Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

IO Files: US/A/AC.14/SC.1/9

Memorandum by Mr. M. Gordon Knox to the United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)¹

secret

[New York,] November 4, 1947.

The following is an analysis of the Russian proposals on Palestine.² At first sight, it would appear that a compromise could be found between the Russian proposals, and those suggested by the United States. The differences are seemingly not great. Furthermore, most states hope that the remarkable agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the Palestine question can be continued. Also it is a foregone conclusion that at the present time, unless the Russian bloc agrees with the United States regarding support for a specific partition plan, there will be no partition at all, since there will be no two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.

Nevertheless, examination of the Russian proposals makes one wonder whether the Russians want partition or whether it is chaos they seek in Palestine. The Russian plan envisages the following things happening:

1. British troops would have no legal authority in Palestine after December 31, 1947. The troops, therefore, would have no basis for maintaining order; they would be welcomed or unwelcomed guests as the case may be. Their equivocal position during a period of civil strife might make them a target for abuse and attack which would tend to weaken law and order in Palestine, and damage British prestige in the Middle East.

2. British administration would cease to function on January 1, 1948, and twenty-five years of experience would be thrown to one side and replaced by a United Nations commission which would have no substantive experience on which to base its decisions and administrative acts. The outcome would be that persons representing eleven different nations which presumably would be at logger-heads, would be called upon to manage an area torn by civil strife.

Under paragraph four of the Russian proposals a loophole exists whereby the authority of this Special Commission, even if the Special Commission could agree on certain administrative decisions, could be challenged and appeals could be made from the Special Commission’s decisions to the Security Council which is its parent body. In the Security Council, there is the veto. For instance combining paragraphs four and five of the Russian proposals, the Special Commission would determine the boundary of the Jewish and Arab States. If the Arab state were displeased with the boundary decision and if the Russian member of the Special Commission had been in the minority when the particular frontier was voted on, the Arab state could refuse to abide by the decision of the Special Commission and challenge the Special Commission to seek support for its boundary line in the Security Council. The Arab state could hope that a Russian veto would cause the Security Council to repudiate the Special Commission’s decision. There would be a ripe opportunity for the Arab state or the Arab League to offer political concessions to the Soviet Union in return for a Russian veto of a particular boundary decision, or any other decision which might be unfavorable to the Arab state.

Similarly, under paragraph six of the Russian proposals the Special Commission would elect a Provisional Council of Government for both the Jewish and the Arab states. Here again the very personnel of the Provisional Council would be dependent on Russian approval. The Provisional Council would not be elected by the inhabitants of the Jewish and Arab states, but by the Commission. Under paragraphs six, seven, eight and nine, of the Russian proposals a complicated procedure is established whereby the Provisional Council elected by the Special Commission and operating under the general direction of the Special Commission would hold elections to a Constituent Assembly in the Arab and Jewish states. Since the election rules in each state would be subject to the approval of the Special Commission, the effect would be that the Constituent Assembly might be largely the creation not of the electors, but of the Special Commission. Furthermore, the only frame of reference guiding the Special Commission in determining what kind of elections in [to?] the Constituent Assembly should be held would be that said elections should be held on “democratic lines”: Past experience in Germany, Austria and Korea shows how widely divergent are the views of the West and the Soviet Union regarding “democratic lines”.

The next step under the Russian proposals would be to have the Constituent Assemblies draft “democratic constitutions” and elect governments for the Jewish and Arab states. It is not clear, however, what authority these governments would have. In any case at least under the transitional period, the provisional councils would establish local administrative organs of government under the supervision of the Special Commission. However, these Provisional Councils would have no control over the armed militia and, therefore, would have no means of enforcing their decisions. According to paragraph ten of the Russian proposals, the Provisional Councils would form the armed militia in both of these states but in general the military and political control over the activities of the armed militia would be exercised by the Special Commission.

To summarize, the Russian proposals set up a very cumbersome and highly complicated rule of authority which would be difficult to make function even if the members of the Special Commission could agree among themselves; even if there were no inherent right of appeal from the Special Commission to the Security Council and even if it could be assumed that the inhabitants of Palestine were in substantial agreement with the principles of partition and desired by all means to make the partition plan work successfully and smoothly. None of these assumptions exists. Finally, this question can be asked: If this elaborate Russian plan of a Special Commission electing Provisional Councils which in turn hold elections to establish Constituent Assemblies which drafts constitutions and elects governments, fails to be carried out within the twelve months maximum period, does this mean that the Special Commission continues to exercise authority over Palestine after the end of the twelve months period? Also, how can the Special Commission enforce its regulations when it only has the right to give orders to both Jewish and Arab armed militia and no other means of making sure that said orders will be carried out? With the termination of British authority on January 1, 1948, and removal of physical presence of British troops not later than April 30, 1948, there will be no means for the Special Commission to proceed with its alleged duty of setting up two independent states against the wishes of the majority of inhabitants of Palestine, except by appealing to the Security Council for force. The Security Council at present has no force which can act, since Article 43 of the Charter has not been implemented. Action can be taken under Article 106 but the presence of troops of the Great Powers in Palestine would be extremely dangerous to the peace and security of that area, and perhaps lead to the division of Palestine into zones, and the repetition of the disastrous results which followed the dividing up of Germany, Austria and Korea.

I think that the United States should make it clear that it can not and will not support the Russian plan: that there can be no compromise between the Russian and American plans, but that if the Russian proposals were to be used as a basis for discussion they must be completely rewritten. I can see the advantage of having the partition plan as generally agreed upon, labelled the Russian plan rather than the American plan. But in that case I suggest that the Russian proposals be stripped of the following weaknesses:

1. The link to the Security Council

2. The elimination of British control prior to independence

3. The creation of a United Nations control body (the Special Commission) which has no means of carrying out its orders and which, therefore, has responsibility without having authority.

1. Addressed also to General Hilldring.
2. See telegram 1141, supra.