867N.01/10–1547
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
| Participants: | The British Ambassador |
| Mr. Lovett | |
| Mr. Wailes1 |
The British Ambassador called by appointment at 12 o’clock today and handed me the attached memorandum2 listing certain points [Page 1182] which Mr. Creech Jones proposed to include in a further statement on Palestine to be made by him in the near future. I asked the Ambassador if a copy of this document had been made available to our delegation in New York, and he replied that he was not sure, but that he would see that this was done.
The Ambassador then said that he had been instructed to make the following oral observations on the subject of Palestine:
- 1.
- His Government wondered whether we had given full consideration to the implementation of the proposed majority solution. He then described at some length the severe fighting, and difficulties the British had encountered in the Arab revolt of 1934 or 19353 and said this now led his Government to believe that a volunteer constabulary in Palestine would hardly be sufficient to handle any major Arab disturbances. I replied that this phase of the Palestine problem had been given the most careful consideration by this Department, other interested agencies and top officials of the Government. I inquired whether the Ambassador’s comments meant that the British delegation was not going to support the majority plan and the Ambassador replied rather evasively that he was not sufficiently versed in the voting technique at the United Nations to know whether a country directly involved in the problem, such as the United Kingdom was in the Palestine situation, would be expected to vote or not.
- 2.
- The Ambassador then inquired whether we had given consideration to the time element involved in the maintenance of peace through the volunteer constabulary. I replied that we likewise had given serious thought to this matter and mentioned that the majority report referred to a two-year transitional period. The Ambassador stated that the serious problem with respect to the Arabs might last for an indefinite period, and I said that we appreciated this fact. The Ambassador stressed the point that serious difficulties with the Arab world would naturally affect British and American interests in the area, the general defense situation, et cetera. I said that we realized the dangers inherent in any plan which was not entirely acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, as well as the dangers which would exist if we did nothing. I pointed out that his Government had played a prominent part in proposing a committee of inquiry and that the majority plan was the result thereof.
- 3.
- The Ambassador stated that his Government wondered whether we had considered the question of the viability of the Jewish state from the standpoint of defense and of the Arab state from the economic point of view. I replied that we had also given these matters careful consideration.
- 4.
- The Ambassador said that he had been greatly surprised at the position taken by the Soviet Government with respect to the majority report. He frankly failed to see what they would gain by it. In fact assuming that their desire was to stir up trouble, it would seem that it would be better if they were to back up the Arabs as the Arabs had felt they were going to do. I said that we, too, were mystified as to the reasons for the Soviet position.
[Here follows the final paragraph dealing with a matter other than Palestine.]
- Edward T. Wailes, Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.↩
- Infra.↩
- The Arab revolt began in 1936.↩
- For the summary record of the statement made by Mr. Creech Jones before the Ad Hoc Committee on October 16, see GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 96–98.↩
- Ambassador Johnson’s statement of October 11; see editorial note, p. 1180.↩