I don’t envy you people in your job of keeping away from the horns of the UNSCOP bull. Your problem is well stated in the middle paragraph of page 4 of your October 31 letter.2
In so far as I can visualize it, what has happened is that on examination the gendarmerie horse proved to be an intractable beast, so that the Delegation sought to transfer the burden to the British goat. The British have yet to be heard from on this. My guess is that it was a good try on our part but that, despite Creech Jones, they won’t fall for it. To Bevin it must seem that we’ve got ourselves into a position from which we are trying to squirm, and I think that quite possibly he is enjoying the spectacle, having been in the same position himself for lo! these many years. But, no matter how we dress up what we have in mind for the British in a stand-by role, they know that they would have to implement partition. I don’t see how we can count heavily upon the moral authority of UN, since, if UN votes the UNSCOP plan in the face of opposition and resistance by one of the peoples directly concerned, and by some of its own members, UN’s moral authority could be scored at zero, for it will have violated its own charter. There has been plenty of notice of this, official and otherwise by this time.
[Page 1239]It seems to me that, in this murky business, we should at least hang on to any principle that is discernible in it. The one principle that has been advanced thus far to justify our support of the UNSCOP report is that it is a majority report of a UN committee, which we have to support for that reason. However, so far as I can see we have now abandoned even that one principle by taking the position that Economic Union, regarded by UNSCOP as essential to the majority plan, is not essential. We might with equal reason take the position that partition is not essential to the plan, or immigration. Any one of these is or would be a major policy decision marking a departure from our basic September [October?] 11 decision. Jettisoning of Economic Union is not an amendment or modification of the majority plan “in order more accurately to give effect to the principles on which that plan is based,” nor is it in line with our position “that the powers of the Joint Economic Board be strengthened”.
A sit-down strike by the Arab portion of Palestine would not hold up Economic Union, because, according to UNSCOP, that is to apply even if one of the states does not adopt it. On the other hand, the failure of one outfit to agree to the Declaration and to Economic Union would be such a serious matter for the future of Palestine that UNSCOP was well advised to provide that the situation should be reviewed by the General Assembly in such an event.
It is hard to see why so much has been sacrificed for the purpose of plunging Palestine into chaos not later than July 1, 1948.
Since writing the foregoing on November 3 the Russian plan has been stated. On first reading, the bugs seem to be as follows: (1) It won’t work, as it depends on cooperation; (2) It would result in a dog-fight over what are “democratic parties and social organizations,” just as in Korea and throughout the Russian orbit; (3) the Russians would have veto power on the Security Council. A short trusteeship under the Trusteeship Council would reduce or obviate objections (2) and (3) but objection (1) would remain, as it does for all plans to implement the UNSCOP report thus far advanced.
Our main difficulty here is that when New York puts a draft position up to us, we don’t know how much steam the suggested position has behind it. We are uncertain how high up that position has been cleared at your end, or what new policy line lies behind it. A further difficulty is that while we are collecting a few preliminary thoughts on the subject, we are informed by the radio or the press that USUN has already spoken up in meeting. It may be, of course, that clearance between New York and Washington is done on a high level that we don’t know about in NE.
Now it is the morning of the 5th and we have Pearson’s statement. It seems good to me, but I think he has given up too easily on the [Page 1240] Trusteeship Council. If Ben Cohen’s formula on “states directly concerned”3 could be utilized so that the Mandatory Power would be the one and only state directly concerned, the difficulty might be overcome.
The difficulties attached to the SC formula seem considerable. While SC might have some justification for considering Arab resistance a threat to the peace, the Arabs could with equal reason contend that enforcement by SC of partition against Arab wishes would be aggression by the SC itself.
Sincerely,
- Letter of November 1 not printed.↩
- This is the paragraph beginning with “It is my hope, Gordon”; see p. 1226.↩
- Mr. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, enunciated his formula at an informal meeting of the United States Group on Trusteeship at London on January 17, 1946. His view was that “it was up to the State with administrative responsibilities to take the initiative.” (Minutes of the Group, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, pp. 554, 557) The Counselor again defined this term at the meeting of the Secretary’s Staff Committee on April 20, 1946, “to mean only the state immediately administering or in control of the territory.” (Minutes of the Committee, ibid., pp. 569, 572)↩