Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BB Summaries/11–447: Telegram

[Extract]

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret

New York, November 4, 1947—2:59 a. m.

1141.

Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Subcommittee 1 (12th and 13th Meetings)

The USSR presented to the Subcommittee on Nov. 3 a 10-point proposal on implementation of the Palestine partition plan, recommending a one-year transitional period, during which the administration would be under the control of the SC. Detailed plans for setting up the independent Arab and Jewish states were also set forth in the Soviet plan. At its afternoon meeting the Subcommittee approved the majority of the Economic Union section of the UNSCOP Report.

At the outset, Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that the US proposals on the pre-independence period meant that the administration of Palestine would be ensured by UK and that British troops would remain until the Arab and Jewish states became independent. Under the US proposals all measures preparatory to independence would be carried out by the UK, while it was a fact that the UK’s mandatory system over Palestine had failed. In the USSR view “it is incorrect and does not correspond to the task of forming independent Arab and Jewish states to create such a situation in which all the preparatory measures in Palestine would be entrusted to the UK and put under its control, even if the UK would offer its services.”

Quoting statements by Creech Jones (UK) on the UK attitude on implementation of UN recommendations, Tsarapkin said these statements did not leave any place for doubt that the UK would not implement a decision which was not agreed to by both parties. As it was known that the Arabs had rejected partition, it appeared clear that referral of the preparatory measures for setting up the two states to the UK would lead to a situation in which both states would remain on paper.

As for the UN commission proposed by US, Tsarapkin observed that it was obvious that such a commission with such limited functions would be powerless and would only be a cover under the UN flag. He maintained that the UN could not agree to placing the problem into the hands of only one power. Acceptance of the US proposals, he said, would lead to the undermining of the Palestine problem, and the USSR could not agree with the US proposals on implementation, nor did it believe these proposals could serve as the basis for solution of the problem.

Tsarapkin then presented the following 10-point program on the structure of Palestine: (1) the British Mandate to be abrogated as from Jan. 1, 1948; (2) UK troops to be withdrawn from Palestine within the shortest time possible, but not more than four months after the abrogation of the Mandate; (3) between the termination of the Mandate and independence, a transitional period of as short a period as possible, with a maximum length of a year; (4) UN administration of Palestine during the transitional period “in the person of the SC” which should exercise the administration through a special commission composed of the representatives of SC members, the commission having its seat in Palestine; (5) on arrival in Palestine the commission should carry out measures for the establishment of Arab-Jewish frontiers in accordance with the GA decision; (6) after consultation with the democratic parties and social organizations of the two states, the special commission should elect in both states a provisional council of government, the activities of both councils to be carried out under the general direction of the commission; (7) both provisional councils should hold elections along democratic lines to the constituent assembly not later than six months after their formation, with the election regulations to be elaborated by the councils and approved by the special SC commission, (8) the constituent assembly of each state should work out a democratic constitution of its state and elect a government; (9) both provisional councils should proceed under the supervision of the special commission to establish administrative organs of government, central and local; and (10) both provisional councils should within the shortest possible time form an armed militia from the citizens of their states, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes. This militia, in its operative respect, should be under command of its national commanding personnel, but general military and political control over its activities should be exercised by the special commission, Tsarapkin explained.

Discussing the USSR proposals, Johnson declared that condemnation of the US plan as one which would sabotage the whole program was without substantial evidence. He observed that the USSR plan varied only in minor details from the US proposals. Pointing out that the problem of Arab rejection of any plan of partition would likewise arise in the USSR plan, Johnson said that the dilemma of this GA was to get a plan to which both parties would agree. He failed to see any advantage to be gained from prolonging the transitional period. He questioned whether it would be possible for UK troops to get out of Palestine in four months, Johnson further declared that an inexperienced commission in a troubled area like Palestine would have a most difficult task.¹

Johnson expressed the hope that the Arab state would have an enlightened view of its own self-interest. In case the Arab state did not accept the proposals, he declared that some other arrangement would have to be worked out, perhaps involving continuation of the UN Commission as a Trusteeship Authority. The period when the proposed SC commission would be in Palestine after the UK troops had left would be a difficult time. He appealed to the Subcommittee to set up the independent states as soon as possible.

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Austin

1. Telegram 1152, November 5, from New York, reported that the United States Delegation discussed the Soviet proposals and that “While it was agreed that it would be highly undesirable to endow an organ of the SC with full governing powers in Palestine, it was recognized that the prospects for approval of a partition plan in the Assembly would be prejudiced if it proved impossible for the US and the USSR to reach agreement in the Ad Hoc Subcommittee. Ambassador Johnson was authorized to continue to press for adoption of the US plan, preserving a flexible attitude to permit future compromise if necessary.” (501.BB/11–547) This wording was incorporated in the United States Delegation Decisions, November 5, under US/A/M/60, 10 files.

   In a memorandum of November 6 to Ambassador Johnson, Mr. Knox indicated that this wording did not present a clear picture of what had transpired at the meeting. He concluded that the following addition would clarify it: “It was emphasized, however, that the United States would not agree to any plan (short of action taken under Chapter VII of the Charter) which placed the administration of Palestine under the Security Council and thereby gave the Soviet Union a negative control over its development through use of, or threat to use, the veto power.” (USUN files)